

South Asian Studies

Volume 45 No. 1 Jan.-June, 2010



Editor
B.C. Upreti

BI-ANNUAL JOURNAL
OF
SOUTH ASIA STUDIES CENTRE
University of Rajasthan
Jaipur

SOUTH ASIA STUDIES CENTRE
University of Rajasthan

Contents

1. Afghanistan : 'Towards' A Sustainable State ? Ambrish Dhaka 1-21
 2. Climate Change, Gender and Migration : The Vulnerabilities and Insecurities of Women in Southern Part of Bangladesh Razia Sultan 22-46
 3. Environmental Security in South Asian Region : Issues and Challenges Kirti Singh Chauhan 47-69
 4. Socio-Economic Implications of Maoist Conflict in Nepal Archana Sharma 70-98
- Notes Memoranda**
5. Understanding Domestic Violence Anupama Kaushik 99-107
- Book Review**
1. Thomas L Friedman, The World is Flat, Penguin Books, 2006, Reviewed by Dr. Ambrish Dhaka. 108-114

Afghanistan: 'Towards A Sustainable State?'

Amrisha Dhaka

Introduction

The countryside conspicuous of war ravaged humanity and desolate faces with deep buried pain of countless losses spending an era with no noticeable development; and then there is a sudden passage of meteor on 9/11 that turns it into the landscape of hope, a hope to survive in peace and satisfaction for coming generations. This is no metaphor considering from the point of view of the Afghans, who saw no end to their travails until the dawn of the 21st century. Ascribed as a failed state, Afghanistan had gone into oblivion bearing the ascription of a failed society too; something, which they desisted and resisted all through the pressures of *jihad*. Despite their ethnic pluralism and infighting among the groups, no one has ever shown willingness for a separate homeland, a typical characteristic for any failed nation-state, wherein, if there are plural nationalities. Like a true game of *Buzkashi*, they have competed for the single ascendancy towards power and profits, often aligning into groups against each other. Such has been the backdrop of Bonn Peace Process in which every shade of influence was tried to include so as securing a maximum guarantee for its successful implementation. Another important feature of this negotiation was the huge amounts of aid pledged for Afghanistan. In fact, it is believed to be one of the gluing points between the rivals. The donors finally offered \$ 4.5 billion at the Tokyo

Summit in January 2002. This huge sum was to be spent through various heads and appeared a sufficient opportunity to regurgitate the countrywide administration that hitherto found appended to the warlords.

The division of power in Afghanistan between the "northern alliance" and the Pushtun nation can be seen in every calculation of the global community while setting agenda for peace in Afghanistan. The Cold War divide of USSR-US and their allies runs deep into Afghanistan. The Tajik led northern alliance has been traditionally supported by Russia, Iran and India; whereas the Pushtun dominated Taliban had backing from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and covertly from the US too¹. The 9/11 did a severe damage to latter combination and for the first time US and Pakistan had come to terms with the several other geopolitical partners in the region, including Russia, Iran and India. The Bonn Agreement was signed on 5 December 2001, as a first step towards the establishment of a broad based, gender sensitive, multi ethnic and fully representative government.² It emerged with a cabinet chaired by Hamid Karzai and five other vice-chairpersons including Seema Samar as one of the women candidate. But the far greater emphasis was conspicuous on the ethnic balance that was sole guarantee to any trust building in the process. This has been a base line to all the Bonn process and other power set up negotiations.³ But one needs to ponder whether is it not the case of being all too apprehensive of the maturity of Afghan factions that the basic bargaining positions are all considered as simply the respective clan, tribal, regional affinities rather what could have been elsewhere a classic situation in a conflict zone.⁴ The rationale behind this kind of structuring has been to move towards a sustainable state based on ethno-federalism which could only be the

Vol. 45, No. 1, Jan. – June, 2010

guarantee to any stabilising trends. Radnitz quotes Horowitz, who identifies five basic tenets of ethno-federalism as a) dispersal of conflict from single point to multiple points thus reducing the geo-centrality and intensity of the conflict, b) shift of conflict from inter-ethnic bases to intra-ethnic bases, c) creation of incentive for inter-ethnic cooperation, d) ethnic lines of cleavage weaken and systemic cleavages emerge, and e) reduction of economic disparity between groups and increases disparity within groups.⁵ This pre-emptive mindset has often been seen as regressive step short of attaining a fully operational state in Afghanistan. There is also an attempt to push parallel strategies of state building by engaging the elite and their pressure groups into power sharing and on the other dispensing the social duties towards citizens through international aid and grant that would enable them to ordain the statehood at the later stage, to which they would be accountable for. But, the relationship between the two is weak as Afghanistan still cannot claim a functional democracy. There is another way round the state structure and it is more widespread and conspicuous in the countryside. The local warlords have been able to have their say in all the flow of aid and their selective targeting and besides the recent elections to the Wolesi Jirga have also made it clear that democracy still cannot run across the wishes and interests of the country elite. Adding to the crisis is the question of economic revival and rebuilding the Afghan economy, which heavily hinges upon the mono-cropping of opium. The warlords have been relying for funds on opium trade and also usurping cash revenue from mineral wealth, timber and road tolls.⁶ Amid this milieu, the issue of gender and civil society are easily left out, but the concerns are important for the fact that they constituted the root cause of the fall of Taliban and the present change.

Vol. 45, No. 1, Jan. – June, 2010

This paper attempts to look at the impact of the US presence in Afghanistan post 9/11 and now the major objective of its presence in the region. The Bonn Agreement has provided the warring groups to once again look Afghanistan in cohesion, but how far they have been able to do so is to be verified. It means the reassessment of the old relations between various ethnic groups and their traditional geopolitical positions, to what extent this factors into the viability of the state. The millennium development goals charted out in the Vision 2020 document alongwith the Afghanistan Compact identifies three important and complimentary areas or pillars of activity as, a) security, b) governance, rule of law and human rights and c) economic and social development.⁷ It remains to be seen how the various aid and assistance programme in Afghanistan can raise prospects for attaining these goals.

The US's Global War on Terror' in South Asia

Prof. C.R. Mohan writing for *The Washington Quarterly* contended that though the immediate objectives of the US's war on terrorism is conspicuous, what is still unclear is its ability and sincerity to focus on the deeper conflicts that have plagued the region. This undoubtedly hints at the Kashmir question, and also adding to it the fact that 'the region itself has been more receptive than ever before to the new US engagement.'⁸ The CIA in its important vision paper has outlined the role of population and its democratic strength as strategic vantage points against the traditional pursuance of its interest in inner Asia and the Pacific. This has been one of the key identification for its presence in South Asia so as to control the human resource flow from this region in its favour. And, the US presence in Afghanistan forms a very first and significant step

Vol. 45, No. 1, Jan. – June, 2010

in realising this goal. South Asia has both the good and the bad of human good. The most talented youth from the region is contributing to the superpower status of the US, and so is the other disappointed section, which sees the US as a source of disruption to their life and philosophy, and are bent upon humiliating it. But, this alone does not justify US presence in the region, a much important agenda is setting the world order in which China and Russia too are equal weights and now often react in tandem to its global overtures. The US needs South Asia for two objectives: one, it needs for sustaining its internal economies of scale and second, to raise the marginal cost of destabilising its global dominance, hitherto speculated for.

The withdrawal of Unocal from the TAP gas pipeline was a harbinger of sorts, if not the fall of the giant Buddhas. The void left by the Soviets in 1989 was still unorganized as the legitimacy of rule was still at bay, when there was complete breakdown of Afghan nationalism. The period of 90s was a total dismal one for an average Afghan, who was declared as a defunct citizen beyond the civilized world and a nation declared total failure. It was only at the turn of century that the low engagement policy of Clinton administration was suddenly given up by George Bush Jr. and the opportunity came in with the 9/11 attack. It was not that the US had not been engaging terrorists before, in fact since the Kuwait crisis, the US perceptive greed for oil became one of the explanations of its desire to control the Arab world and its reluctance to limit its strategic partner Israel in the region. Thus, it provides sufficient cause for the Cold War Islamic veterans to field back their tactics against the very country who funded and facilitated them. And, the Operation

Vol. 45, No. 1, Jan. – June, 2010

Enduring Freedom and Anaconda were the first of the instalments credited to the victors of Cold War, who had funded these forces of terror. The talks for retrenching the idiosyncratic governance of Taliban had failed with Pakistan still feeling its strength as able negotiator between the US and the fundamentalists in Afghanistan. The US military movement practically started on 7 October 2001, when initial bombings took with the onset of 'Operation Enduring Freedom'. The whole operation had attained one stage of military success after the capitulation of Kandhar on 9 December 2001 and the feeling of Taliban leader Mullah Omar. The military success had very vital geo-strategic component i.e., the crucial role played by Northern Alliance. It was not the first time that the Alliance had been the crucial in turning force. The fall of Najibullah government was hastened by these forces under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Masood in 1992.

The US and the coalition started dismantling the Taliban regime largely aimed at a) destroying Al-Qaeda's grip on Afghanistan by driving the Taliban from power, b) disrupt Al-Qaeda's global operations and terrorist financing networks, c) destroy Al-Qaeda terrorist training camps, d) help Afghanistan recover from the Taliban's reign of terror, e) help Afghans put aside long-standing differences to form a new interim government that represents all Afghans, including women.⁹ The obvious limitation was how to control the disfigured landscape which was very tricky both in terrain and men. The first policy shift was visible when the US accepted the Northern Alliance as a possible force who could be utilised for destroying the Al-Qaeda network and other terrorist groups. This also brought it to a condition where it would have to reassure the

world community that this time its involvement, which it had sought on the basis of global support against terrorism would mean stability in the region and a conclusive action of its adventure there. Although, the practical implications for the common Afghan were once again the same, i.e., more and more civilian deaths due to bombings and large scale displacement. The attitude of international community in providing the assistance had been generous. But, it came with a very interesting phenomenon of structuring nationalism, or engendering the economics of nationalism, by helping them to come together for want of the aid.

Parsing the Political Bait on Ethnic Lines

The war on terror had unfolded the clay feet of Taliban. They quickly abandoned the abode which they cherished to transform in a model Islamic state. The much awaited opportunity came for northern alliance, which advanced quickly into the retreating Taliban's footsteps. This dilly dallying of power game was immediately intervened by the US embarking upon immediate global consensus on its leadership over reconstructing Afghanistan. The September 9/11 had set the ground for US to legitimize its excessive presence in the region. The UN Security Council Resolution 1383 endorsed the Bonn process that had formulated a 30 member governing authority. It is interesting that apart from the few top northern alliance leaders, most of these filled in posts had leaders who were hitherto unknown to common Afghan masses or were of minuscule consequence so far as resolving the Afghan conflict was concerned. In fact, the days before 9/11 one of the most significant eventuality was the murder of Ahmed Shah Masood, perhaps the possible ruler of Afghanistan. A visible attempt to find a sustainable Pushtun leadership

was in place for most obvious reasons, a) to garner the mass support from the majority Pushtuns, and b) gain balance vis-a-vis northern alliance, which was obviously equally autonomous in its political choices, and perhaps even closer to its financiers, i.e., Russia, India and Iran. There was initial dissatisfaction amongst the northern alliance leadership, in fact, the talks were highly unsure, until their masters successfully bargained with the US-EU led initiative. In fact, the Bonn agreement allowed eleven positions for Pushtuns, eight to the Tajiks, five to Hazaras and the Uzbeks were given three. This obviously reflects the increased space rewarded to northern alliance for their role against Taliban.¹⁰ The influence is also visible in constitution of Afghan National Police. The restructuring efforts commenced in December 2005 followed by rigorous selection process finally identified 31 generals for senior most positions. It included 12 Pushtun, 16 Tajik, 2 Hazaras and 1 Uzbek. They are to play key role in further extension of the structure, taking care of vetting out the human right violators of previous Taliban regime.¹¹

The present situation in Afghanistan is significantly comparable to the 1992 situation. The only difference has been that Taliban were no Najib that would handover power. In fact, they brutally murdered him on 27 September 1996, after taking over Kabul. And, also this time US has a role accountable not only within the region, but also towards the global community that no longer would carry along with him in some cold war rhetoric. The forces present in Kabul have been prevented to occupy the space that had been left by Taliban. The April 1992, Peshawar Accords had led to the formation of government chiefly concerned with the division of powers between the Hizb and Jamiat political groupings. Mujadidi

Vol. 45, No. 1, Jan. – June, 2010

became President on 28 April 1992 and the following day 29th April, Ahmed Shah Masud entered Kabul with 'an army of several thousand men and a hundred tanks'.¹² The gradual discontent between the Hizb and the Jamiat soon became conspicuous as rivalry between Hikmatyar and Masud. This personification of *Jihad* led to cultism followed by ethnicization of conflict, the hitherto irreversible process.

The maturation of ethno-territorial identities of warring parties was a new phenomenon at the time of Bonn Accord. Hence, governance in Afghanistan was a catch-22 situation. The armed factions, who made the US job easy were not willing to give up their militia capacity as their role in set up was not ascertained with top leadership. The crisis on the other hand was that none of the Pushtun leadership had grass root support sufficient enough to alienate the Taliban. In fact, President Hamid Karzai seems to be most heavily guarded president after the US's. The whole programme of convening a Loya Jirga and then moving towards the Presidential and Parliamentary elections find a situation of pitched battle alongside ethnic dynamics. The electoral process disallowed any political campaigning along party lines or pressure group, disallowing any possible mitigation of ethno-personal non-allegiance to warlords. Afghanistan can at best be the case of quasi-democracy as the President always has a third of his men in the upper house. And, the lower house is more of a municipal kind of body, where parties are merely for the name sake and the individualism has been highly maintained in order to isolate or alienate a potential challenge to Karzai's leadership. This has been verified by the fact that the system of proportional representation has been given a go by in the recent parliamentary elections, pre-empting the possibility of erstwhile mujahideen groups to entrain into mainstream politics. And, quite

Vol. 45, No. 1, Jan. – June, 2010

paradoxically the talks are on with the Taliban so as to get them into 'mainstream' politics, the only identified political grouping other than northern alliance.

Humanitarian Intervention, Aid and its political benefits

Bonn Agreement had been sandwiched into hefty loaves of financial aid promised to Afghanistan re-construction. The UN General Assembly immediately took stock of the situation in its 56th session discussing report on 'Emergency international assistance for peace, normalcy and reconstruction of war-stricken Afghanistan', 7 December 2001. It highlighted that at the time of initiating action nearly 17 out of 28 provinces were in grip of drought and famine. A three year consecutive of poor precipitation had wrecked rural life with general crops failures and wiping live-stocks, and overall depletion in people's assets and inventories. This had been augmented to critical levels by selective targeting of ethnic minorities by the Taliban during its rule. The provinces of Takhar, Bamian, Baghlan, Kunduz, Ghowr and Badghis were worst hit due to this Taliban-made famine. Afghanistan had a major share of its income coming from opium cultivation prior to the advent of Taliban. This was thwarted, but in effect it created scarcity that led to the major breakdown of rural economy. Their recent upsurge is all due to this historic experience. There it needs to provide rural infrastructure and employment opportunities prior to dissuasion from opium cultivation. Afghanistan's another major economic activity is quarrying. This extractive economy has been suited to local warlords who have been prospering at the cost of national resources.

The initial aid programme focussed on getting Afghanistan out of poverty-hunger trap. Therefore, large scale schemes were offered under World Food Programme (WFP), viz., food-for-work (ffw) or food-for-education (ffe). These were especially channelized in areas controlled by northern alliance regions. Even before the fall of Taliban, the humanitarian assistance had major presence in the northern alliance held areas. A major programme to check the malaria epidemic was launched under the aegis of WHO. The WHO under the Malaria Roll Back Initiative (MRBI) had been providing training to local personnel in Faizabad and Kunduz provinces. Similarly, steps for capacity building for Basic Development Needs (BDN) and Primary Health Centres (PHC) have been taken in the provinces of Gazni, Paktia, Paktika and Khost. A survey for Acute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP) was conducted by WHO in 1997 and then again in 2004 has recorded a breakthrough progress with reduction from 100s cases few years back, to just three wild poliovirus cases in 2004. According to the WHO Report, "this achievement has only been made by relentless efforts in upgrading the Acute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP) surveillance system in Afghanistan with more than 450 sentinel sites and about 4400 reporting points at village level all over the country. Thus making a root level structure of not only sentinel site surveillance but also community based reporting."¹³

But, there is still long term policy operative needed to downscale some of grievous social health indicators. Only 15% of deliveries are attended by trained hands. Nearly, half of the Afghan progeny is stunted due to acute malnutrition, also added is the fact the war has engrained some or the other kind of stress factor in nearly half of the Afghan

population. Only, a quarter of the population has access to safe drinking water and only a fifth with access to sanitation. This demands one of widest possible humanitarian assistance to a nation with two and half decades of attrition. Some of the effective programmes for rehabilitation and reintegration of migrants have proved vital to successful implementation of Bonn Accord. The National Solidarity Programme (NSP) has been initiated with offices in Herat and Farah Provinces and NSP Consultants in Parwan, Bamyan, Wardak and Paktika. The National Emergency Employment Programme (NEEP)-Rural Access was launched on 28 September 2003. The National Area Based Development Programme (NABDP) projects are ongoing in Balkh, Faryab, Jawzjan, Kabul, Khost, Laghman, Nangahar, Paktya, Parwan, Samangan and Takhar. According to the Global IDP Database of the Norwegian Refugee Council Report, there are 79 projects designed to respond to the 'needs identified via the Provincial Planning Exercise (including 6 in poppy eradicated areas). The Ogata Initiative funds shall cover water needs in Nangahar, Balkh and Kandahar via NABDP channels. And, Provincial Planning Exercise (PPE) has resulted in the design of 227 projects, most of which will be implemented through national programmes (64 by NEEP and 79 by NABDP)."¹⁴

The other crucial mode of intervention has been the financial assistance promised to Afghanistan government. This has been in fact the life support system for the current state. However, there is a need to have a national public-economy that can sustain its administration organisation. This requires a certain amount of revenue collection from the bases of economy, which are still very shaky in Afghanistan. Much of the economy

is illegal and illegitimate and for the time being it is not feasible to abruptly pull the rug from below the feet. The first attention has been focussed on creation of national assets through construction activities. This shall not only provide roads, power, telecom and buildings for schools, hospitals and other institutions, but also create an employment opportunity for the masses to get linked with the state. Although, Afghan government has been very keen on seeking the private partnership in these sectors, but it is very unlikely if there is any local entrepreneurship is available and the global community shall only seek a venture when there is a market. Therefore, the aid promised if implemented by the state with full commitments can deliver the goods at the right time. However, there is also a crisis of dual governance in Afghanistan. A significant section of the promised aid is being contracted out to western companies or the NGOs. These obviously are accruing not to the state accounts, and for obvious reasons the Afghan government might find itself limited with the scope of extension of state revenue.

Structuring the Democracy

Afghanistan's recommitment to democracy is a much speculated affair. The groups and power interests involved are at heavy odds against a civil society negating them. In fact, much of the exercise to de-eflicate them was done already in the present electoral process conducted under the new constitution and Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB). The overall emphasis was to deprive traditional political groups any significant role and identity. A democracy hitherto abhorred by the west and quite paradoxically exemplified by socialist countries. The party/less election of President, the Wolesi Jirga and the Provincial Councils exposed the dual

crisis in the return of democracy in Afghanistan. There is always a fear that the parties formed during the *Jihad* days might give a call for mobilisation in political process, stifling the civil society reconstruction. Both, Hizb-i-Islami and disbanded Taliban forces had regrouped to disrupt the elections.¹⁵ In fact, much of the voting went along the ethnic lines with the conditioning of votes both across Iran and Pakistan, where practically one sided vote went in favour of Karzai. The elections in Afghanistan clearly showed the interpolation of strategic motives to a persistent quest for geopolitical space in Eurasia and the near Asian neighbourhood, and any such kind of a stability defying these objectives would be undesirable by the US policy makers. In other words, the programme for *Democracy-the Limited Edition* has been the case for Afghanistan. The election process in Afghanistan has remained under supervision of UNAMA, while IAEC and JEMB have been the implementing agency. The voter registration programme was a unique effort as approximately over 10.5 million voters were registered, and some 9 million of them participated.¹⁶ This apart, preparations to successfully conduct the elections was also a big task. It meant resource mobilisation and management, operational support, polling, risk management, public outreach and facilitation of international electoral observation.

The political process is also supported by judicial and administrative reforms, both vital wheels of running the state system. Italy has been the leading donor to judicial reforms project. The UNDP is assisting coordination of funding to Judicial Reform Commission. The Priority Reform and Restructuring (PRR) Programme is in second stage of process that involves recruitment of some 1500 positions of law faculty

and specialists. Besides, the UNDP has provided support for Law Curriculum Development. The Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCS) is a principal body set up for administration reforms.¹⁷ It has so far been able to come up with a draft training policy highlighting a new approach to leadership development, creating a senior group of leaders and creation of competency models that would serve further guidelines for Afghan Civil Service. Another step taken by IARCS has been the preparation of a new Civil Service Law. The Afghan Government in its National Development Framework (NDF) has committed to regional economic development, capacity development and other immediate recovery projects. A generation of such projects with the UNDP has been aimed to revive the countryside governance.

Afghanistan's basic conflict situation does not get addressed right at the moment. The most important task remains to be done that had in fact half begun by the PDP-A regime as post--Saur revolution measure, but quickly wilted under the scorching heat of cold war machinations. The landownership and water resource accessibility is the prime source of regional discord and the ethnic conflict. The warlordism also sustains on deliverance of these rights. It shall be seen how the Karzai government and the global interventionists help resolve this traditional dispute that is one of the most ancient source of conflict aptly identified by Karl Marx in one of his articles written on the Asiatic mode of production.

New Eucumene in Neighbourhood

Afghanistan being a landlocked country has inevitable relationship with its neighbours. This also lurks from the facts of history that the region has been subject to influences from three different cultural

realms; an important determinant to its nationalism and consolidation. This in part also reveals the cold war legacy, where it had to fall back into ethno-cultural space provided by Iran and Pakistan.¹⁸ Despite the fact that both of them contest the Afghan space as patrons. Iran has often been frustrated by the US support to Pakistan in pre and post 9/11 periods, as well. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan created a further rift when Pakistan under Zia's leadership drew much closer to the US and Iran gradually had to take side with Russia in post-Geneva Accord period. Thus, they together determine much of Afghanistan's destiny. This influence has gone beyond the international norms of interaction between nations. Today, the role played by Pakistan and Iran has been creating new power situations in Afghanistan, where the ethnic and other considerations are in grip of these states. And, they can raise or lower the levers of conflict at their wish.¹⁹ Another, important influence has been cultivation of the hotspots of evil by the US-led west as part of strategic containment of USSR during the cold war days. A matrix initially fed by the US and Pakistan that went decisively against them in Taliban days. The strategy for growth of Al-Qaeda type network so as to create a shatterbelt around Russia, and have more of Kosovos around it backfired into 9/11 fiasco. This has lent into creation of an economy funded by narcotics and gun running in the periphery of Afghanistan, and spilling well into Pakistan too.

Iran has stakes for there is large Shia Hazara minority, whose travail in Afghanistan's reconstruction might probably come to rest this time. Iran's hostility with Taliban accentuated when the Pakistan fed Sipah-i-Sahaba murdered eight Iranian officials in Mazar-i-Sharif in August 1998.²⁰

Vol. 45, No. 1, Jan. – June, 2010

Mazar-i-Sharif massacre reminds of the kind of brutality faced by the Hazaras. Iran's important strategic goal has been to preserve the minority rights and provide a viable bargain to the Hazaras. Any other situation would invite destabilising intentions. The US has been particularly noticing Iran's capability in tilting the balance of power between the Pushtun majority and minorities on the other hand. Iran though cooperated with the global efforts in war against terror, but it refused to allow its soil be used for carrying out any aggression against Afghanistan. This geostrategic cost has been lingering into US calculations in penetrating Eurasia. Brezinski's book *Out of Control* revealed US's shift in doctrine from containment to enlargement. The trilateralism augmented alongwith EU and Japan has backfired in post-9/11 period. And, the bottom line appears to be that 'Russia's unique, cultural, geopolitical, social and economic characteristics make a significant contribution to the process of Eurasian rebirth, while the United States [has] to accept a lesser role.'²¹ Added, is the fact the northern alliance, a wished away partner in the US success in Afghanistan has a tactical support from Iran, alongwith Russia and India.

The Afghan reconstruction debate has once again put these relations into scrutiny. The trade flows across Afghanistan largely depends on illicit and personalised means of guarantee, often priced through local warlords. The significant location of transit routes through Afghanistan makes it an important toll point. And, the state resuscitation efforts need all taxing of the transport funding its expenditure rather ending into the coffers of the warlords. Afghanistan has poor economic base, its major activity, the agriculture is marred with narco-production and another

Vol. 45, No. 1, Jan. – June, 2010

important activity, the mining and quarrying is in grip of smugglers and warlords. A significant amount of precious stones, and marble is taken to Pakistan and in return the food and other life sustaining goods are imported. Another important cold war impact has been the human factor closely binding the states. Nearly, 6 million Afghan refugees are still present and working in Pakistan. Their backward linkages in terms of remittance are important source of support in Afghanistan. This cannot be ignored whilst implementing any policy for state revival. If there aren't any jobs and working conditions no better, then there would be reluctance to repatriation. Consequently, the state might face strong opposition and the latent forces could strike an opportunity in undermining the reconstruction efforts. Business in Afghanistan is a difficult proposition. Firms have reported as much as 8 percent of their sale going into bribe and other pay-off. At present the local Afghan managers are still short in skill of handling the larger business operations, often explained by the fact that only 60 percent of them are secondary or higher secondary education. Trade is more in the form of re-exports of petroleum goods imported earlier. The loss of traditional carpet industry to Peshawar has been one of the biggest damages in the cold war period. It is very difficult how to get these industries back to the native region. One important difference that could make it move out is the infrastructure. Iran, Pakistan and Turkey could be the leaders in investing in such sectors. Turkey had been the largest investor in 2005, while Iran and Pakistan couldn't account for more than 5 percent total of the Afghanistan Investment Support Agency (AISA) approved projects.

Conclusion

The present statuses of efforts are questionable indeed in terms of sustenance and time stands a verifying agent to all the cautious structures laid all through the discourse above. Afghanistan's staggering march to stability is a multi-faceted poignant story. The land and its peoples have shown wisdom but tightly wrapped in passionate zeal to surpass all in the game. This has lent them quick to fallible conclusions. Global community too has dual face of its efforts in reconstruction. At one stretch they seem to so overarching and influencing by plethora of aid and assistance, but their total lack of vision for what kind of Afghanistan they seek to, reveals their inability to grip the aspirations of common Afghans. Perhaps, much relies on time when there is a reliable security environment and a comprehensive intelligentsia is created. A satisfactory strength of skilled manpower is created that could augment the stature of the state and administration. And, a very important caveat that U.S. comes to some kind of stable understanding regarding the separate identification of its needs and the needs of the Afghan people. This separation of concerns at the policy making is important if any delay or miss-stepping in the reconstructing of Afghanistan is to be avoided.

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