International law defines as the province of a state that part of the earth which is subject to the government of the state. Political geography as well is rooted in this definition, but has nothing to do with the clauses and provisos through which international law expands the domain of the state into either the sky or the earth to an indeterminate distance or extends that domain to all ships—particularly warships—which it interprets as a floating part of that state whose flag it flies. For political geography, on the other hand, all of those data are important which concern the extension of the jurisdiction of the state over adjacent seas and those various obligations which, in favoring one state, penetrate and violate the territory of another. Thus those Russo-Persian treaties of 1813 and 1828 through which the Caspian Sea became a "Russian Lake," which Russia "exclusively as hitherto" sails, should not go unnoticed. On maps the Russian boundary must be moved to before the roadsteads of Babol and Rascht as this Russian area of the Caspian Sea actually divides the Persian provinces of Khurasan and Azerbaijan as well as if a Russian province lay between them. The spread of the customs district of the German Empire over Luxembourg should also be pointed out in maps. The exercises of the Sea and Health Police of Austria-Hungary on the coasts of Montenegro cannot be represented on the map, but are greatly emphasized in every geographical description of these countries. Political geography in particular should emphasize the many such cases, for they fix more precisely that in the state which is related to the surface of the earth and is therefore the proper domain of geography, i.e., the region in its geographic sense. Moreover, such conditions are closely related to the spatial growth of states for two reasons: first because they appear at the periphery where such growth usually takes place and for which they pave the way, and second because they are the sign either of preparations for, or the remnants of, a growth process. Inventories of states which depict the territory of the state as a stable, fully fixed object come to this dogmatic and sterile conception primarily through disregard of such ruptures. Consideration of them can only strengthen the single correct conclusion: that in the state we are dealing with an organic nature. And nothing contradicts the nature of the organic more than does rigid circumscription. This is also true for political geography which, to be sure, deals primarily with the fixed bases of popula-
tion movements, but which must never lose sight of the fact that states are dependent both in their size and their form upon their inhabitants, i.e., they take on the mobility of their populations, as is particularly expressed in the phenomena of their growth and decline. Some number of people are joined to the area of the state. These live on its soil, draw their sustenance from it, and are otherwise attached to it by spiritual relationships. Together with this piece of earth they form the state. For political geography each people, located on its essentially fixed area, represents a living body which has extended itself over a part of the earth and has differentiated itself either from other bodies which have similarly expanded by boundaries or by empty space. Populations are in continuous internal motion. This is transformed into external movement, either forward or backward, whenever a fragment of land is newly occupied or an earlier possession is relinquished. We get, then, the impression that a population moves forward or backward as a slowly flowing mass.1 Seldom in known history has it been the case that such movements spread over an unpossessed territory. Usually they lead to penetrations or displacements; or small areas, together with their populations, are combined into larger units without changing their location. In the same manner these larger states disintegrate again, and this process of union and disintegration, of growth and diminution, represents a major portion of the historical movements which are geographically depicted as an interchange of smaller and larger surfaces. Each spatial transformation has unavoidable consequences on all neighboring areas in Europe, as in any part of the globe, and its transmission from one area to another is one of the most potent motifs of historical development. Within this "spatial motif" there are two tendencies: enlargement and reproduction, both of which operate continuously as incitements to mobility. All philosophic theories of historical development are particularly defective in that they have overlooked these immediate conditions of the development of the state. In this respect the so-called developmental theories in particular are incorrect, whether they propose linear, spiral, or other developmental progression. To the aforesaid is added a third motif, establishment, or the nature of the relationship of the state to the land which determines the rate of the growth and in particular, the permanence of its result.

1. The size of the state grows with its culture. The expansion of geographical horizons, a product of the physical and intellectual exertions of countless generations, continually presents new areas for the spatial expansion of populations. To master these areas politically, to amalgamate them and to hold them together requires still more energy. Such energy can be developed only slowly by and through culture. Culture increasingly produces the bases and means for the cohesion of the members of a population and continually extends the circle of those who, through recognition of their homogeneity, are joined together.

Ideas and material possessions disperse from select originating and exit points, find new dispersal routes, and extend their area. In this manner they become the forerunners of the growth of the state, which then utilizes the same routes and fills the same areas. Above all we see a close relationship between political and religious expansion. But even these are surpassed by the enormous influence of commerce which yet today acts as a powerful impetus on all drives toward expansion. Lending support to all of these impulses are population pressures which increase with culture and which, having in their turn promoted culture, lead to expansion due to the pressures of space.

Though the greatest cultures have not always been the greatest state-builders—the formation of states is only one of many manners in which cultural powers may be utilized—all of the great states of the past and of the present belong to the civilized peoples. This is clearly shown by the contemporary distribution of the large states: they are situated in Europe and in the European colonial areas. China is the only state of continental dimensions which belongs to a cultural sphere other than European; at
the same time, however, of all non-European cultural regions, East Asia is the most highly developed.

If we go back to the beginnings of our own culture we find the spheres of the relatively largest states around the Mediterranean, which lands could not, however, build states of continental proportions due to their form and their location in a steppe zone. The amalgamation of several of them into the Persian Empire first brought to life a state the size of which, at about 5,000,000 sq. km., could be compared to European Russia. Egypt, together with its desert areas, was not larger than 400,000 sq. km., and the inhabited areas of Assyria and Babylonia not over 130,000 sq. km. Assyria's greatest, though uncommonly short-lived, expansion covered an area of about three times the size of present-day Germany. Of all the former "World Empires" only the Persian corresponded to this grandiloquent name in that it drew upon the fullness of the Asian continent, particularly Iran, which is five times larger than Asia Minor. Neither the empire of Alexander (4,500,000 sq. km.) nor the Roman Empire (3,300,000 sq. km. at the death of Augustus) achieved this truly Asiatic dimension. The empires of the middle ages, particularly that of Charlemagne and the Roman Empire of the Hohenstaufens, were only fragments of the old Roman Empire, and constituted only a fourth of its area. The feudal system favored the formation of small states in that it divided and subdivided the land like a private estate causing, in the transition to more modern times, a general decay of states. What was left of old Roman spatial concepts died out after two of its presuppositions, learning and commerce, had already expired. From the ruins new formations arose which spread in Europe under the aegis of the equilibrium imposed by the wars. This system aimed at each having essentially the same area, whereas real power was unequally divided. In the lands outside Europe, first in America and Asia, political power spread with the trade, the beliefs, and the culture of Europe. The larger areas of these places formed the basis for states of two or three times the size of the largest which had previously existed. The speeded progress of geographical discoveries and knowledge of peoples permitted the growth of this new world empire over North America, north and south Asia, and Australia in less than 300 years. The relatively uninterrupted increase in population in Europe over the preceding 200 years and the invention of new means of transportation led them continuously to new means and motives for expansion and gave them a cohesion and permanence unheard of in history to that time. The British Empire (and within it Canada and Australia in their own right), the Asiatic-European empire of Russia, the United States of America, China, and Brazil, are states of a heretofore unprecedented size.

Just as the area of the state grows with its culture, so too do we find that at lower stages of civilization peoples are organized in small states. In fact, the further we descend in levels of civilization, the smaller become the states. Thus the size of a state also becomes one of the measures of its cultural level. No primitive state has produced a large state; none even one of the size of a German secondary state. Even among the larger and older powers we find, as in the interior of Indochina, village states of 100 inhabitants. Before the Egyptian occupation, in the nearly 138,000 sq. km. of the Azande territories assessed, Schweinfurth counted—probably not exhaustively—35 states, some of which did not extend beyond village boundaries. A large Azande state such as existed in the middle of the region even in Junker times, was scarcely as large as a third of Baden. Secondary states there were about the size of Waldeck or Lippe. Most, however, were from 3-12 sq. km. and were, in reality, sovereign villages. This was the case prior to that invasion of the entirety of the upper Nile between Nubia and Nyoro and between Darfur and Sennar. As the descriptions of Stuhlmann and Baumann show, it is still the same today in the whole of the north of German East Africa. Even in territories such as Usinje and Ukuundi, inhabited by the Wakuma or Watusi who are renowned as the founders of states, the "village beadle" governs over small independent states of village district size with rustic shortsightedness and impotency. The fragments in which the Romans found the lands of the Rhaetians, the Illyrians, the Gauls and the Teutons, and the Germans those of the old Prussians, the Lithuanians, the Estonians, and the Livonians, were not much above such conditions.

2. Editors' note: This refers to the Germany of the 1890's.
Those peoples of powerful organization whose swarming, locust-like appearance often dealt terror to the young colonies in South Africa and North America also built only small states. Even though they devastated large areas, they lacked the capacity to hold and unite them. At annexation Basutoland comprised 30,000 sq. km., and Zululand 22,000 sq. km. Even these regions would have been reduced still further without the intervention of the whites. The league of the five, later (in 1712) six, tribes of the Allegheny region of North America were the most dangerous enemies of the young Atlantic settlements for more than a hundred years. Their territory occupied perhaps some 50,000 sq. km., though only spottily inhabited, and in 1712 they put 2150 warriors in the field. One need not accept the disparaging deductions of Lewis Morgan to conclude that the empire of Montezuma and the Inca empire were neither large states in the spatial sense, nor were they well integrated states. When we say that the Inca empire at the height of its militant expansion—which it had reached by the time of the arrival of Pizarro—comprised nearly the area of the Roman Empire at the time of Augustus, we must also add: it was nothing more than a loose bundle of conquered tributary states without stable or temporal cohesion, scarcely a generation old and already in disintegration even before the Spaniards overthrew it like a house of cards. Before the Europeans and Arabs had cultivated large states in America, Australia, north Asia, and inner Africa by conquest and colonization, these vast areas were not politically utilized. The political value of their earth lay fallow. Politics as well as agriculture led to a gradual knowledge of the powers that lie dormant in the earth, and the history of every country is that of the progressive development of its geographic conditions. The creation of political power by uniting smaller areas into larger is transmitted as an innovation into the “small-state” lands of the primitive peoples. In the struggles between smaller and larger state orientations which necessarily accompany this phenomenon, and in its disruptive effects, lies one of the main causes of the retrogression of these peoples since their more intimate contact with the cultured populations. That that race which has developed into a state has ended its political minority is called by Mommsen (Röm. Gesch. III, p. 220) a law, “as generally valid and as much a natural law as that of gravity.” The precise expression of this, however, is to be found in the comparison of political areas. What a difference: North America, which today contains two of the largest states on earth, had, at the end of the 16th century, no single state of even secondary size. And what is it to the Papuans of New Guinea that they inhabit the largest habitable island in the world? They have not raised themselves in the least above the rest of the Melanesians, whose lands together do not make up a sixth part of New Guinea. Indeed, without the intervention of the Europeans they would have become increasingly tributary to dwarf-like Tidore (78 sq. km.).

States show then a gradation of size in accordance with their historical age. Among present-day states of continental size only China can be described as being old, and even it acquired the larger portion of its present area (Mongolia and Manchuria, Tibet, Yunnan, western Szechuan, and Formosa) only in the last century. All of the others on the other hand, the Russian Empire, Brazil, the United States, British North America and Australia, arose within the last two and a half centuries, and all of them on land which had formerly been made up of the small states of primitive peoples. The most remarkable trait in the present-day division of the earth—the powerful size of some few states—is a characteristic which has arisen in the last centuries and has been further developed and strengthened in our own time. Andorra is over a thousand years old, and Lichtenstein, as are several minor German states, is one of the oldest in its region. Compared to these, Prussia and Italy are in their first youth.

2. The growth of states follows other manifestations of the growth of peoples, which must necessarily precede the growth of the state. We have referred to diffusions which advance faster than the state; which precede and prepare the ground for it. Without political purpose of their own they come into the closest relationship with the life of states and do not stop at national boundaries. Ranke once said, “Over and above the history of single races I assert that general history has its own principle: it is the principle of the mutual interest of the human race which binds nations together and which dominates them, yet without being involved
in them” (Weltgeschichte, VIII, p. 4). This mutual interest in life lies in the ideas and goods which tend toward trade between peoples. It has seldom been possible for a state to set barriers on either the one or the other. More often the rule has been that these attract states along the same paths which they have already forged. Due to similar drives toward expansion and traveling similar paths, ideas and wares, missionaries and tradesmen often find themselves together. Both bring people closer together, create similarities among them, and thereby prepare the ground for political advancement and unification. Thus we find a coincidence to the point of mutuality in religion, weapons, cottages, domesticated plants, and animals in the states of the Azande even though they are sharply divided by wilderness boundaries. And commonality is still great even among the most distant tribes of North or South America though they give the impression of absolute political foreignness.

All of the ancient states and all states on lower cultural levels are theocracies. In them the spirit world not only dominates individuals, but conditions the state as well. There is no chief without priestly functions, no tribe without its tribal totem, no dynasty which does not boast of its divine origin. The theory of the divine right of kings and of the regional bishoprics is but a dim twilight of this condition. It is not in medieval Islam and Christianity alone that states were founded under the sign of the half-moon and the cross. In modern Africa, over and above state differences, the sphere of Islam looms opposite that of Christendom, and heathendom lies between; the latter consisting of small states as opposed to the large and secondary states of the former. In Europe the church hovered over a general political decay in which “all peoples turned their dissimilarities against one another,” preparing new and greater state formations, while in west Asia and north Africa Islam assumed these tasks.

The fantastically vast spatial notions of the Church at that time indicated a great superiority which, of course, retreated in the same measure as the worldly powers enlarged their scope. With science and trade, the Christian mission had prepared the way for the organization of new states in Africa, etc. by the Europeans. In Germany the lands of the Prussian order show vestiges of the broader purpose with which the church pursued the organization of states, while at the same time disintegration continued unabated in our country.

Primate states are national in the narrowest sense. Their development is directed at the eradication of this limitation, and then returns to the national in a spatially broader sense. The states of the primitive peoples are family states. But the beginnings of their growth are greatly stimulated by their interaction with foreigners. Kinship groups can be a unifying force as far as the distributional area of the tribe extends; but this does not make a nation, even though common language and manners, engendered by apolitical commerce, make political unification easier. In times of advanced intellectual development this commonality comes to consciousness as a feeling for one’s country and then operates toward integration and unification. Since, however, by its nature, this requires greater cultural development than is the case under conditions of rapid religious or mercantile expansion, this commonality comes into earlier conflict with the territorial expansion of the state which, since the Roman Empire for the first time aspired to a cosmopolitan character, has always ultimately triumphed over tribal distinctions. The state, however, recognizes the agglomerative value of national consciousness and seeks to reformulate it as a state consciousness by an artificial amalgamation of peoples in order that they may use it for their own purposes: Pan-Slavism. The Latin family of peoples shows how deeply and how broadly such a process may operate. It must set all cultural powers into operation and is therefore most successful in states which are, at the same time, large cultural regions. The modern, areally large yet fundamentally national state is its most characteristic offspring. Lying between these and the true confined tribal state are the numerous states of the past and the present, the cultural powers of which have been insufficient to unify their mixed ethnographic bases.

Commerce and communication far precede politics which follows in their path and can never be sharply separated from them. Peaceful intercourse is the preliminary condition of the growth of the state. A primitive network of routes must have previously been formed. The idea of uniting neighboring
areas must be preceded by apolitical information. If the state has entered its growth period then it shares, with commerce, an interest in route connections. Indeed, it takes a lead in their systematic formation. The ingenious roads of both the Iranian and the ancient American states are better comprehended in terms of political than of economic geography. Highway and canal systems have, from the time of the mythical rulers of China to the present, had to serve the unification of the state, and every great ruler strove to be a builder of roads. Every commercial route paves the way for political influences, every network of rivers provides a natural organization for state development, every federal state allots commercial policy to the central government, every Negro chief is the primary, and if possible the only, trader in his territory. Colonization usually follows the “flag of commerce.” The role of the trading post is prominent in the history of the North American states, as in the case of Nebraska with a post of the American Fur Company. The advancement of political boundaries is preceded by that of the customs frontier: the German Customs Union was the precursor of the German Empire.

The broadening of the geographical horizon by all of these apolitical expansions must precede political growth which, first borne by them, is later carried out independently as a goal of formulated policy. This is most clearly shown in that the sensible horizon of many a small Negro state is not as large as the area of a German secondary state, and that of the Greeks at the time of Herodotus had, at most, attained a magnitude comparable to the area of Brazil. The close relationship between geographic discovery and the growth of the state has long been recognized and is exhibited in the accomplishments of those who did both, such as Alexander, Caesar, Vasco da Gama, Columbus and Cook. To the present the greatest successes of expansive politics have been prepared under the guardianship of geography. The best contemporary example of this is that of the Russians in central Asia.

3. The growth of the state proceeds by the annexation of smaller members into the aggregate. At the same time the relationship of the population to the land becomes continuously closer. From the mechanical integration of areas of the most varied sizes, populations, and cultural levels there arises, through proximity, communication and the intermixture of their inhabitants, an organic growth. The growth of states which do not transcend mere annexation makes only loose, easily sundered conglomerates which can only be temporarily held together by the will of one whose intellect realizes a larger conception of space. The Roman Empire up to the first century before Christ was constantly threatened with dis-integration until it created the military organization necessary to hold it together and had won for Italy the economic superiority which made of this most fortunately situated peninsula in the middle of the Mediterranean the focal point of a commercial sphere crossed by first-rate roads. Similarly we later see how, through the looseness of the “Gallic provincial alliance, continually vacillating between alliance and hegemony,” the Roman merchant traced the path which the colonist, and after him the soldier, followed, and how all this worked toward the welding together of these adjacent, nearly inert elements into a mighty empire.

This process of the amalgamation of regional districts similarly enjoins the closer relationship of the people with their land. The growth of the state over the surface of the earth can be compared to the downward growth which leads to an attachment to the soil. It is more than a metaphor when one speaks of a people as taking root. The nation is an organic entity which, in the course of history, becomes increasingly attached to the land on which it exists. Just as an individual struggles with virgin land until he has forced it into cultivable fields, so too does a nation struggle with its land making it, through blood and sweat, increasingly its own until it is impossible to think of the two separately. Who can think of the French without France, or of the Germans without Germany? But this relationship was not always so firm and there are, even today, many states in which the people are not so intimately related to their land. As is true with regard to the size of the state, so also is there a historical series of stages in the relationship of the state and its land. Nowhere in the world do we encounter that detachment from the land which, according to many theoreticians, is supposed to be characteristic of more ancient conditions. However, the further we go back to primitive conditions, the looser this connection becomes. Men
settle less densely and are more scattered; their cultivation is poorer and is readily moved from one field to another. Their social relations, particularly their system of moral organization, bind them so closely together that their relationship to the land is weak. And since small states at this stage isolated themselves from one another by wilderness boundaries and the like, not only is much space—often more than one half of a larger area—politically wasted, but competition for that which is politically most valuable in the land is also missing. Thus even the largest streams were often used neither as boundaries nor as trade routes by the Indians or the Negroes, but immediately became of imestimable value when the Europeans used them in their advance.

There is then a reduction in the political value of the land as we regress from the newer to the older states. This is closely related to the reduction of political areas. Even ancient observers of African life have alluded to the fact that in the innumerable small wars there it was not the acquisition of land, but rather the spoils of prisoners and slaves that was important. This fact is of great consequence for the history of Black Africa: slave hunts decimated the population and at the same time hindered the development of states, i.e., a double negative. The essential point is that the state is never at rest. A continuous outflow over its boundaries makes of it an exit point for expeditions of conquest which is surrounded by a belt of depopulated and desolate lands. Insecurity dominates its boundaries. They are dependent solely upon the energy with which these forward pushes are made, and as soon as these diminish the region shrivels up. No time is given for it to become stable on a particular piece of land. For this reason the duration of these powers, of which there are many examples in southeast Africa, from the Zulu to the Wahehe, is usually short. In the more advanced states of the Sudan this zone of conquest, or better, sphere of predatory incursion, is only a part of the state. The location and size of the Fulbe states, Bornu, Baghirmi, Waday, Darfur, etc. remain stable for long periods of time, but waver continuously at the point where they meet the unsubjugated "heathen lands," i.e., usually on the south side. Nachtigal in the north and Crampel and Dybowski in the south have shown in those areas how indefinite the location and extent of Waday is. But uncertainty regarding the political value of the land is still greater. The renowned "land-greed" of the conquering states of antiquity, particularly the Romans, is a notion which is not yet entirely settled. The acquisition of land was only an accompanying phenomenon in the great political revolutions of antiquity. Power, slaves and treasure were the prizes of battle, particularly in Asiatic wars, and hence the fleeting effects of their growth. In Rome from the time of the Pyrrhic wars a true struggle with the necessity of the acquisition of land may be observed. Desiring empire, a system of alliances and the checking of one power by another formed the base there. The expression of Mommsen regarding the Rome of the eighth century as "a dissolve block of lands without intensive occupancy and suitable boundaries," is characteristic of this condition. The comparison with the Holy Roman Empire with its confusion of feudal kings, vassals, priests, exalted to the rank of princes, and independent cities is obvious. Caesar's greatness lay in the fact that he gave to the more stable body a definite, secure boundary as well as spatial expansion.

4. The boundary is the peripheral organ of the state, the bearer of its growth as well as its fortification, and takes part in all of the transformations of the organism of the state. Spatial growth manifests itself as a peripheral phenomenon in pushing outward the frontier which must be crossed by the carriers of growth. The closer these carriers live to the boundary, the more intimately do they share an interest in this process; and the larger the frontier, the more pronouncedly peripheral will the growth be. A state which stretches out toward a desired district sends out at the same time growth nodes which exhibit more activity than does the rest of the periphery. This is discernable in the shape of countries and in the distribution of their inhabitants and other power media. The outcrops of Peshawar and Little Tibet, and those from Merv and Kokand permit immediate recognition of that which even their history does not show; that in their direction British India and Russia grow together, determined to envelop all the benefits of the lands which lie between them, just as Rome through conquering Gaul grew counter to the advancing Teutons. On its German and Italian boundaries which for
centuries were positions of particularly strong growth, France concentrates its power media in striving to resume repressed growth. It is characteristic of such segments that they attract a major portion of the activity of the state. The marches of eastwardly expanding Germany which, as they were conquered piece by piece, were fortified and colonized, are repeated along the growing edges of America in the west and in Argentina in the south. There, in a few years large cities have arisen from the primitive log cabins of the fortified frontier. Given the crowded conditions of states in Europe such excellent portions of the periphery are at once among the most dangerous and the most fortified: the wounds which they can receive are to be feared above all others.

Other portions of the periphery of a state are given a special character because they are made up of the outwardly oriented peripheral segments of once independent regions which have grown together with that state. In every large frontier area we find such fragments of former national, provincial, or municipal boundaries which are the less altered the less they are adjusted to the forward and backward pushes of historical movements and the more practically they are created, i.e. have been adjusted and adapted to the terrain. There is a difference as between the worn outer banks and the highly indented inner shore of a spit, between a centuries old and a continuously developing boundary. The western and southern boundaries of Saxony can be offered as examples of this.

The frontier undergoes the same development as does the area, the consolidation, and the continuity of the state. If we go back to the first states on earth we find an indeterminacy of boundaries to the point of effacement. Where the area is uncertain, its periphery cannot possibly be distinct. The mania for transferring our conception of the boundary as a precisely determined line to conditions where the state comprises only an ill-defined spot on the earth has led, in the Indian policy of the American powers as well as in Africa, to the most arrant misunderstandings. As Lichtenstein3 has said of the Kaffir boundary, the attempt was often made to fix a stable boundary which neither of the two parties should overstep without special permission from the sovereign; “in this, however, there has never been mutual consent.” Not lines, but tiers are the important thing in this concept. In so far as a state is surrounded by politically empty space, the chances of encounter, of broad collision, are reduced and the state is drawn together. If its peoples, however, push beyond these limits, then it becomes more a matter of integration than of displacement: “The rights of property of the chiefs among the primitive peoples generally overlap.”4 If the untangling of such rights of property has presented the greatest of difficulties for the colonial authorities—is in actuality impossible—, there lies in this from the very first a powerful facility for every seizure and shift for the conquering and colonizing advance of the powerful states. Coupled with the primarily ruinous disparity in the political evaluation of the land, this has greatly speeded the dispossession of these peoples. Their political affairs were like their commerce in that they easily surrendered that which was most valuable as they didn’t realize its worth. Long previously the cultural disadvantage of the closing off of one small state from another, one of the main causes of stagnation, was recognized. With the advent of the Europeans this concept went into decline. At a higher level, in the Sudan or in Indo-China, the boundary is fixed at many points on the periphery along mountains and watersheds. The system of the empty boundary zone is, however, also retained. One finds excellent examples of this in the Sudan in the works of Barth, Rohlfs, and Nachtigal. In contrast to cases in Africa and Indo-China, China a few years ago separated itself from Korea by a boundary line which was precisely determined. With regard to the further development of scientific boundaries, which are geodetically fixed, immovable, protected by fortifications and everywhere closely guarded—and which have not as yet been realized even in Europe—see my essay, “Über allgemeine Eigenschaften der geographischen Grenzen &c,” in the reports on the conference of the K.S. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften 1892.

5. In its growth the state strives toward the enfoulement of politically valuable positions. In its growth and evolution the state practices selection of geographical benefits in that it occupies the good locations of a district before


The Laws of the Spatial Growth of States

The poor. If its growth is related to the dispossessions of other states, it victorious captures the good areas and the dispossessed continue in the bad. Therefore in the younger lands (colonies) whose entire history is known to us, the new political structures lie pronouncedly tiered along the sea, on the rivers and lakes, and in the fertile plains, while the older political forms are driven into the initially less accessible and less desired interior, into the steppes and deserts, the mountains, and the swamps. The same has happened in North America, in Siberia, in Australia and in South Africa. By the advantages which such locations offer to the first colonists they early determine the fate of large lands for a long time to come. Even if political possession is changed the earlier coming population remains at a cultural advantage, and the cultural miscarriage of many politically successful invasions can be explained in this manner. Carriers of the same culture have, all in all, the same concept of the value of the land, and for this reason all European colonies of the last centuries have undergone corresponding spatial development. At other times other assessments predominated. The ancient Peruvians did not go down the Amazon, but rather extended their domination in the plateau along a slender strip nearly 4000 km. long. The ancient Greeks did not seek large fertile interiors, but rather, following in this regard the Phoenecians, sought islands and peninsulas between inlets. The Turks, on the other hand, occupied the high steppes of Asia Minor which the Greeks disdained, and the Magyars the puszta of the Danube lowland. Custom as well as the level of culture are reflected in this and it is for this reason that political growth continues as long as possible in regions where there are similar living and working conditions. The Phoenecians settled on the coasts, the Dutch on islands, and the Russians on rivers. How greatly the expansion of the Roman Empire was benefited by the closed natural character of the Mediterranean lands was well known to the ancients. For Greece as well as for Rome these lands therefore presented the most fortunate of colonial regions where they could feel almost everywhere even more at home than does a central European in North America between 35° and 45° north latitude.

The envelopment of politically valuable locations is also expressed in the shape of the state. This we take to be a transitional stage of rest for the fundamentally mobile organism. Germany's expansion along the North and Baltic Seas, France's enclosure of the Meuse north of Sedan, Austria's encroachment over the ridge of the Erzgebirge along almost the total course of the Saxon-Bohemian border and her southern-most point which encloses the Boka Kotsarska, and England's enclosure of the Channel Islands are some examples of this. Chile's northern boundary, drawn at 24° in the apparently useless Atacama desert, pushed up to 23° as soon as the guano deposits were discovered in the Bay of Mejillones. The discovery of diamonds on the Vaal River since 1867 followed the expansion of England across the Orange into an area which belonged to the Orange Free State; this is the direction in which Bechuanaland later grew further to the north. At lower stages states have a predilection for situating themselves on or near trade routes as is easily seen in the Sudan and in the interior of Africa. It is for this reason that Waday so seldom expanded toward Fezzan.

A major portion of the often long arrested growth tendency of states follows from the enclosure of politically advantageous locations, for since political growth consists of motion, or more the joining of countless movements, the state sees advantage in annexing those natural regions which favor movement. Thus we see it striving to attain the coasts, moving along the rivers, and spreading out over the plains. Another segment of the state pushes on through the barriers to those regions which are accessible to man. In this one must not think only of restraints but of the claims toward the filling out of naturally bounded regions as well. Rome grew along the desert in North Africa and West Asia. It had reached the southern foot of the Alps in 222 B.C. but first crossed them as a state some 200 years later after it had grown far beyond the Alps to the east and west. Bohemia filled its basin before any of the neighboring states had established fixed boundaries and as it grew beyond this basin its growth extended to the south east toward Moravia and the opening of the basin. Also of this same type is growth which takes place in the direction of least resistance. The growth of the central European powers to the east instigated at the first partition of Poland appears as an eastern backwash of the long frustrated western orien-
tation of political energies. It is thus that the states of the Sudan grow uniformly, as has been said, from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean in the direction of the weaker Negro states. Likewise the development of British dominion in India takes the form of an enclosing of the more powerful native states from the base of the more easily overpowered and weaker districts.

6. *The first stimuli to the spatial growth of states come from them from the outside.* Natural increase renews a simple political body and continuously reproduces it, but does not of itself produce any other form. The family renews itself in its offspring and begets new families and these remain together in the form of a family. Where exogamy dominates, two families follow precisely the same pattern. The tribe or family branches off to form another tribe, etc. All such bodies become, through their attachment to the land, a state. As they increase, larger states do not arise from the smaller, but rather a multitude of states of the same size. In order that an accustomed size not be exceeded, the size of the population is limited by all possible means, among which are the most cruel practices, and in this manner the growth of the state is limited. Growth is still further hindered by the enclosure of the state within a depopulated boundary area. The state is supposed to remain easily surveyable and within grasp. As far as our knowledge of primitive states extends their growth has never advanced without foreign influence. The origin of such growth is colonization in the broader sense. Men from regions of larger spatial conceptions carry the idea of larger states into districts of lesser spatial concepts. The native who is aware only of his own state is always at a disadvantage to him who knows at least two. Geographic location pointedly shows how the larger states in areas of small statism have grown inward from the most accessible outer side, i.e., from the coasts or the edges of the deserts. If we look at Africa prior to the time of the establishment of the European colonies we find large states along the line where Negroes, Hamites, and Semites are contiguous, and almost none where the Negroes are bounded either by each other or by the sea. Where, however, we find Negro states in the interior, there are also usually found sagas with regard to their founding concerning the foreign origin of their founders. Such tales are widespread over the earth. Often wandering hunters lay claim to this role which is reminiscent of the historical role of the slowly immigrating and infiltrating Kioko in the more recent transformation of the Lunda empire.

All of the states of Africa are conquered or colonial states. History shows a hundred times over this silent in-migration and expansion of a people which, first tolerated, suddenly comes to the fore in possession of power. Such has been the course of almost every European colonization. Thus the Chinese established their empire in Borneo. At the beginning of the Roman Empire, though cloaked in a mythical haze, we find the foreigners whose in-migration led to the ascendancy of Rome which was already better situated for trade and sea commerce than were other Latin cities. The first modern large state formation on Borneo since the empire of the Chinese gold miners, that of Rajah Brooke, is, in detail, the exemplification of such sagas of origin. At the advent of the Europeans there was in the entirety of Melanesia only one state structure, that of the immigrant Malayans on the north-west coast of New Guinea. The historical core of the wander sagas of the ancient American cultures cannot, it is true, be sorted out. But it cannot be by chance that the foundation of all states is assigned to foreigners. All other states of any size worth mentioning in America have, from European foundations, expanded inland into the small state regions of the Indians which are scattered throughout. America, Australia, and Africa south of the equator are the poorest development of states.

Whence comes the concept of a large state which is carried into these small state areas. Where they have not been carried by Europeans, sea, desert and steppe peoples; Hamites, Semites, Mongols and Turks, have been their bearers. If we further ask where the investigation of the origin of this concept leads in regard to the Europeans, we arrive at the shores of the eastern Mediterranean where fertile lands are situated in the midst of broad steppe areas. Egypt and Mesopotamia, Syria and Persia are large oasis lands which encourage the condensing of their populations into narrow areas and which are surrounded by districts which invite their inhabitants to spread out. From this distinction there springs
a rich source of historical life. Just as Lower Egypt grew in the direction of Upper Egypt, as China grew in all directions from its loesslands, all such regions have furnished masses of men for martial inundation and slow colonial conquest. The political organization of these masses, however, and the great mastery of space which welded their single lands together, came from the steppes. From such lands have descended the founders of the great states in Egypt and Mesopotamia, Persia, India, China and also in the African Sudan. Because pre-Columbian America was without pastoral peoples—which peoples once dominated the greatest part of the old world—it was without continuous political ferment. This also provides a partial explanation for poor state development there.

The effects of wandering pastoralists on settled agriculturalists and tradesmen show, however, only one side of a more fundamental contrast. This same contrast underlies the bases of the state foundations of the sea-going peoples, the Phoenecians, the Normans, the Malays, and again in the newest European colonies. We also encounter this in the worldwide tendency of the settled peoples, and particularly of the agriculturalists, to either retreat politically or to come to terms. All purely agricultural colonizations, that of the Achaeans in greater Greece, as well as those of the Germans in Transylvania and the Boers in South Africa, tend towards torpidity and are tainted by political clumsiness. The great success of Rome lay in the cross-fertilization of a robust peasantry and a more mobile, worldly element.

There is a difference in historical movements which is present throughout humanity. Some remain fast, others press forward, and both are encouraged in this by the nature of their dwelling places. For this reason the formation of states pushes forward from seas and steppes (regions of movement) into forest and arable lands (regions of persistence). Permanent settlement leads toward weakening and decay, whereas mobility, on the other hand, promotes the organization of populations. Such, in the Tartar hordes, the Vikings, and the Malay seamen, united lesser powers to greater effects. The most extreme cases of either can be found in Africa, as in the case of the Zulu, a warlike people organized to the point of the nullification of the family, and the Mashona, a people degenerated to slavery by generations of self-inflicted fragmentation. The two belong together since the former live from the latter. It is not necessary that a people in the process of the formation of a state force its nationality upon the politically passive as Babylon was Semiticised, because the laws of the growth of peoples and of states differ.

7. The general tendency toward territorial annexation and amalgamation is transmitted from state to state and continually increases in intensity. With an increasing estimation of its political value, the land has become of increasingly greater influence as a measure of political power and as a spoil in state struggles. As long as there is political competition the weaker states attempt to equal the more powerful. Carried over to the land there arises from this a struggle for spatial annexation and amalgamation. That the areas of Austria-Hungary, Germany, France and Spain can be expressed as 100, 86, 84 and 80; those of the Netherlands and Belgium as 100 and 90; and those of the United States of America and of British North America (with Newfoundland) as 100 and 96, and Ontario and Quebec as 100 and 97; and that throughout their history similar relationships have existed at the various levels of size and position, is the result of slow development and of annexation and amalgamation brought about by numerous struggles. Long before the sixteenth century which, in view of the struggles of Spain, Austria, and France for dominance in Europe had forged the concept of European equilibrium—the embryo of which however had already appeared at the end of the 15th century in Burgundian, Swiss, and Italian developments—this drive has been a law of the spatial development of states. At lower stages of development the same limited capacity for spatial domination may be active, as in the regional cluster of Uganda, Wanyoro, Ruanda or Bornu, Baghirmi, Waday and Darfur. Still lower we already see the joining together of smaller tribes following an attack by a stronger neighbor which operates as do the blows of a hammer in hardening political cohesion.

From the smallest beginnings of growth to the giant states of the present we see, then, the same tendency toward the emulation of the large on the part of the small and toward the largest by those which are already large and wish to equal the largest. This tendency is vital and, like a balance wheel, operates above
variations and reverses to hold aloof the individual growth exertions together. It has shown itself to be as effective in the village states of the Azande territories as in the giant, continent-dividing states. And thus the drive toward the building of continually larger states continues throughout the entirety of history. We see it active in the present where, in continental Europe, the conviction of the necessity of joining together, at least economically, against the giants of Russia, North America, and the British Empire is awakening. Nor have the most recent colonial developments proven this law the less. In Africa it has called forth a veritable race of the powers for land, and England and Germany have made a division in a ratio of 125 to 100 of the remainder of New Guinea.

This goal is reached by very different means. A small state takes from its neighbor states enough land to become equal or similar to the greater among them: Prussia, later Germany, between France and Austria. States develop near and succeed one another in a common area of the earth, whereby the later ones approximate the dimensions taken by the earlier: Spanish America, French North America, the United States of America, and British North America. If a state is divided into two, they should not differ greatly in size: the kingdoms of the Netherlands and Belgium. A state which has been reduced in size takes at another side as much as is necessary in order to remain on that size level which it shares with its neighbors: Austria, which for a loss of 44,310 sq. km. on the Apennine peninsula then took 51,110 sq. km. in the Balkan peninsula. A fragmented partnership such as that of the Hansa operated according to the plan that the lands of the north not be allowed to join, i.e., that these lands remain in a situation similar to their own. Carthaginians and Greeks held each other in check so that Rome in central Italy was able to raise itself to the might of either of them. With reference to one broad area toward which one cannot remain passive, Russia and China are becoming the masters of Central Asia in that, according to an opinion of Wenjukow, the former have similar problems to solve as regards the Turkic peoples as have the latter with regard to the Mongois.

Naturally such emulation is not restricted to spatial size. Neighboring states differ as to advantages of position or natural endowment from which arise far-reaching commonalities of interests and functions. In the end even large states are concerned with selected areas. Canada, with its Canadian Pacific rivaled the Pacific-Atlantic connections of the United States, and shipping on the Great Lakes uses separate canals on both sides. Throughout the entirety of America there runs an imitation in organization and style of the political life of the North American free states, just as in the Sudan a pattern shines through all of the Islamic states whether their founder was a Fulbe or an Arabicized Nubian. So, too, the Persian and Roman Empires were patterns for a series of the states of antiquity and even throughout the old American plateau states there is a distant similarity which is strikingly apparent in the ingenious construction of roads.

In peaceful competition as in martial dispute the rule holds that those advancing must meet their opponents on their own ground. Insofar as they are victorious they become similar to them. States bordering on the steppes and in battle with steppe peoples must themselves become enough steppe states that they can master the advantages of the steppes; Russia and France show this in Central Asia and Algeria.