Ethnic Groups and the State

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CHAPTER 1

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I. INTRODUCTION

The theme of this volume is the effects of the state, its official ideologies, its structural forms, its alliance strategies, and its specific policies upon ethnic identity formation. Ethnic identity formation is viewed as a process that involves three sets of struggles. One takes place within the ethnic group itself for control over its material and symbolic resources, which in turn involves defining the group's boundaries and its rules for inclusion and exclusion.[1] The second takes place between ethnic groups as a competition for rights, privileges, and available resources. The third takes place between the state and the groups that dominate it, on the one hand, and the populations that inhabit its territory. Its focus is on the maintenance and extension of its control over local territories and populations and the provision of qualified manpower to administer its institutions, implement its policies, and create wealth, power, and safety for itself and its inhabitants. These three sets of struggles intersect in different ways at different times, but it is possible to specify particular patterns of elite competition within and between ethnic groups, the role of the state in each pattern, and the potential consequences of each pattern for ethnic identity formation and political mobilization.

Most available theories that touch directly or indirectly on the issue of the relationship between ethnic groups and the state are deficient in one or more respects to deal adequately with the issues raised in this volume. Several problems recur in the literature on ethnic groups and the state that prevent a proper appreciation of the role of the latter in relation to internal struggles for control of ethnic communities and in relation to competition between ethnic groups. One recurring problem concerns the treatment of the state, that is, whether it is to be seen as an instrument of a class or an ethnic group or as a relatively autonomous force, whether it is to be seen as a distributor of privileges or a promoter of justice and equality among groups, whether it is to be seen as an impartial arena for conflict resolution or a partial

intervenor in societal conflicts. A second set of problems concerns the categories to be used in the analysis of society and how they are to be defined. Is the study of ethnicity a sub-branch of interest group politics or of class analysis or a separate subject of study in its own right? Or, to put it another way, are interest groups, classes and ethnic groups to be treated as analytically separable and coequivalent or is one or another category primary? A third set of problems concerns the level of analysis and the central theoretical issue or issues. Most sociological theories that are relevant to a discussion of ethnic groups and the state focus on society as a whole and take as their main theoretical issue the conditions for conflict or cohesion, national integration or internal war and treat the societal units--interest groups, classes, or ethnic groups--as givens rather than as objects for examination themselves. Too often neglected is the issue of how identity and cohesion within groups are formed and maintained in the first place, how political mobilization of groups occurs, and how and why both group cohesion and mobilization often decline. It is not that there is no literature on the latter question, but that its insights tend to be neglected when scholars move to the societal level.

The discussion in this chapter on these matters will be divided into five sections. The next (Section II) will take up the issue of the role of the state in relation to social conflicts. It will be argued in this section that the state inevitably plays a differentiating role as a distributor of privileges among groups. Section III will take up the issue of the relevant units of analysis --interest groups, classes, and ethnic groups--and how they should be defined and analyzed. It will be argued in this section that the tendency to reification and objectification of categories, particularly those of class and ethnic group, must be avoided and that each of the three units, interest group, class, and ethnic group, must be treated as analytically distinct. Section IV will take up issues of conflict, integration, and identity. The dangers of treating social groups, particularly ethnic groups, as givens and of assuming the inevitability of disintegrative conflict among them will be discussed. It will be argued that, although conflict is endemic in multi-ethnic societies, neglect of the internal conflicts between them distorts both history and attitudes toward the

future of such societies. The last section presents an alternative perspective on ethnicity and the state that focuses on identity formation and elite competition within and between ethnic groups. It will be argued in this section that, although the state inevitably plays a critical role in conflicts within and between ethnic groups and that its role is always in some sense partial, its policies can be assessed and evaluated as more or less conducive to political integration and more or less favorable to particular ethnic groups. However, the ethnic groups favored by state policies are not necessarily the dominant groups.

II. THE STATE AS A DIFFERENTIATING FORCE

Recent revivals of discussion on the origins, composition, and character of the modern state have focussed primarily on two sets of issues. One set concerns the question of the relative independence or dependence of the modern state upon the units which it encompasses, the units being individuals and interest groups for some theorists, classes or ethnic groups for others. The second set of issues focuses on whether the modern state is to be seen as a promoter of equality and distributive justice or as a promoter of uneven development among regions, classes, and ethnic groups and a distributor of privilege.

Most contemporary theories of the modern state can be broadly distinguished in terms of whether or not they see the state as an arena, as an instrument of group domination, or as a relatively autonomous entity with interests and strategies of its own. The first view arises out of the group pluralist perspective. The second is held in common by both classical Marxists and by theorists of the plural society. The third point of view has been developed most systematically by a number of contemporary neo-Marxist theoreticians.

The Group Pluralist Perspective. In the group pluralist or interest group perspective, the state is seen as a largely neutral arena of interest group conflict. The results of such conflict may be that the state adopts policies, distributes resources, or creates agencies specifically of relevance to particular categories of the population. Those policies, resources, and agencies themselves may then become catalysts for further interest group organization. The state then in the group pluralist approach is seen as both a responder to the demands

of organized groups in the society and as a precipitator in the formation of new groups, including ethnic groups. However, the state is not in this perspective a force that acts independently to prevent the organization of particular groups or to facilitate the organization of others.[2] The state is viewed neither as dominated by the groups that contest in its arena nor as an autonomous force in relation to them. Rather, it is seen as a more or less neutral agency whose policies are the products of the encounters of groups in conflict.

The ethnocentrism of this view of the state will be evident to most specialists in comparative politics and history. It derives from observation of American politics primarily, though it has been extended to western democratic societies generally. Obviously, it is not of much relevance to absolutist states, to contemporary authoritarian states, and to other societies where groups are not permitted to organize freely or are "chartered by the state in accordance with the state's and not the groups'" own interests.[3] A more serious criticism of the group pluralist conception of the state as a neutral arena arises from the fact that, even in the liberal democratic states, access of groups to policy making is often selectively controlled.[4] In many cases, particular interest organizations succeed, with the help of the state, in capturing virtually monopolistic control over some policy areas for long periods of time, a point to which I will return below.

Neo-Marxist, Core-periphery, and Internal Colonial Theories. At the other extreme from the group pluralist view of the state as a neutral arena are the formulations of some Marxists and neo-Marxists who view the state as an instrument of domination. In the classical Marxist view, the state is not only partial rather than neutral, it is the instrument of one class, the bourgeoisie, in its struggles with the proletariat. It is "an organ of class domination, an organ of oppression of one class by another."[5] This classical Marxist view of the state has been modified considerably in recent years by two groups of theorists working in the Marxist frame of reference. One group of neo-Marxists, including such writers as Althusser, Habermas, Poulantzas, and O'Connor, has moved to the view that the modern industrial non-Communist state is not simply a product of the class struggle but is a relatively autonomous force.[6] In this view, the managers of the state apparatus develop interests of

their own, particularly an interest in maintaining their power and control, which may lead them to act independently of or even against the wishes of the dominant bourgeois groups. Some neo-Marxists even approach the group pluralist school in seeing the modern industrial and post-industrial state "as a field of power balance and conflict resolution,"[7] although one that is not neutral with respect to maintaining the existing capitalist order as a whole.

A second group of neo-Marxist theorists, those associated with the core-periphery and internal colonial perspectives particularly, have modified the classical Marxist position in another direction by bringing ethnic struggles to the forefront. The first group of neo-Marxists have noted that the modern capitalist state has played a protective and even an emancipatory role in relation to some minority and disadvantaged groups, but their spokesmen have ignored or treated only in the most peripheral way the roles of ethnic groups generally in the modern state. The second group of neo-Marxist theorists, however, have gone much further and have argued in fact that, under present conditions, ethnic struggles are more pervasive and salient than class struggles. The reason for this state of affairs is that the capitalist world economy and imperialist state expansion have led to a differential distribution of state resources and valued employment opportunities among ethnic groups.[8]

Although the core-periphery and internal colonial theorists do not take up directly the issue of the relative autonomy of the modern capitalist state, the implications of their position can only be that its autonomy is restricted in two ways. It is embedded externally in a world economic system in relation to which it cannot act independently.[9] Internally, it is dominated by minority or plurality ethnic groups engaged in the differential distribution of privilege. For Wallerstein, the essence of the modern state is not its relative autonomy but its role as a distributor of privileges and a differentiator among ethnic groups. In another formulation by Hechter, the modern capitalist state is an upholder of a "cultural division of labor" that distributes valued jobs and economic development unevenly, in such a way that the core region of the country controls the best jobs while the peripheral regions are dependent upon the core and the ethnic groups that inhabit those regions are

confined to the least skilled and prestigious jobs.[10]

The State in the Plural Society. This neo-Marxist view of the state as an instrument of domination by privileged ethnic groups is one which is shared with the school of pluralist thought associated with Furnivall and M. G. Smith. In Furnivall's and M. G. Smith's conceptions of the plural society, defined as a social order consisting of institutionally segmented cultural groups living "side by side, yet without mingling, in one political unit," one cultural section monopolizes power,[11] controls the state apparatus, and dominates over other cultural groups who are admitted to participation in their own governance in a limited way, if at all. Furnivall, of course, had in mind colonial societies created by conquest and regulated in the interests of colonial capitalists, which were sharply distinguished from Western democratic societies. Smith, however, who extended the definition of plural societies to both postcolonial and to some contemporary industrial societies, saw the form of the state arising not out of conquest but out of the "cultural incompatibility" of its plural parts, which made it impossible for the members of different cultural groups to act as citizens in a common political enterprise and, therefore, inevitable that the stronger group would use the state as an instrument of domination over the others.[12] In fact, the society could be maintained at all only by domination. In short, the political form of the plural society was a "despotism" of one cultural group, usually a minority, over others.[13]

The Differentiating Role of the State. It is apparent that most contemporary theories of the state, with the exception principally of the group-pluralist theory, view the state as either always dominated by particular social forces, a particular class or ethnic group or combination of classes and/or ethnic groups, or as at most relatively autonomous from the dominant social, economic, or ethnic groups in society. Some theories of the state refer only to a particular type of society, such as the internal colonial type or the plural society, and allow for the existence of other types of states and societies and state-society relations. Such theories, however, tend at most to present dichotomous or trichotomous classifications of states.[14] All these theories, however, derive from more or less holistic models of state-society

relationships that are convincing only if one accepts their underlying assumptions. Moreover, none of the theories provides an adequate basis for analyzing the state and its policies separately from the groups that compose society. Some of the neo-Marxists argue that the state is relatively autonomous from the dominant classes in society, but not from the capitalist economic order as a whole, which it acts to preserve.

If one is not willing to begin an analysis of ethnicity and the state with a set of assumptions derived from one of the prevailing models and one wishes to consider the specific relationships established between the state and social groups over time, how then is one to proceed? An analysis by Rae of the attempts by contemporary states to pursue egalitarian policies and the inevitable contradictions involved in their attempts to do so provides an alternative kind of beginning from prevailing theories that is free from their assumptions.[15] Rae's analysis shows that one does not have to accept the underlying ideological premises behind Wallerstein's description of the modern liberal state or that of anyone else to accept the argument that it, in common with all states, is always engaged in the differential distribution of resources among categories in the population. Even when the state sets out to be "ostentatiously egalitarian," it must choose, as Rae has pointed out, between types of "equalitarian" policies that invariably favor some groups or categories in the population and discriminate against others.[16] Moreover, it often does so for reasons of its own convenience as well as to favor or protect particular groups against others.

Most modern states either select certain categories of the population for favored or protected treatment or select certain areas of life in which inequality will be prohibited or establish rules that distribute inequalities in life impartially, or randomly. They do so for a variety of reasons. The state may be controlled by a class or ethnic group or some combination of classes and/or ethnic groups, whose members it chooses to favor. Or, the dominant groups may seek support among certain categories in the population and may adopt an "equalitarian" policy for that purpose. Or the state may choose a particular equalitarian strategy for its own administrative convenience. Such choices may be faced both by post-industrial and contemporary developing societies.

It is sometimes assumed that the state, through such "equalizing" policies as "affirmative action" and "protective discrimination," actually creates or precipitates the formation of new identities among various categories of persons. In some cases, it may in fact do so, in other cases such new identities may be quite shallow and temporary. However, such policies never precipitate organization among all relevant categories of the population. Consequently, the identification of groups for whom claims are made in response to such state policies should be the beginning not the end of analysis.

Likely to be far more important in affecting the identity, cohesion, and mobilization of particular ethnic groups than specific government policies are the selection by governments of particular leaderships, elites, and organizations within an ethnic group as collaborators or channels for the transmission of government patronage. Sometimes, a government is more or less compelled to accept and collaborate with a leadership or elite group that arises independently, but government support may then reinforce and sustain a dominance achieved by the group's leadership. At other times, government's decision to collaborate with a particular leadership or elite may be made before any political mobilization takes place and may prevent it or channel it in ways that either preserve an existing sense of community among a group of people or forestall its development.

The main point to be noted here is that government or the state is not simply an arena in which competing groups or interests work out their conflicts and shape policies that then precipitate the formation of new groups. Rather, government or the state tends to work through particular leaderships and groups over long periods of time and to go for advice to particular leaders and elites in shaping its policies. Sometimes a particular leadership within a group may even gain control over an entire area of government policy and the institutions associated with it and use them as a means for consolidating their leadership over their own community. Many examples of this process have been documented for economic and professional interest groups in the U. S., such as the American Farm Bureau Federation's dominance in the agricultural community or the American Medical Association's dominance in the medical community, both made possible not only by persistent government patronage and support but by the control over government

policy and institutions maintained by these organizations themselves. Research on ethnic groups and the state must explore these kinds of relationships and their effects on ethnic identity, mobilization, and control.

The view of the state that is being proposed to facilitate this kind of analysis is more in accord with the relative autonomy neo-Marxist perspective than with the classical Marxist or group pluralist perspective. That is, the state is not simply an arena for group conflict nor an instrument for class domination but a relatively autonomous entity that tends, however, both to favor some classes and ethnic groups at particular points in time and also to develop relationships with elites within particular communities to serve its own interests. Those interests include local control, administrative convenience, and the gathering of popular support. Even when the state attempts to adopt an equalitarian set of policies, it cannot usually succeed for reasons pointed out by Rae. However, the state is not simply a policy-producing mechanism balancing different notions of equality against each other. Every state, rather, tends to support particular groups, to distribute privileges unequally, and to differentiate among various categories in the population.

The above argument does not imply that the state always and inevitably takes a stand on the side of one group or another in conflict situations. Often it does. However, the state may choose to remain "neutral" at times when groups are in conflict. Neutrality, however, like equalitarianism, is a difficult strategy to pursue and not only because groups in conflict nearly always seek the support of the state. It is difficult also because a neutral policy often means, in effect, support for the <u>status quo</u>, a refusal to rectify an existing imbalance between groups.

Finally, although it seems most appropriate to begin with the notion that the state can be and is most often a relatively independent, if not a dominant actor, this is not to deny that it can also be captured by particular groups or segments of a society for long periods of time. The main point here is that the state invariably makes distinctions, classifies its populations and distributes resources differentially. It is a principal task of research on ethnic groups and the state to determine how privileges are distributed among different ethnic categories, with which elites within an

ethnic group state leaders tend to collaborate, and what the consequences of both are for ethnic group identity formation and political mobilization.

III. CLASS, ETHNICITY, AND INTEREST

Deciding how to analyze the role of the state obviously resolves only half of the problem in the analysis of the relations between ethnic groups and the state. Several issues recur in the literature on ethnicity concerning the other half of the problem. They include: how to treat ethnic groups in their own terms, how to treat them in their relations with other social formations, and how to analyze processes of ethnic identity formation within ethnic groups.

The first issue is the familiar one of whether or not ethnic groups have a reality of their own or are better seen as sub-types of or substitute formations for other forces, such as classes or interest groups. Even in a study of ethnicity and the state, most Marxists would argue either that classes remain the relevant units of analysis or that ethnic groups can be properly understood only in relation to class categories and formations. The group pluralists see neither classes nor ethnic groups as the relevant units but individuals and concrete, membership groups. Classes and ethnic groups are artificial categories for the group pluralists whose focus is on explicitly organized groups and their relations to individuals, to each other, and to the state. Ethnic groups or classes become relevant only insofar as they establish concrete membership organizations that pursue their interests. At that point, the principal question becomes how effectively or genuinely the group does in fact "represent"--in all the meanings of the term--its "constituency." The cultural pluralists, that is, the school founded by Furnivall and Boeke and perpetuated by Smith, Schermerhorn, Kuper, and van den Berghe has tended either to see ethnic groups and cultural communities as the principal social formation in contemporary states, or as at least coequivalent with and not reducible to any other kind of formation, such as class or interest.

Many difficult analytical issues could be avoided if it were possible to accept the view that ethnic groups are simply a type of interest group seeking resources in and from the modern state. However, it is not possible to adopt such a view for three reasons. First, ethnic groups are centrally

concerned with cultural matters, symbols, and values and with issues of self-definition that distinguish them from other types of interest associations. Second, the interest group approach pays attention only to groups formally organized to press demands upon the state, whereas the organizations of many ethnic groups are internal to the community. Many ethnic groups of potential political significance would thus be ignored in a strict interest group analysis. Third, interest group analysis pays no attention at all to potential groups, to categories of people that may or may not develop internal organization and/or enter the political arena as interest groups in the future. For the latter two reasons, scholars who rely on interest group analysis are nearly always taken by surprise when class or ethnic movements suddenly burst forth in a political arena previously dominated by conventional interest associations.

At the other extreme from the interest group approach that takes seriously only concrete membership groups are those types of sociological and political analysis that focus on classes and ethnic categories, but reify or objectify them or treat them as "givens." By reification, I mean the tendency to attribute to mere categories a reality that they may not have or that may be merely temporary. By objectification, I mean the assumption that one or another category, class or ethnic group, represents a primal reality or has a greater significance or is more "fundamental" than others. Objectification is, of course, common among Marxists who assign an objective reality and primacy to class and class conflict. Objectification is to a large extent built into Marxist analyses of whole societies, though not necessarily into the analyses of processes of class formation. Objectification is also a feature of the work of many specialists in ethnicity, particularly those who emphasize the "primordial" character of ethnic groups and nations. If interest group analysts tend to be caught unawares by the sudden florescence of new political movements, class and ethnic group analysts tend to be surprised by the waning of revolutionary movements or the ebb and flow of ethnic movements or the rise of ethnic movements where class movements were anticipated.[17]

Of course, these choices regarding the appropriate stance to be taken with regard to the categories we use as social scientists raise fundamental epistemological issues.[18] One concerns

how we can talk about groups at all rather than individuals, which is a subject that cannot be addressed here. Another is whether or not some ways of talking about groups are closer to reality than others. Many social scientists avoid such issues entirely by arguing that all analytical and conceptual choices in the social sciences involve arbitrariness and that it is a form of crude empiricism to insist that our concepts mirror "reality." All that matters is how well the concepts succeed in predicting the outcomes of social processes. My own view on these matters is that there is no group that has a concrete reality that can be successfully captured, whether through membership lists, studies of socio-economic composition, or public opinion polls. If such a reality could be captured, it would constitute no more than a snapshot in time in which we arbitrarily get our subjects to hold still for the camera, as in an election or in a Gallup poll. Since all group and even individual realities, for that matter, are merely moments in time, we are forced to use categories that we think reflect underlying realities or that we anticipate may acquire meaning for numbers of people in future.[19]

My point here is not that it is a mistake either to be too concrete or too arbitrary in our selection of categories of analysis, but that concreteness is momentary and categoric groups are arbitrary constructions that are useful as ways of bringing into focus long-term processes of change. If we want to study variations and be prepared for change, we need to focus on categoric groups, while avoiding reification and objectification of them. One method of avoiding or minimizing the consequences of reification and objectification is to bring in a distinction between subjective and objective social formations. A second is to make use of sub-units of analysis that are not merely concrete in the sense of voting or membership units, but are identifiable ongoing elements and potential building blocks in the construction, in reality, of the categories in question. In this chapter, those elements are elites, defined as leadership segments with concrete characteristics and statuses, whose actions are critical in determining whether or not such categoric groups as classes and ethnic communities will be mobilized for political purposes or not. The importance of the subjective-objective distinction is what is primarily at issue in this section. The question of sub-group analysis will be

discussed in the next section.

Most Marxists and some specialists in ethnicity make a distinction between objective and subjective formations that at least avoids problems of reification if not of objectification. For Marxists, whose focus is on the conditions for revolutionary change, the important question is not one of membership in concrete groups, but of consciousness. What matters is not whether or not members of different ethnic groups, for example, belong to the same trade union, but whether they perceive their unity and separateness as a class from the owners and managers of the means of production and the fact that their interests are fundamentally opposed to those of the owners. If they do not, it is either because their class consciousness has not yet developed because of failures of class leadership or because of some form of false consciousness.

Among some specialists in ethnicity, a distinction is made between objectively distinct cultural categories and subjectively conscious communities that corresponds to the Marxist class-in-itself and class-for-itself distinction. For such scholars, the study of ethnic groups in society must be preceded or informed by an analysis of the conditions that lead to the creation of ethnic communities from ethnic categories in the first place and of an appreciation of the degree of self-consciousness that exists among ethnic groups in the society in question. Not all scholars of ethnicity, however, accept this distinction. For many, the array of ethnic groups in a society at a particular point in time is a given. What matters for ethnic group relations and societal order is the degree of differentiation among the groups on various measures and their extent of isolation, compartmentalization, and autonomy.

The distinction between objective and subjective formations is, therefore, much better accepted among Marxists than among specialists in ethnicity. On the other hand, problems of objectification are more common among the former than the latter. The tendency among Marxists to read class interest behind ethnic movements is far more common than any tendency among ethnic analysts to read ethnic sentiment behind class movements.

When it comes to analyzing the processes of movement from objective to subjective formations and the interrelations between classes and ethnic groups, ethnic group analysts tend to be more attentive to questions of class than class analysts

to questions of ethnicity. Marxists who analyze the movement of a class-in-itself to a class-for-itself or who are concerned with the relations between the state and the dominant social class use concepts such as degree of differentiation among classes or that of class fraction. These concepts, however, all focus on the relationship between classes or segments of classes to the mode of production and/or to the mode of appropriation of surplus value. They do not usually discuss the differentiation of classes in terms of ethnicity because economic interest is generally considered pre-emptive. A major exception to this general trend among Marxists, however, is the school of neo-Marxists that adopt the core-periphery and internal colonial perspectives.

Although I have said that contemporary specialists in ethnicity are likely to be more attentive to questions of class, this has not always been so. M. G. Smith analyzed the divisions of the plural society nearly exclusively in terms of its cultural segments and did not bother to differentiate those segments in terms of class. Other contemporary proponents of the cultural pluralist school, including Kuper and especially van den Berghe have, however, rectified this neglect of class among theorists of the plural society and have developed complex and sophisticated analyses of the interrelations between class and ethnicity in the plural society. It has even been argued that the neo-Marxist internal colonial school and the theory of the plural society have, in effect, merged.[20]

The significance of the theoretical problems just discussed and the consequences of different approaches to them for understanding the relation--ships between ethnic groups and the state can best be illustrated by contrasting the approaches of the core-periphery and internal colonial schools, on the one hand, and that of the theorists of the plural society, on the other hand.

<u>The Core-periphery and Internal Colonial Approaches</u>. With regard to the core-periphery and internal colonial approaches, four points are especially relevant to this discussion. The first is that both Wallerstein and Hechter assert the analytical distinctiveness of both class and status or ethnic group.[21] Second, Wallerstein takes the position that both ethnicity and class boundaries are fluid.[22] Third, however, classes have an underlying objective reality that ethnic groups do not have. Moreover, despite his explicit rejection

of the idea that ethnic group consciousness is a form of "false consciousness," Wallerstein brings the notion of "false consciousness" back in when he defines "status groups" as "blurred collective representations of classes,"[23] which will emerge once again when ethnic conflicts recede. For, the "fundamental political reality" of the contemporary world is the existence of a capitalist world economy and of "class struggle" within it. The form that the class struggle takes, however, changes constantly, sometimes taking the "overt" (true?) form of "class consciousness," sometimes taking the (false?) form of "ethno-national consciousness."[24]

It should be evident that it only confuses matters to insist, as Wallerstein does, that the class struggle is the underlying reality and class consciousness and ethnic group consciousness the two forms that it takes. Nothing but ideology or a reified construct such as the capitalist world system can justify attributing to class any greater reality than status group. Both need to be defined in both objective and subjective terms. The issue before the social scientist is to specify the conditions under which any set of objective criteria in a social order, whether they be the common economic circumstances in which different individuals are placed or the cultural markers shared by people, become transformed into subjectively felt bases for identification with a group and for common action to achieve group goals.

Class and Ethnicity in the Plural Society. In the view of the plural society articulated by Furnivall and Smith, the fundamental social reality was the existence of "cultural sections," each living "its own life" separately from the others, meeting only in a very limited way outside the marketplace.[25] In Smith's view, these sections constituted corporate groups whose basic institutions were distinctive and intact. Insofar as these separate cultural groups interacted with each other in the political arena, their relations were marked by dominance and subordination or by conflict. The Furnivall-Smith pluralist view is very much the obverse, therefore, of the classical Marxist view.

Several adherents of the cultural pluralist school, particularly Kuper and van den Berghe, have moved away from the Furnivall-Smith model,[26] as have Wallerstein and Hechter from the classical Marxist model of society. Van den Berghe in par-

ticular has insisted that classes and ethnic groups must be treated as analytically distinct, open and fluid, and not reducible to each other.[27] What is missing from van den Berghe's work, as well as from that of other theorists of the plural society, is a dynamic schema that permits an analysis of the interrelationships among elites and leadership groups <u>within</u> ethnic groups and classes. It is not enough to say that ethnic groups and classes are fluid and permeable. One must also have a method of analyzing the fluidity and permeability.

Neither van den Berghe nor any of the other theorists of the plural society have provided any methods or approaches for analyzing the internal workings of the separate cultural groups and the types of differentiation that exist within them. The task they propose for the analyst is not to analyze the internal dynamic processes of change and interaction within the group, but is the static one of classifying the various institutions of each group,[28` comparing them to the institutions of other groups, and thereby judging the degree of incompatibility and the likely lines of conflict among them. One gets no sense from these theorists of the internal controversies over dogma, dialect, reform, and power that invariably take place within any large, sophisticated, and complex cultural group. Associated with this deficiency is another: the absence of any tools or methods to analyze processes of inter-group relations and communication.

<u>Summary</u>. In this section, I have attempted to clarify a few distinctions and to indicate some of my own assumptions. The first distinction is between interest groups, on the one hand, and social categories on the other hand. Classes and ethnic groups are unlike concrete membership groups in that they have to be analyzed both as objective categories and as subjective communities. Nor is there any underlying objective reality for either class or ethnic group. Rather, there are a multiplicity of ways in which economic and cultural categories within these two sets will become subjective groups and/or concrete membership groups such as political parties, interest groups, or sovereign states. The specific theoretical problem raised in this volume is what role the state and its policies may play in this process.

The second important distinction is between classes and ethnic groups. Although they are both categoric groups and, therefore, both distinct from membership groups, they are also to be distinguished

from each other. That is, ethnic groups are not to be seen either as merely interest groups or as "blurred collective representations of classes." My own definitional preference is for two definitions of ethnic groups, one for objective ethnic categories and the other for subjective ethnic communities. Elsewhere, I have defined an ethnic category as "any group of people dissimilar from other peoples in terms of objective cultural criteria and that contains within its membership either in principle or in practice the elements for a complete division of labor and for reproduction." An ethnic community is an ethnic category that "has adopted one or more of its marks of cultural distinctness and used them as symbols both to create internal cohesion and to differentiate itself from other ethnic groups."[29] In this way, one is provided with a set of definitions that corresponds to the subjective-objective distinction among Marxists between class-in-itself and class-for-itself. Ethnic groups are categories more variable than any other social formation because they can also sometimes be classes or interest groups, but what distinguishes ethnic groups clearly from both are that the former are defined in relation to cultural markers, practices, or behavior patterns and as potentially whole societies. Insofar as class is concerned, it is not necessary for my purposes to choose between competing definitions, Marxist or Weberian. The important consideration is to maintain the distinction shared by both Marxists and Weberians between classes defined objectively, whether in relation to the means of production, to the appropriation of surplus value, or to life chances in the market, and classes defined as self-consciously organized groups ready for struggle with other classes.

The third major point of this section is to draw attention to the fact that even those theorists of class and ethnicity who have avoided reification and objectification of the categories, class and ethnic group, have not taken the next step of providing methods of analyzing the internal and external relations of class and ethnic group segments with each other and with the state. Rather, they have been concerned primarily with state-society relations as a whole, with the conflict potential of particular types of overlap or division between classes and ethnic groups, and with the issue of the relative dependence or independence of state and social structure upon each other.

Insofar as Marxist class analysis is concerned, there is a tradition of analyzing internal class groupings or "fractions" and inter-class relations. There is not, however, a corresponding tradition for the analysis of intra-ethnic groupings. It will be argued in the concluding section of this chapter that internal conflicts within ethnic categories for control over the material and symbolic resourcs of the group are of critical importance in its internal mobilization and its external relations with other groups. It will also be argued that, in this struggle for local and internal control over ethnic groups, the state and state policies also play important roles as they do in relations among ethnic groups. Before taking up the latter issues however, I wish to pursue in the next section the consequences of more traditional forms of analysis for understanding problems of conflict and integration in multi-ethnic societies.

IV. CONFLICT, INTEGRATION, AND THE STATE

The three principal types of analysis that have been discussed in this chapter, namely, the group pluralist, Marxist and neo-Marxist, and cultural pluralist modes are all essentially conflict theories. The Marxist and cultural pluralist schools in fact explicitly reject consensualist structural-functional and systems modes of analysis. The three modes differ primarily in whether or not and how they approach the question of integration at all. Most Marxists and neo-Marxists are concerned primarily with the conditions for conflict and revolution in societies and only secondarily with the methods of socialization and conflict reduction used by contemporary bourgeois states to maintain themselves. Both the group pluralist and cultural pluralist schools, in contrast, assume the existence of conflict in society, but they are ultimately concerned also very directly with the possibilities and conditions for integration of functionally and ethnically diverse societies. All three approaches, however, take a fundamentally negative view of the prospects for integration in most multi-ethnic and multinational societies, at least in "the short term."[30]

It has already been noted that the group pluralists begin with the evident functional and group diversity of modern industrial societies, from which they develop two theoretical arguments. One is that, such diversity being much less marked in

totalitarian and pre-totalitarian than in democratic societies, the presence of diversity must be seen as a favorable factor in the preservation of democracy. However, diversity may or not be favorable to integration, which depends upon the cleavage structure of the society. The leading argument of this school on this matter was developed by Bentley himself as the theory of cross-cutting cleavages.[31] This well-known proposition states that the intensity and the disruptive consequences of conflict are reduced and cohesion enhanced in societies where individuals belong to a multiplicity of groups that criss-cross each other in such a way as to reduce the homogeneity of groups. On the other hand, where individuals belong to relatively homogeneous groups and where group membership in different types of functional and religious or ethnic groups are reenforcing, the potential for conflict is high. The theory of cross-cutting/overlapping cleavages as applied to ethnic interest groups then states that the conflict potential between ethnic groups is reduced if the members of different groups find themselves in the same functional membership groups and is enhanced if they do not. That is, if members of ethnic groups A and B belong to different churches, have different occupational spreads, read different newspapers, and belong to different social and recreational clubs, then communication between them is reduced and the potential for conflict is increased. The latter type of situation of overlapping cultural cleavages is what the cultural pluralists consider the prototypical situation of the plural society. Insofar as the group pluralists assume that such a situation is inherently conflictual in nature, their approach is similar on this issue to that of the cultural pluralists.

Most Marxists obviously see conflict arising not from overlapping cleavages, but from class struggle between self-conscious classes. Moreover, the notion of cross-cutting cleavages as an inhibitor of consciousness and conflict would most likely fall under the heading of "false consciousness" to the extent that members of a social class see any other ties than that to class as politically significant. Most forms of ethnic identity, of course, also come under the heading of false consciousness for most Marxists and neo-Marxists.[32] However, for neo-Marxists such as Wallerstein and the internal colonial school, who treat ethnicity more centrally, ethnic conflict is

considered to be endemic in multi-ethnic states. Wallerstein argues that it will also be the predominant form of social conflict until the class-based world-revolutionary upheaval overturns the entire world capitalist economy. Hechter argues that contemporary multi-ethnic industrial states contain internal colonies formed by "imperial expansion" in which ethnicity persists and ethnic nationalism among peripheral peoples is a recurring threat to the existence of the state itself.

Two of the principal pluralists, Furnivall and Smith, were very strongly oriented towards the conflictual aspects of the plural society, which they saw arising inevitably out of the external relations of the cultural sections. Not only was conflict in the plural society endemic, it was more invasive and more intense than in other societies. Conflicts that in other societies would be considered normal, "between town and country, industry and agriculture, capital and labour" were intensified in the plural society because the opposing sides were likely to belong to different racial or cultural groups.[33] Moreover, there is a greater tendency for conflicts "over specific issues" between members of different groups to become "generalized" in scope and to involve the entire group than is the case in other societies.[34] Nor did either Furnivall or Smith consider the possibility that intergroup associations and the creation of shared institutions in the modern state might "modify the political consequences of cultural pluralism" and that it might be a matter of choice on the part of leaders in different cultural groups in plural societies to magnify or minimize cultural differences.[35]

Other exponents of the cultural pluralist school have modified the emphasis on the inevitability of conflict. Kuper, for example, argues that the relationship between pluralism and conflict is more problematic than Furnivall and Smith were prepared to concede. Such modifications notwithstanding, for all the cultural pluralists, the social system of the plural society is characterized by the coexistence of culturally distinct segments whose relations with each other are potentially if not actually conflictual.[36]

Geertz's famous statement of the matter, which itself is an elaboration of an earlier statement of Shils,[37] is similar in some respects to that of the theorists of the plural society. For Geertz, the array of ethnic groups that exist in any society

and the cultural baggage they carry with them are "givens." Ethnic identities are relatively fixed from birth or early life, are rooted in fact in the non-rational foundations of the human personality, and are, therefore, readily available for purposes of political mobilization by elites who wish to use or misuse them for political purposes. Such ethnic political mobilization brings different ethnic groups into conflict with each other and also creates a "tension between primordial and civil politics" that can be resolved ultimately only through an "integrative revolution." How such an integrative revolution was to be brought about was never made clear by Geertz, but Shils, who initially formulated the problem, thought it would be brought about through the tutelage of the great liberal cosmopolitan leaders of the postcolonial developing countries: men such as Nehru, Bourguiba, and Nyerere, with whom, clearly, Shils and most other liberal intellectuals of that time felt an ideological kinship.[38]

It is remarkable to what extent the pessimism concerning the future of multi-ethnic states has cut across ideological and analytical boundaries. Non-national or multi-national states in the developing world especially have been seen for the most part as either inherently unstable and non-viable in the long run or potentially viable only by means of an "integrative revolution." Existing Communist multi-national states such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are either considered viable only within the context of "proletarian internationalism" or are considered multi-ethnic empires that will ultimately disintegrate, depending upon one's ideological perspective.

I believe that the reasons for the common negative evaluation of the viability of multi-ethnic societies is the tendency for nearly all analysts, when they move from the group to the societal level, to analyze societal cleavages in terms of encounters between solidary groups [39] and to be relatively inattentive to questions of identity formation and internal conflict within the groups they consider the fundamental units of society. Even where analysts are attentive to processes of identity formation, as in the case of some Marxists, they are attentive only to one type, whose beginning and end are known, that is, the formation of a class-for-itself from a class-in-itself. Absent from Marxist analyses of processes of class formation, however, is a recognition of alternative processes of

identity formation with different beginnings and different end states, such as occur with ethnic formations. Most Marxists are also insufficiently attentive to specific formations or elites within particular classes, with interests of their own, whose actions may lead to other forms of social mobilization of peoples than the creation of self-conscious classes or to collaboration with other intra-class and intra-ethnic group formations that prevent or forestall any form of social mobiliza--tion for long periods. Moreover, when they move to societal-level analyses, most Marxists are less concerned with "intra-grouping cleavage" than with "conflict <u>between</u> major groupings (classes)."[40]

Insofar as the theorists of the plural society are concerned, Furnivall and Smith saw no need to raise the issue of identity formation at all since the groups they spoke of were, in their eyes, already cohesive self-contained entities. Van den Berghe has introduced an objective-subjective distinction into the analysis of the cultural sections of plural societies that is similar to the Marxist distinction between class category and self-conscious class. However, the cultural segments of the plural society are seen as constituting persistent objective categories in the population whose members may at any time arrive at a "subjective perception" of the objective differences between their group and other groups [41] that may lead to intense conflict. In effect, the view presented by van den Berghe is of groups with two modes, "objective" or inactive, and "subjective" or active, the latter being the conflictual mode.

An alternative approach to the standard sociological model of solidary groups in conflict or evolving toward conflict is one that begins with a model of intergroup relations that assumes both the existence of sub-groups within each class or ethnic category and of different relations between each sub-group within and across categorical boundaries.[42] While such an approach would maintain the objective-subjective distinction in analyzing the process of identity formation, thereby recognizing the possibility that objective categories may be self-conscious classes, ethnic communities, or nations, it would also remove the teleological assumptions from the analysis. The achievement of broad class or ethnic group consciousness would be recognized rather as a rare event, often conflictual and even pathological in its "end state," but

usually partial and short-lived even when it seems to have reached such a state. The "normal" reality, in contrast, would be recognized as one in which each sub-group has actual or potential relations of conflict or cooperation with every other sub-group that are more important or at least as important as the over-all relationship between the two groups.

It would be recognized also that, while ethnic mobilization that obliterates internal class distinctions and class mobilization that overrides ethnic distinctions may occur, it is also possible for ethnic elites from different ethnic groups to collaborate in relation to common class interests while retaining a strong sense of a separate ethnic identity. Such inter-ethnic class collaboration may take two forms. It may be a limited, informal economic collaboration or identity of interests that does not extend to social and political relationships where ethnicity may remain primary. It may also involve more institutionalised relationships such as those that exist in "consociational" regimes where elites from different ethnic groups collaborate on a regular basis to preserve both ethnic separateness and inter-ethnic elite dominance in relation to subordinate classes.[43]

Such an approach would be attentive to patterns of intersectional communication and collaboration between segments of separate ethnic groups. It would also avoid the usually untenable assumption that particular states are creatures of particular classes or ethnic groups and be attentive to the more usual reality, which is one of alliance between the state and particular subgroups within a class or ethnic group. Finally, it would involve an awareness that processes of collaboration with or competition against other groups lead to new perceptions concerning one's own identity and sometimes even to new and broader or narrower identities. Thus, from this perspective, ethnic identities would not be seen as fixed for life, but as variable, subject to change according to context and circumstance. It would also involve a realization that even more variable than ethnic identities are their manifestations in political form. Finally, it would qualify the common pessimism concerning the future of multi-ethnic societies and lead to an appreciation of the multiple possibilities for alliance and collaboration, as well as conflict, across ethnic group boundaries and between ethnic groups and the state.

The analytical implications of the shift from focussing discussion on conflict and integration in whole societies to discussion of processes of identity formation and decline and of sub-group relationships are the subject of the next section.

V. ETHNICITY AND ELITE COMPETITION FOR STATE POWER, STATE RESOURCES, AND LOCAL CONTROL: AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Prevailing theories of ethnic groups and the state all suffer from one or another of several problems that have been identified above: reification of either classes or ethnic groups or both; attempts to assert the primacy of one or another line of division, ethnicity or class, and to treat one as a mere representation of the other; inadequate treatment of internal divisions within classes and ethnic groups; an excessive concern with the issue of whether or not the state is an instrument of class or ethnic group domination and too little concern with specific state strategies and policies toward ethnic groups. In this section, I want to show how these problems can be avoided by adopting an alternative perspective from those discussed above.

The first step in any kind of social science analysis is to decide what the issues are and what units of analysis will be used to deal with them. In most of the literature discussed above, the issue is the possibilities of national integration in plural or multi-ethnic societies. The basic units of analysis are ethnic groups, generally treated as primordial groups or plural segments; classes, often presumed to have an "objective" reality underlying social conflicts whether or not the principal cleavages are ethnic, religious, or social; and the state, defined as being more or less dominated by or autonomous in relation to classes and ethnic groups.

An alternative starting point is to raise the issue of the conditions for identity formation among different groups in society and to ask what are the consequences for group formation of different types of state strategies and policies, leaving aside for the moment the issue of the stability or permanence of the existing states. The units of analysis then become ethnic and class categories and state strategies and policies. No assumptions are made about whether or not the various ethnic and class categories are primordial, given, or "objective" in the sense of one being more real than another. No

assumptions are made about whether or not the state is an instrument of class domination or of ethnic "parasitism."[44] The two inter-twined issues then become: first, explaining how and why some ethnic categories and not others, in particular times and places, form themselves into self-conscious communi--ties and take sometimes the further step of making demands for a greater share of state resources, for civil equality, for political recognition, or for sovereignty. On the other side, the issue is not or at least not only which groups dominate the state structure, but what specific alliance strategies and policies do they follow in relation to ethnic and cultural groups. Which groups are recognized, which not recognized? How are they recognized? Many categories and groups are not even recognized by the census authorities, that is, they are not even counted in the literal sense of the term and, in such cases, do not "count" politically in the figurative sense of the term. Some categories and groups are singled out for special protection or privilege by the state, given or denied citizenship, given or denied proportional or extra representation in electoral constituencies or government bodies or in government service. Some categories and groups are entitled to special protection of their language or religion or personal laws, some are not.

The view of the state that I wish to propose here is not that of an impartial arena in which organized interests compete and resolve their conflicts or of a relatively autonomous entity operating partly independently of the dominant classes or ethnic groups but acting to maintain a particular economic or racial order. Rather, I propose a view of the state as comprising a complex set of persisting institutions over which elites in conflict are engaged in a struggle for control. For this array of institutions, we conventionally use the shorthand term, "the state," which contributes to the tendency to reify this set of institutions. However, in this case, reification is not something that can be corrected by careful social science analysis. On the contrary, reification of the state is part of the process by which dominant groups in society establish either their right to rule or their right to compete for power and control over the institutions of "legitimate authority." The state is said to express the persisting interests, goals, and values of the "nation." Groups in conflict that confine their struggles to control over the existing institutions rather than to their

overthrow and replacement compete for the right to carry forward those interests, goals, and values or to articulate new ones, but always for the benefit of the nation as a whole and in the interests of the state as the political form of the nation. The state then becomes, especially in societies undergoing secularization, modernization, and industrialization both a resource and a distributor of resources, on the one hand, and a promoter of new values, on the other hand. Consequently, the state is also not simply an agency pursuing equality or distributive justice. The state and its policies are a potential benefit to some groups and communities, but they are also a threat to others, particularly to local elites and communities and to groups whose values differ from those of the secular, modernizing, industrializing state.

State strategies and policies change over time as different elites gain control over its commanding institutions, but dominant elites in society often remain in control for long periods of time during which they establish alliances and coalitions with other elites who control significant material or symbolic resources. In advanced industrial societies and in the larger and more complex multi-ethnic developing countries, one is not likely to find a small and easily identifiable "power elite" with interlocking connections. But, it is usually possible even in such societies to identify those groups that are disproportionately represented and favored in and by state institutions and state policies and with whom they ally in the broader society.

The state is itself both a resource and a distributor of resources. It is not an abstraction, but a set of repressive, allocative, and distributive institutions and decision-making bodies. Its functioning is facilitated and the potential for violent conflict in the struggle for control over it is reduced if the state operates behind a veil of legitimacy and if contestants in the struggle for control operate according to widely accepted rules. Therefore, all states have a legitimating ideology or "political formula" that provides a minimum basis of popular support for its actions irrespective of their content. The more stable regimes also have well-established procedures and conventions for securing influence or control over decision-making bodies that determine the content of state actions.

The state is also a threat, especially in developing or centralizing countries. Particularly in such countries, it threatens the power and authority of local elites who have previously maintained control over local populations relatively independently of or as locally autonomous agents of a central authority. It does so by the extension of its own bureaucratic apparatus for extracting resources, allocating benefits, and settling disputes. It does so also by attempting to instill loyalty to itself and its legitimating ideology in a direct relationship with the local population. Such a direct relationship is usually established by two methods: the establishment of government schools that socialize the population with a new set of values and the solicitation of popular support for new state projects and programs by leaders and political parties. Such projects and programs are usually justified by the promise of a different and better life for the people or their children and one also that will free them from the limitations and repressions of the life they have previously led under the control of locally dominant elites.

Since the state requires a legitimating ideology, it also poses a threat to the traditional controllers of symbols and values in society--the priests, ulama, rabbis, monks, and others--insofar as its premises are different, as they often are, from those held and taught by the latter. They tend to be different because most modern states seek to establish the bases for their authority in sources other than a deity, because they pursue secular goals, and because they arrogate to themselves the right to establish laws of behavior even in those areas such as the regulation of personal and family life that have traditionally been considered the prerogatives of the clerics or of sanctified customs and traditions interpreted by clerics.

The "development" process in centralizing, modernizing, industrializing states is usually accompanied by struggles for control at the center over the state as resource and distributor of resources and the state as a source and promoter of new values. It also often involves struggles for control between central authorities and local elites. At the center in such societies, the struggle tends to be dominated by elites in control of bureaucratic organizations such as the military, the civilian bureaucracy, and political parties. The struggle between the center and the localities may take the form of conflict between elites at the

center allying with forces in the localities opposed to the locally dominant elites or of conflict between the civilian bureaucratic apparatus or local political party organizations and local notables. The local elites are predominantly of two types: those who control the primary material resources, which is land for the most part in pre-industrial societies, and those who control symbolic resources, the clerics.

Alternatively, elites at the center may choose to extend their influence at the local level by allying with the locally dominant elites or by adopting a policy of non-interference with respect to religious and cultural matters but not in economic matters. Alliances and various collaborative arrangements are commonly made between central elites and local landlords, chiefs, and feudal patrons. Decisions by the center not to interfere in local religious practices are designed to prevent opposition from local religious elites. For example, it may be decided to leave them in control of schools or to prohibit competitive proselytization by outside elements.

Clearly, both types of conflicts--for control at the center and for control over local territories and communities--take on an added significance when elites in competition are from different ethnic groups and/or use different languages. The ability to mobilize large numbers of people around symbols and values with a high emotional potential is a major, though unstable, resource that can be brought into the fray against the controllers of bureaucratic apparatuses, instruments of violence, and land. They are likely to be used most by elites who lack bureaucratic instrumentalities or instruments of violence that can be deployed at will in a struggle. That means primarily political party elites and religious elites. Political parties that become institutionalized in the long run develop bureaucracies or extensive cadres of their own that can compete with those of the civilian and military bureaucracies. Religious elites also may control extensive networks of temples, shrines, endowments, and schools. However, in most developing countries, political party bureaucracies and cadres are not sufficiently well developed to compete effectively with or to maintain control over the civilian and military bureaucracies. The institutional resources that are controlled by religious elites, such as schools and shrines, also are usually no match for armies and state bureaucracies, though there have

been notable exceptions both in Western history and in that of contemporary developing countries. For the most part, however, particularly in developing countries, political parties and religious elites are effective rivals with the civilian and military bureaucracies because of their ability to mobilize popular support and because of their control over symbolic resources and values that are needed to legitimize authority.

In industrial and postindustrial societies that have developed a consensus on fundamental values and agreement on procedures, a stable division of function develops in which mass political parties with their own bureaucracies and cadres exercise effective control over the civilian and military bureaucracies both because they have the organizational strength to do so and because they have established effective control over the deployment of the secular symbolic resources of the society. In such societies, the religious authorities either provide additional symbolic support for political authority or they remove themselves from the competitive political sphere altogether. Such societies are rare and the neat division of functions just described is fragile. Moreover, even in societies where a stable balance of this sort seems to be well-established, social and economic changes in a local community and new encroachments by already centralized states or expansions in their sphere of activities may precipitate new center-locality conflicts in which issues of language and religion come into play again and provide bases for ethnic political mobilization.[45]

The view of the state, then, that is being proposed here is not simply an arena or an instrument of a particular class or ethnic group, though it may sometimes be one or the other. More broadly, however, the state is itself the greatest prize and resource, over which groups engage in a continuing struggle in societies that have not developed stable relationships among the main institutions and centrally organized social forces. It is also a distributor of resources, which is nearly always done differentially. It is also a threat to locally dominant landed elites and to religious leaders, particularly in developing countries. Elites who seek to gain control over or who have succeeded in gaining control over the state must either suppress and control central and local rivals or establish collaborative alliances with

other elites. When elites in conflict lack the bureaucratic apparatus or the instruments of violence to compete effectively, they will use symbolic resources in the struggle. When elites in conflict come from different cultural, linguistic, or religious groups, the symbolic resources used will emphasize those differences.

It is not always necessary to answer the question of which groups actually control the state apparatus and what purposes, revealed or hidden, they hope to achieve by the policies they pursue to assess the specific consequences for the formation, persistence, or transformation of a group's identity and cohesion of particular state alliance strategies and policies. The questions I propose, rather, are how particular strategies and policies affect the formation of groups in the first place or the persistence of particular groups already formed.

One initial aspect of state policy that has been given considerable attention in the literature on ethnicity is the differential allocation of state resources, particularly government jobs, among different ethnic groups. In fact, there is a school of ethnicity or an approach to ethnicity that takes the position that ethnic competition for state power and state resources is the heart of the matter of ethnic group formation.[46] Ethnic categories develop self-consciousness and identity when persons of that category perceive that persons from another category are getting a disproportionate share of government jobs. Or, alternatively, it is argued that the state, by deliberately pursuing quota policies or policies of "affirmative action," precipitates the formation of new ethnic groups or new identities among previously dormant ethnic groups who wish to take advantage of the opportunities made available by the state or resent the benefits provided to other groups than their own, as a consequence of which they may develop a sense of being discriminated against. In some formulations of this approach, contemporary ethnic groups, far from being seen as primordial groups, are viewed as merely another type of interest group among other groups competing for scarce resources in the modern state.

The "resource competition" approach to ethnicity has much to recommend it because, clearly, this is a primary form in which ethnic group relations are conducted. Treating ethnic groups as just another type of interest group, however, is an analytical error, for it ignores the cultural matters that are important to all ethnic groups and

that distinguish such groups from other types of interest associations. Ethnic groups, by definition, like the state itself, are concerned not only with material interests but with symbolic interests. Moreover, no matter how old or new, "genuine" or "artificial," rich or superficial, the culture of a particular ethnic group may be, its culture and the definition of its boundaries are critical matters that do not arise in the same way for other interest groups. The culture and the boundaries of an ethnic group are nearly always problematic in one sense or another. Most important, the definition and articulation of the central values of the group and, consequently, decisions concerning which persons are rightfully members of the group are matters of frequent concern within it. That means that issues of control over the community and its central values and symbolic expressions are also a matter of recurring concern.[47]

It is this dimension of group dynamics that both the plural society and the interest group schools of ethnicity overlook. The plural society theorists--and the primordialists--treat ethnic groups as unitary and given. They consider their work of characterizing these groups as done when they have specified the extent of institutional separateness of one group from another and/or the type of cross-cutting cleavages that exist between two groups. The internal struggles within the group on these very matters are ignored. The interest group theorists who concentrate only on the material demands of ethnic groups are even less concerned with these matters.

The neglect in most of the sociological and political science literature on ethnicity of matters of internal definition and control and the focus on so-called "objective" factors has meant also an exclusive focus on ethnic group relations, which in turn are not fully understood because half the important matters are left out of account. One consequence of the attention to "objective" factors and intergroup relations is an inability to deal with or even comprehend, let alone predict, the ebb and flow of ethnicity and nationalism among particular peoples at different times and the sometimes dramatic shifts in ethnic group identifications. Theorists of the plural society, for example, cannot begin to explain why most Muslims in south India with similar Islamic values and institutions to those of Muslims in the north have had more peaceful relations with Hindus on the

whole than Muslims in the north and did not support the Pakistan movement until its closing stages, why the Pakistan movement could not provide a sustaining ideology for the Pakistan state after independence, why that state ultimately disintegrated in 1971, and why its future remains still uncertain. For the theorists of the plural society, the Muslims of India would be simply a plural segment, rather than a category containing a multiplicity of different ethnic groups, ideological tendencies, and religious sects. If they were to probe deeper, they might argue that there were plural segments within the broader Muslim plural segment, they might also argue consistently with their theoretical position that differences in intergroup relations with Hindus--an even more dubious plural segment--explain the differential orientations of Muslims in north and south India. However, they would still not be in a position to understand or predict the course of identity formation, intergroup relations, and political demands because their theory does not direct them to the intragroup conflict within the various Muslim communities for self-definition and for control that are indispensable to a full understanding of the rise, decline, and resurgence of Muslim separatism in South Asia.

Nor can the interest group theorists provide any help on these matters, for their theory offers no basis for distinguishing one ethnic group from another. They are all treated as if they were creatures of the opportunities made available by the state. They come and go as the opportunities come and go. But the facts are otherwise: some come and go, but some remain to fight another day, often in different clothes. Those that do remain are the ones that are engaged in internal struggles as well as making external demands. In fact, it can be asserted that only those ethnic groups that do engage in recurring internal argument and struggles for control over the meanings of the values and symbols of the group and over its boundaries are likely to have sufficient dynamism to persist through time.

A recognition of the critical importance of intragroup struggles for control and of the right to speak on behalf of the group also helps to resolve the persisting difficulties in the literature on ethnicity that arise from reification and objectification of the categories, ethnic group and classes, and that have made most treatments of the relations between class and ethnicity deficient in one way or

another. For, once it is recognized that the processes of ethnic--and class--identity formation and of intergroup relations always have a dual dimension, of interaction/competition with external groups and of an internal struggle for control of the group, then the direction for research on ethnicity and on the relationships between ethnic groups and the state are clear. It becomes critical to have analytical categories that can be used to analyze both the internal conflicts and the external relations of the group and the points of intersection between the two.

Without such categories, it is not possible to analyze with any precision the relations between the state and ethnic groups. For, state authorities do not deal with abstractions and with solidary groups, but with particular leaders and elites. At times, they hope that the leaders and elites with whom they choose to deal can carry their group with them solidly as a support for the legitimacy of the state or as a bank of votes for the ruling party. At other times, they hope that the leaders with whom they ally have sufficient influence to divide a group that has opposed the state or the ruling party.

Elsewhere, I have shown that it is possible to specify the major lines of division within and and between ethnic groups both in pre-industrial and in industrializing societies, the possible conflicts and alignments that may develop between elites, and the consequences of particular conflicts and alliances for ethnic group identity and politicization.[48] In pre-industrial societies, the primary issues are not, in fact, allocation of state resources, but control of local communities, which is an issue both within ethnic groups and between ethnic groups and external forces, including other ethnic groups and the state. Since, in pre-industrial societies, the principal source of political and economic power is control over the land and the principle source of social control is religion, the main lines of conflict involve the local landowning and religious elites in conflict with each other or with alien elements.

In the struggle for control over local communities, three characteristic lines of conflict may develop with different consequences for identity formation and for state control (see Figure 1.1). One potential line of conflict is between a local aristocracy attempting to maintain its privileges against an alien conquering group or against

Figure 1.1: Patterns of Elite Competition/Collaboration, State Action, and Ethnic Mobilization/Assimilation in Pre-Industrial Societies

	Pattern			Role of State	Likely Consequences	Examples
I. A.	Local Aristocracy	vs.	Alien Conqueror or Centralizing State	Antagonistic	Rebellion or defeat/displacement of local aristocracy, sometimes involving local ethnic separatism	Imposition of non-Czech, Catholic landlord class in Czech lands by Habsburgs in 17th C.[a]
						Indian Mutiny of 1857
						Magyar "aristocratic nationalism" of 18th C.[a]
B.	Local Aristocracy	collaborates with	Alien Conqueror or Centralizing State	Collaborationist (Indirect Rule)	Ethnic Dormancy ("Clientelistic Loyalties")	Anglicized Welsh aristocracy in Wales in 19th C.
						Malay Sultans during British rule
						Indian Princes, Talukdars, and Zamindars during British rule
						Sub-Saharan African Chiefs during Colonial rule
						Southern feudal patrons in Italy after 1860[b]
II.	Local Religious Elite "A"	vs.	External Missionaries or Dominant Religiously Distinct External Group	Neutral or Supports One Side	Ethnoreligious Mobilization	Competitive Hindu-Muslim-Sikh-English Missionary proselytization in Punjab in 19th C.
	Local Religious Elite "B"					Competitive proselytization in eastern Europe in 18th-19th C.[a]

III.	Local Religious Elite	vs.	Local Collaborationist Aristocracy	Supports Aristocracy	Ethnoreligious Mobilization	Nonconformist ministers leading nonconformist tenantry in Wales against Anglican, Anglicized Welsh landlord class
						Split in north India between "traditionalist" ulema of Deoband and aristocratic modernists of Aligarh Muslim University
IV.	Local Religious Elite	vs.	Local, but Alien Aristocracy	Supports Aristocracy	Ethnoreligious Mobilization	Buddhist monks against Christian Missionary schools and Europeanized collaborationist aristocratic elite in Sri Lanka
						Parish priests and lower clergy against Magyar nobility in Slovakia and Transylvania; against Turks in Serbia and Bulgaria; against Magyar and Magyarized Romanian aristocracy (Catholic and Calvinist) in Romania[a]

[a] These examples were used in an earlier presentation of this schemata in Paul R. Brass, "Ethnic Groups and Nationalities: The Formation, Persistence and Transformation of Ethnic Identities," in Peter F. Sugar (ed.), Ethnic Diversity and Conflict in Eastern Europe (Santa Barbara, Ca.: ABC-Clio, 1980), pp. 15 ff., where the sources for these examples also are given.
[b] See Alberto Palloni, "Internal Colonialism or Clientelistic Politics? The Case of Southern Italy," Ethnic and Racial Studies, II, No. 3 (July, 1979), 360-377.

centralizing state power. In that struggle, the local aristocracy may choose to fight and to mobilize the community by an appeal to ethnic or religious values or it may choose to collaborate, thereby postponing or preventing ethnic mobilization and nationalism. Most native aristocracies choose the second path when it is left open to them. A second line of conflict is between competing religious elites from different ethnic groups: between external missionaries and native religious elites or between competing local religious elites for control over the allegiances of marginal groups. In either case, ethnic or ethnoreligious mobilization is very likely to take place. If the state is seen as supporting an external force, then that ethnoreligious mobilization may be directed against the state and its authority.

A third type of elite conflict in pre-industrial societies is predominantly intra-ethnic in form. It occurs when a local, indigenous aristocracy collaborates with external authority, typically the colonial state. The local aristocracy may or may not convert to the religion of the dominant authorities, but its members generally adopt some aspects of their culture and behavior. For example, in the typical Western colonial setting, they may or may not become Christian, but they usually adopt Western values. If the local religious elites feel that their authority is being threatened or the values that sustain their relationship with their followers are being undermined, they may promote the mobilization of their followers in ethno-religious terms. A fourth type of elite conflict is a variation on the third that was common in Eastern Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in which the local aristocracy is not only collaborationist but alien.

While these four types of elite conflict in pre-industrial societies, especially the first three, are simple in form, there are complexities that are not easily reduced to a two-dimensional chart. Even so, however, the basic patterns may be recognizable within the complexities. For example, David Laitin, in his work on internal divisions among the Yoruba people,[49] has attempted to explain the greater salience and persistence into contemporary times of "ancestral city" in contrast to religion as a form of identification in the face of the greater sociocultural significance of religion than place of origin in contemporary Yoruba social relations. His explanation is provided in

terms that fit well into the basic patterns of Figure 1.1. In his explanation, the British policy of indirect rule in Yorubaland involved not only collaboration with local chiefs, but the selection of some chiefs for special status. In Yorubaland, the King of Oyo and his city were singled out for special favor, especially in relation to the modernizing, more cosmopolitan city of Ibadan, but also in relation to other, more traditional cities such as Ife, Ijebu, and Ekiti. Insofar as religion was concerned, however, the British, who originally supported Christian missionary activity, reversed that policy to one of neutrality and occasionally even support for Muslim religious institutions. The primary route to political favor, however, was through identification with one's ancestral city and the primary form of political competition was between persons from different cities. That competition intensified as modernization proceeded and the people of Ibadan moved ahead of those of Oyo despite British protection--in fact, because of British protection--of traditional Oyo political authority and social structure.

In terms of the typical conflict patterns identified in Figure 1.1, therefore, what we have in Yorubaland is a variation that has developed as follows. There were two principal forms of local conflict: between local chiefs from different cities and between Muslim and Christian missionaries. The state supported the local chiefs in general, but favored some chiefs over others and some cities over others. The state remained neutral with regard to religion. The consequence was the politicization of sub-group identities along the lines of ancestral origin and the depoliticization of religious identities.

The Yoruba case of depoliticization of religious cleavages, of course, contrasts quite sharply with the situations that developed in India under British rule, particularly in Punjab and Bengal. In those two regions, religious cleavages between Hindus and Muslims (and Sikhs as well in the Punjab) were the fundamental politicized cleavages. In contrast to the situation in Nigeria, religious divisions were recognized by the British and religious competition was encouraged by the creation of separate electorates for the main religious communities and by other forms of direct political acknowledgment by the British of the significance the colonial regime attached to religious differences.

In modernizing and in postindustrial societies, when new opportunities arise, most of them created by the state, for educational advancement and for new kinds of employment, other kinds of conflicts develop (see Figure 1.2). They arise because of two processes often precipitated by state action. One is the almost invariably uneven spread of education, industrialization, and employment opportunities across regions, communities, castes, and classes. The second is the creation of new elite groups out of processes of social change, particularly educated elites in search of government employment and professional groups in private practice operating in relative freedom from old forms of social control and creating new types of community networks through their own professional activities. The spread of non-religious education, including exposure to Marxist, nationalist, and other contemporary political ideologies also promotes tendencies toward secularization and leads to the rise of new secular elites, oriented toward achieving political power in institutions and arenas created by the modern state.

These two types of processes in turn precipitate two characteristic and well-known types of conflicts that affect the formation or transformation of ethnic group identities and the relationships between ethnic groups and the state. One is competition between persons from different ethnic categories or regions for government jobs, for places in educational institutions, and for representation in elected and appointed government bodies. Sometimes such competition occurs initially between ethnic categories that have very little subjective self-consciousness as communities. For example, in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Madras province in India, disappointed job applicants from the more advanced of the non-Brahman castes and fathers who wished to see their sons advance in government service discovered that Brahmans occupied an overwhelmingly disproportionate share of government jobs. Neither non-Brahmans, who formed 97 percent of the population nor Brahmans, who formed three percent, were anything but ethnic categories without an underlying social reality and solidarity. However, the non-Brahman movement merged with a cultural movement that asserted the distinctiveness of Dravidian south Indian culture, of which Tamil culture was a part, identified that culture with non-Brahmans as a whole, branded Brahmans as historic invaders from the north, and used these new symbolic constructions to provide a

Figure 1.2: Patterns of Elite Competition/Collaboration, State Action, and Ethnic Mobilization/Assimilation in Modernizing and Post-Industrial Societies

	Pattern	Role of State	Likely Consequences	Examples
I.	Ethnic Educated Elite "A" vs. Ethnic Educated Elite "B" / Ethnic Educated Elite "C"	Neutral or Supports One Side	Ethnocultural, ethnolinguistic or caste mobilization	Blacks vs. other minority vs. privileged white ethnic groups in U.S. Brahman/non-Brahman conflict in Madras Malay vs. Chinese and Indian educated commercial elites
II.	Local Religious Elite vs. Local Secular Educated Elite vs. External Ethnic Elite	Neutral or Supports One Side	Competing religious and secular nationalism or Only secular nationalism	Mid-20th C. Quebec[a]
III.	Local Ethnic Educated Elite assimilates Dominant Ethnic Group	Supports Assimilation	Assimilation (may or may not be permanent)	Jews in Hungary during mid-19th C.[b]

[a] See, for example, Kenneth McRoberts, "Internal Colonialism: The Case of Quebec," Ethnic and Racial Studies, II, No. 3 (July, 1979), 293-318.
[b] See George Barany, "'Magyar Jew or: Jewish Magyar'? (To the Question of Jewish Assimilation in Hungary)," Canadian-American Slavic Studies, VIII, No. 1 (Spring, 1974).

stronger social basis for their economic demands.[50] The movement ultimately did not lead to the creation of a non-Brahman ethnic community as such, but rather, through a larger process of change, became transformed into a movement of Tamil regional nationalism with the Tamil language as its central symbol. The political spokesmen for Tamil nationalism claimed to represent the culture and interests of the Tamil-speaking people as a whole against alleged dangers from New Delhi and north India. The symbols of Tamil regional nationalism ultimately came to provide a new context in which elites came to struggle for control over the government and administration of a Tamil-speaking province. The point here is that resource competition by itself does not produce ethnic political cohesion. It must be associated with groups that have a common pool of symbols to draw upon and an elite or elites capable of transmitting to the ethnic group(s) a sense of increasing attachment to those symbols as a basis for social and political mobilization. In Tamil Nadu, transcendent symbols of Tamil regional nationalism ultimately prevailed over the symbols of social protest associated with intercaste relations in a long historical process of identity transformation in which both the elites in conflict and the broader political context of struggle also changed dramatically. The relationship between elite competition and ethnic identity formation, therefore, is not to be seen as either wholly material in character or as producing instant ethnic communities.

The role that the state plays in such situations is often to support the non-dominant groups. It may do so for several different reasons. In the case of Brahman-non-Brahman conflict in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Madras, the British supported the non-Brahmans in part because they themselves feared the disproportionate dominance of Brahmans in the administrative service and because they resented Brahman participation in the developing nationalist movement. They therefore supported non-Brahmans with a view toward creating a counterweight against Brahman dominance in public life.

In the United States after World War II, the federal government has consistently and increasingly intervened on the side of the Black middle class with legislation and programs to eliminate discrimination, to provide employment in government and

higher levels of industry, and to provide higher educational opportunities. It has done so largely because the social and ideological climate changed in such a way as to make it politically necessary for political parties to compete for the support both of a liberal white middle class in sympathy with Black aspirations and for the support of the increasing Black population in the northern cities. Government support for Black middle class aspirations then led to the so-called "backlash" and counter-mobilization of white ethnic groups.

Whether or not one wishes to characterize state policy in these two instances as "divide and rule" tactics or a search for collaborators or an opportunistic desire for electoral support, the two situations illustrate the point that state policy is not a simple reflection of the "interests" of a dominant class or ethnic group in maintaining its dominance. At the same time, they also illustrate how state policy may lead to long-term collaboration with particular segments of an ethnic group, which in turn influences processes of ethnic mobilization and counter-mobilization. Finally, however, while the state's action may precipitate new forms of ethnic mobilization, it does not determine the outcome, that is, the ultimate extent of internal solidarity achieved by ethnic groups. That result is likely to be more influenced ultimately by internal changes and conflicts among segments within the group and external relations between elites and segments of other ethnic groups.

The second type of conflict in modernizing and post-industrial societies is between old religious elites and new secular elites which, in turn, may take two forms: a struggle for a redefinition of the central values and purposes of the group and/or a struggle between the two for support within the community and the right to represent the community in relations with outside forces, particularly the state authorities, and in new state institutions. In either case, the state authorities often choose to intervene since they too have an interest in control over local communities and in who comes forth to represent them. The state, for example, may choose to support the religious elites by agreeing to leave either personal law or education in their hands or it may promote civil law and secular education. When the state supports religious elites, secular elites from different ethnoreligious groups may join hands and form alliances against the state authorities.

Sometimes, the two types of conflicts--external competition for jobs with other ethnic groups and internal struggles for control--may become intertwined. For example, the secular elites from one religious group may try to mobilize the group as a whole to assist them in the scramble for jobs and political advancement by claiming that the disadvantages of its elites are a threat to or insult to the group as a whole. The secular elites may then find they need the support of the religious elites in order to mobilize the community effectively.

Two further examples will help in illustrating the consequences for ethnic identity formation and mobilization of interelite competition and the specific role of the state. Both examples are noted in Figure 1.3. The first concerns Acadian nationalism in the Canadian province of New Brunswick from 1860 to the present and is drawn from the work of Fox, Aull, and Cimino.[51] According to Fox and his co-authors, Acadian nationalism has passed through several stages in the past century. Between 1860 and 1960, when it moved through its formative phases, there were two important developments. The first was the creation of "an Acadian elite consisting mainly of clerics, but including lay professionals, lawyers, doctors, and teachers," produced from College St. Joseph founded in 1864.[52] The second was the development of conflict between the French Catholic clergy and the English-speaking Irish church hierarchy. These two developments led to the formation of a "French Catholic" Acadian ethnic identity.

The current phase, which began in the 1960s, developed out of intra-ethnic elite conflict between the older church-dominated Acadian elite and a new secular political leadership. The latter, led by Louis J. Robichaud, the first Acadian premier of the province, promoted new secular programs, including secular schools, that threatened church control and authority. Out of this conflict, in which the state supported the new secular political elite, a new Acadian nationalist organization led by the new elite was created that displaced the older Acadian nationalist organization. After the replacement of the Robichaud government in 1970 by a provincial government less favorable to French Acadian interests, the new secular Acadian elite became involved in confrontation with the provincial government over enforcement of the federal government's bilingual policies in the province.

The French Acadian example illustrates several features of the process of identity formation. First, it demonstrates that ethnic mobilization is promoted or limited by specific elites. Second, it shows that intra-ethnic elite conflict can be as important in ethnic mobilization as inter-ethnic conflict. Third, it indicates how boundary definition also may change when the dominant elite in control of the movement changes, in this case moving from a French Catholic religious identification to a French Acadian identity in which the religious aspect is far less prominent than the linguistic. Finally, it demonstrates the critical role that the state may play in shifting the balance of power within an ethnic group by allying with one sub-group rather than another.

A particularly interesting and complex example from the post-Independence Indian Punjab, on which there is much information,[53] brings out clearly the critical importance in the course of ethnic group relations of intragroup conflicts, of relations between sub-groups across communal boundaries, and of the role of the state (see Figure 1.3, pattern IV). It also illustrates how the political definition and boundaries of an ethnic group may change in the course of political conflict and negotiation.

In the aftermath of the partition of the Indian Punjab in 1947 and the integration of the semi-autonomous Sikh princely states into the province of east Punjab, a new Punjab province came into existence in India. In the conventional classificatory terms of the census and common opinion, the new Punjab contained two religious communities, Hindus and Sikhs, two principal languages, Hindi and Punjabi, and two geographical regions, Punjab proper and Haryana. In the province as a whole, Punjabi-speaking Sikhs were in a minority and Hindi-speaking Hindus in a majority. In Punjab proper, however, the position was reversed.

After partition in 1947 and for the next two decades, a long-established Sikh political party, the Akali Dal, demanded the creation of a separate Sikh state within the Indian Union to be created out of the Sikh-majority areas of the province. Agitations, negotiations, struggles, and compromises occurred off and on between 1947 until the creation of a Punjabi Suba in 1966, defined not as a Sikh province but as a Punjabi-speaking province, though it was also a Sikh majority province in fact. A

Figure 1.3: Patterns of Elite Competition/Collaboration, State Action, and Ethnic Mobilization/Assimilation: Variants Identified or Discussed in This Volume

	Pattern	Role of State	Consequence	Example
I.	Native Industrial/Commercial Elite vs. Native Urban Middle Class vs. Working Class (Native / Immigrant)	Supports Industrial/Commercial Elites	Ethnic mobilization led by urban middle class supported by native working class	Basque nationalism in Spain
II.	Regional/Local Ethnic Bourgeoisie vs. Dominant Ethnic or Inter-Ethnic Bourgeoisie; Regional/Local Ethnic Lower Clergy vs. Dominant Ethnic Clerical Hierarchy	Supports Dominant Bourgeoisie and Clergy	Regional ethno-religious mobilization	Slovakia in late 19th and early 20th C.
III. A.	French Catholic Clergy vs. English-Speaking Irish Church Hierarchy	Neutral	Limited ethno-religious ("French Catholic") mobilization	French Acadians, 1860-1960
B.	French Catholic Clergy vs. New Secular Political Elite; vs. Dominant English Community	Federal Government Supports New Secular Political Elite	Ethnolinguistic mobilization	French Acadians, 1960-present

IV.



Supports Secular Congress Sikhs

Competitive ethno-religious and ethno-linguistic mobilization

Punjabi Suba movement in 1960s

dramatic turning-point in the conflict occurred in 1960-61 when two of the leading personalities in the Sikh movement went on fasts-unto-death on behalf of the Sikh demand. A change in the leadership of the movement occurred at that time that led finally to the agreement between the Akali Dal and the government of India by which the Punjabi Suba was created.

During the course of the conflict, it often appeared to be and occasionally was in fact true that there were two relatively solidary communities locked in a struggle with each other that often threatened to turn violent. The militant spokesmen of the two sides defined the two sides as Punjabi-speaking Sikhs and Hindi-speaking Hindus. One sub-group, Punjabi-speaking Hindus, believed so strongly in the opposition between the two blocs that they disavowed their own mother tongue in the census declarations and sent their children to Hindi-medium schools.

Insiders, however, especially Congress leaders in the province, knew better. In fact, there were five significant sub-groups and several others of importance as well. However, for purposes of this analysis, it will be sufficient to discuss the conflict in relation to these five groups only. Within the Akali Sikh community, there were two leadership groups with different social bases: urban refugee Sikhs from the Pakistan Punjab led by Master Tara Singh and rural Jat Sikhs, whose principal symbolic leader became Sant Fateh Singh. There was also a leadership group of "secular" Sikhs in the Congress, whose most important leader in the late 1950s and early 1960s was the state's chief minister, Pratap Singh Kairon. Among Hindus, there were two principal sub-groups: rural Hindi-speaking Hindus concentrated in Haryana, whose political spokesmen were predominantly in the Congress, and urban Punjabi-speaking Hindus, whose leaders were either in the Congress or in the Hindu communal party, the Jan Sangh.

On the face of it, the conflict was an intractable struggle between two solidary groups defined in religious communal terms over the demand for a state in which the Sikh religious group would be a majority and the Hindus a minority. It conjured up prospects of violence in an area that had emerged from catastrophic religious communal violence within the living memory of all participants in the struggle. Yet a compromise ultimately was reached by which the Sikh demand was conceded, but its terms redefined. The compromise also was

facilitated by a change in the leadership group of the Akali Dal.

In order for the Punjabi Suba compromise of 1966 to be worked out, however, the various divisions within the two communities had to be exploited and made manifest. Pettigrew describes the intricate manoeuvers by which the secular Congress Sikhs exploited the divisions between the followers of Master Tara Singh and Sant Fateh Singh in such a way that the latter emerged as the preeminent leader of the Akali Dal.[54] Sant Fateh Singh was an acceptable leader of the Sikh community in the eyes of the Congress, largely because his definition of the Sikh demand as one for a Punjabi-speaking state rather than a Sikh religious state was considered negotiable whereas the demand for a Sikh state was not.

On the other side, the Hindus too had to be divided. Specifically, the rural Hindi-speaking Hindus had to be separated from the urban Punjabi-speaking Hindus, who were the principal social subgroup opposed to the demand. This split ultimately developed for two principal reasons: the Congress Hindu political leaders of Haryana would acquire power in the new province of Haryana to be separated from Punjab and they would avoid the unpopular imposition on the population of Hindi-speakers of the province of the burden of having their children required to learn Punjabi in school, which was becoming a political liability for them.

In these conflicts and compromises among sub-groups, the state--both the provincial and Union governments--played an active and partial role. It did not, however, act as an instrument of domination of one group, class or ideological tendency over another. It was not an instrument of Hindus or of intercommunal secularists promoting an "integrative revolution." Rather, it was a powerful, skillful external force operating within, and on behalf of, one subgroup in the politics of the province, working for a political bargain consistent on the face of it with its political principles and one that would also permit the ruling party to emerge from the struggle without losing its base of support in the region.

Nor is there anything unique about the Punjab situation described above. Although it was more complex than most ethnic group conflicts, the situation has a very close parallel in Belgian ethnic group relations, as described in this volume and elsewhere.

It should be evident from this brief survey of some of the principal lines of intergroup and intragroup conflict that it is a great fallacy and an analytical distortion of very serious proportions to continue to use the term "plural segments" to refer to the divisions and cleavages in multi-ethnic societies. It should also be clear why the interest group theory of ethnicity is extremely superficial and takes us nowhere in understanding the issues of identity formation and, therefore, of ethnic persistence in contemporary industrial societies. It provides no basis whatsoever for analyzing the internal processes by which group cohesion is created.

Thus, the two types of theories are, in a sense, opposite sides of the same coin. Theorists of the plural society objectify ethnic groups and, therefore, ignore the internal conflicts within groups and the possibilities for change and for alliances between elites of different ethnic groups as well. Interest group theorists ignore the internal processes of consolidation within ethnic groups by which solidarity may (or may not) be achieved for a time and, therefore, cannot distinguish an ethnic category from an ethnic community or the latter from any other type of interest association.

Finally, two points need to be emphasized about the elite competition theory of ethnic group formation and ethnic group conflict. The first is that it is not an "elitist" theory. It is not assumed that elites can do whatever they wish with the cultures and symbols of the groups they seek to represent. It is, rather, assumed that some elites can sometimes get away with representing their groups to the state authorities even without a popular base, especially when the state authorities for their own purposes wish to recognize them as the group's sole representative. However, in a free competition with other elites from their own groups or with elites from other ethnic groups, it matters a great deal how effective competing elites are in interpreting, reinterpreting, and manipulating the symbols of the group for purposes of political mobilization. Such availability will depend upon such factors as the existence of a socially mobilized population, in Deutsch's sense of the term, and the existence of historical and/or contemporary grievances and hostilities in relation to other groups or to the state.[55] However, it is central to the argument here that elites and interelite competition of specific types and alliance patterns with the state are the critical preci-

pitants in ethnic group conflict and political mobilization. All other factors, including the richness or paucity of available cultural symbols, regional economic inequalities, patterns of differential social mobilization, and the like are but backdrops and resources for elites to draw upon for the purpose. Without elite entry into such situations, injustices and inequalities may be accepted, cultural decline or assimilation may occur, and grievances may be expressed in isolated, anomic, or sporadic forms of conflict and disorder. Moreover, skilful elites who lack such "objective" bases for mobilization as, say, systematic discrimination or evident regional inequalities will often create images or perceptions of them by magnifying minor cases of discrimination or specific instances of regional inequality.

The second point is that the term elite is not meant to be used as a substitute for class, but is meant to refer to formations within ethnic groups and classes that often play critical roles in ethnic mobilization. Thus, aristocratic elites clearly belong to a specific class within an ethnic group; religious elites refer to the clerics, priests, ulama, rabbis, whose class origins may or may not be relevant, and often are not relevant, to their ability to control or mobilize their communities; secular elites may come from many different classes. Each of these elite groups may choose to act in terms of ethnic appeals or in terms of class appeals. Neither their ethnicity nor their class predetermines their action. Rather, their specific relationship to competing elites in struggles for control over their ethnic group or in competition with persons from other ethnic categories and groups for scarce political and economic benefits and resources are the critical factors.

FOOTNOTES

1. The term "ethnic group" in this chapter will be used in the most general and generic sense, rather than in the specific sense of a concrete, corporately organized entity. I view the process of ethnic identity formation as a movement from an ethnic category to an ethnic community, from a merely objectively distinct cultural cluster of people to a subjectively conscious social formation. The term "ethnic group" will be used simply for

generalized references encompassing ethnic formations at any point along that continuum. For a more extended discussion of the definitional issue, see Paul R. Brass, "Ethnicity and Nationality Formation," Ethnicity, III, No. 3 (1976), 225-228.

2. Alfred Stepan, The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 11-14.

3. Ibid., p. 15.

4. Ibid., p. 16.

5. V. I. Lenin, State and Revolution (New York: International Publishers, 1932), p. 9.

6. For useful analyses of the views of this group of Marxist theorists, see Robert Solo, "The Neo-Marxist Theory of the State," Journal of Economic Issues, XII, No. 4 (December, 1978), 829-842 and Boris Frankel, "On the State of the State: Marxist Theories of the State after Leninism," Theory and Society, VII (1979), 199-242. The idea of the relative autonomy of the state was, in fact, present in Marx's work in Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (New York: International Publishers, 1963), esp. pp. 122-123.

7. Solo, p. 841.

8. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World-Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), esp. p. 187.

9. See, for example, Immanuel Wallerstein, "The World System: The States in the Institutional Vortex of the Capitalist World-Economy," International Social Science Journal, XXXII, No. 4 (1980), 747-748.

10. Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975).

11. M. G. Smith, The Plural Society in the British West Indies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 86-88 and Leo Kuper, "Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems," in Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith (eds.), Pluralism in Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 13.

12. Ibid., pp. 13-14.

13. Pierre L. van den Berghe, "Pluralism and the Polity: A Theoretical Exploration," in Kuper and Smith, p. 67.

14. Hechter, for example, allows for the existence of nation-states and segmentary states as well as internal colonial states. They are hardly discussed, however. See Hechter, Internal Colonialism, p. 48 and Michael Hechter and Margaret

Levi, "The Comparative Analysis of Ethnoregional Movements," in <u>Ethnic and Racial Studies</u>, II, No. 3 (July, 1979), 264. Van den Berghe and other theorists of the plural society have tended toward trichotomous classifications of states according to whether or not they are plural societies and, if they are plural, whether or not they are dominated by a minority ethnic group. See, for example, Pierre L. van den Berghe, <u>The Ethnic Phenomenon</u> (New York: Elsevier, 1981), pp. 78-82.

15. Douglas Rae, "The Egalitarian State: Notes on a System of Contradictory Ideals," <u>Daedalus</u>, CVIII, No. 4 (Fall, 1979), 37-54. I do not believe that Rae's analysis is meant as an argument against egalitarian policies. It is certainly not my point here, which is meant only to demonstrate the difficulties faced even by states that deliberately pursue equalitarian policies in achieving equalitarian results. The inability to achieve ideals in an imperfect world is never an argument against their pursuit. D. John Grove, in his cross-national quantitative studies of the effects of public policies in promoting ethnic equality, has argued that such "policies are an important mechanism in promoting greater ethnic equality," but that they also "often create new disparities;" see his "Does Economic Development Create a More Equitable Ethnic Distribution," unpublished paper prepared for the International Political Science Association's round table on "Politics and Ethnicity," St. Anthony's College, Oxford, 26-28 March, 1979, pp. 15-16. Rae's point is that a close examination of all equalizing policies will reveal contradictions of one sort or another. Obviously, however, some inequalities may be considered more or less acceptable in different societies at different times.

For a careful assessment of preferential policies designed to promote equality among ethnic groups in India with explicit comparisons to similar policies in the U.S., see Myron Weiner and Mary F. Katzenstein, <u>India's Preferential Policies: Migrants, the Middle Classes, and Ethnic Equality</u> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). See also the rather more polemical than logical updating of Nathan Glazer's views on these issues for the U.S. in his "Affirmative Discrimination: Where Is It Going?" <u>International Journal of Comparative Sociology</u>, XX, Nos. 1-2 (1978), 14-30.

16. <u>Ibid</u>., pp. 37-38.

17. For an interesting and exceptional neo-Marxist comparative analysis of South Africa, Alabama, Northern Ireland, and Israel that places the persistence of "racial conflict and domination" at the center of discussion and attempts to explain it without resort to notions of false consciousness and without objectifying class and class conflict, see Stanley B. Greenberg, Race and State in Capitalist Development: Comparative Perspectives (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980).

18. My comments here were stimulated by suggestions from Davydd Greenwood.

19. Another way of presenting the general mode of analysis that I am proposing here is as a merging of the methods of comparative history and social science. I agree with the comparative historian who argues that "the kind of flux, contingency, and temporality" that he confronts in analyzing historical "change and development" "cannot be adequately subsumed under rigid structural categories or incorporated into simplified and static models;" George M. Fredrickson, White Supremacy: A Comparative Study in American and South African History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. xvi. On the other hand, meaningful comparison is not possible unless we approach comparative studies with categories of analysis that can be used cross-culturally. My proposal is to use categories of analysis that are defined in the same way for different societies, but that can be used for dynamic comparisons over time as well as across space. The questions I am raising here are, given an array of possible forms of class and ethnic consciousness that might develop (on the basis of specified theoretical assumptions) in societies whose peoples are differentiated objectively in terms of particular relationships to the means of production and to the market and in terms of cultural characteristics and markers, how do we explain the development of class consciousness or ethnic consciousness as political forces among particular categories of people and not others in different societies at different times?

20. Harold Wolpe, "The Theory of Internal Colonialism: The South African Case," in Ivar Oxaal (ed.), Beyond the Sociology of Development: Economy and Society in Latin America and Africa (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), pp. 229-254. On the general question of "convergences" in approaches to class and ethnic groups among Marxists and theorists of the plural society, see also John Rex, "Race

Relations and Minority Groups: Some Convergences," International Social Science Journal, XXXIII, No. 2 (1981), 351-373 and Pierre L. van den Berghe, "Nigeria and Peru: Two Contrasting Cases in Ethnic Pluralism," International Journal of Comparative Sociology, XX, Nos. 1-2 (1978), 162.

21. Hechter, Internal Colonialism, and Wallerstein, The Capitalist World-Economy.

22. Ibid., pp. 184-185 and 224.

23. Ibid., p. 181. See also Wallerstein, "The World System: The States in the Institutional Vortex of the Capitalist World-Economy," p. 750, where he says that "status-group solidarities" may "obfuscate the class struggle."

24. Wallerstein, The Capitalist World-Economy, p. 230.

25. J. S. Furnivall, Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939), p. 447 and Smith, The Plural Society, p. 81.

26. For a contrast between early and contemporary theorists of the plural society, see Sammy Smooha, "Pluralism and Conflict: A Theoretical Explanation," Plural Societies, VI, No.3 (1975), 69-89. For van den Berghe's own statement of the differences between his approach and that of Furnivall and Smith, see Pierre L. van den Berghe, "Pluralism," in John J. Honigmann (ed.), Handbook of Social and Cultural Anthropology (New York: Rand McNally, 1974), ch. xxii.

27. See especially Pierre L. van den Berghe, "Nigeria and Peru: Two Contrasting Cases in Ethnic Pluralism," pp. 162-163.

28. Van den Berghe has insisted that "the main contribution of the pluralist orientation is not the classification of societies into yet another taxonomy," but the reorientation of anthropology and sociology away from its previous primary focus on processes of consensus and integration. He argues for greater attention to "the interplay" between corporate groups and "the movement of individuals" between them; van den Berghe, "Pluralism," p. 966. My point here is that this is not what the theorists of the plural society do in practice and that their concepts do not lead beyond taxonomy.

29. Brass, "Ethnicity and Nationality Formation," p. 226.

30. In the long term, as Greenberg and many other students of ethnicity and nationalism have pointed out, there is surprising agreement among modernization, integration, and nation-building

theorists such as Deutsch, and classical Marxist writers that ethnicity and ethnic conflict will be transcended in favor of "new forms of community and new forms of conflict;" Greenberg, pp. 8-12, citation from p. 8. Greenberg does not agree with the shared perspective nor do I, but it is not an issue that I am taking up in this chapter.

31. The classic statement is in Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967).

32. However, see Greenberg, esp. p. 406.

33. Furnivall, p. 451.

34. M. G. Smith, "Some Developments in the Analytical Framework of Pluralism," in Kuper and Smith, pp. 438-439.

35. Kuper in Kuper and Smith, p. 15.

36. Smooha, "Pluralism and Conflict," esp. p. 80.

37. Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Clifford Geertz (ed.), Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa (New York: Free Press, 1963), pp. 105-157 and Edward Shils, "Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties: Some Particular Observations on the Relationships of Sociological Research and Theory," British Journal of Sociology, VIII, No. 2 (June, 1957), 130-145.

38. See Edward Shils, Political Development in the New States (The Hague: Mouton, 1966) for the idea of tutelage and the specific notion of "tutelary democracy" in the developing countries.

39. Cf. J. H. Robb, "A Theoretical Note on the Sociology of Inter-Group Relations," Ethnic and Racial Studies, I, No. 4 (October, 1978), 465-473.

40. Ibid., p. 471.

41. Van den Berghe, in Kuper and Smith, p. 70.

42. Robb, p. 468.

43. For Arend Lijphart's latest statement on this type of regime, see his Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

44. Van den Berghe, The Ethnic Phenomenon, p. 56.

45. Cf. Anthony Smith, who argues that the "genesis" of ethnic nationalism in modernizing societies arises from the penetration of centralizing bureaucratic authority and institutions into outlying areas, which precipitates the revival of "ancient and declining ethnic ties" among secular urban intelligentsia denied entry into the

privileged cadres of the bureaucracy and in conflict also with traditional religious elites in their own local communities; "The Diffusion of Nationalism: Some Historical and Sociological Perspectives," British Journal of Sociology, XXIX, No. 2 (June, 1978), esp. p. 246. There are several points of contact between my approach and that of Smith. However, he emphasizes the admittedly important role of the urban secular intelligentsia more than I do. There is an emphasis on ideology as a motivating and emotionally satisfying force for participants in ethnic movements in his work that goes beyond what I find necessary to the sociological explanation of such movements. Smith also deemphasizes religion and elevates "language and history" as the preeminent modern "routes" to ethnic nationalism (p. 245), whereas I consider religion to be a persisting force in the development of many nationalist movements up to contemporary times. His model is a diffusionist one which, despite his efforts to universalize it, is excessively tied to the historical experience of eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe. Finally, Smith discusses only cases where ethnic mobilization has occurred whereas I believe it is essential for sociological theory to consider also often comparable situations where ethnic mobilization and nationalism have not occurred. Nevertheless, some of Smith's illustrative examples in both the above-cited article and in his The Ethnic Revival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), esp. pp. 128-132, would fit into my schema in Figures 1.1 to 1.3 below.

46. See Leo A. Despres (ed.), Ethnicity and Resource Competition in Plural Societies (The Hague: Mouton, 1975).

47. Perhaps the best balanced statement of the issues in this paragraph may be found in Abner Cohen, Custom and Politics in Urban Africa: A Study of Hausa Migrants in Yoruba Towns (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), esp. pp. 183-214.

48. See Brass, "Ethnicity and Nationality Formation" and "Ethnic Groups and Nationalities: The Formation, Persistence, and Transformation of Ethnic Identities," in Peter F. Sugar (ed.), Ethnic Diversity and Conflict in Eastern Europe (Santa Barbara, Ca.: ABC-Clio, 1980), ch. i.

49. David D. Laitin, "Hegemony and Religious Conflict," in Theda Skocpol, et. al., (eds.), Bringing the State Back in (forthcoming).

50. See Eugene F. Irschick, Politics and Social Conflict in South India: The Non Brahman

Movement and Tamil Separatism, 1916-1929 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969) and Marguerite R. Barnett, The Politics of Cultural Nationalism in South India (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).

51. See Richard G. Fox, Charlotte Aull, and Louis Cimino, "Ethnic Nationalism and Political Mobilization in Industrial Societies," in Lamar Ross (ed.), Interethnic Communication (Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1978), pp. 113-133 and "Ethnic Nationalism and the Welfare State," in Charles F. Keyes (ed.), Ethnic Change (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981), pp. 221-232.

52. Fox et. al., "Ethnic Nationalism and Political Mobilization," p. 122.

53. See especially Baldev Raj Nayar, Minority Politics in the Punjab (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1966); Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion, and Politics in North India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974); and Joyce Pettigrew, "A Description of the Discrepancy between Sikh Political Ideals and Sikh Political Practice," in Myron J. Aronoff (ed.), Ideology and Interest: The Dialectics of Politics, Political Anthropology Yearbook I (New Brunswick, N. J.: Transaction Books, 1980), pp. 151-192.

54. Ibid.

55. On the interrelationship among these several sets of variables in the process of ethnic nationality formation, see Brass, Language, Religion, and Politics, esp. pp. 43-45.

CHAPTER 2

ETHNICITY AND THE COLONIAL AND POST-COLONIAL STATE IN AFRICA

ABSTRACT

The chapter by Crawford Young focuses on the spread to Africa of the European nation-state form and its consequences for both "cultural identities, and patterns of communal conflict." Although there were significant variations in the ideological underpinnings, administrative practices, degree of penetration, and the extent of influence over it by a white settler class, the European nation-state form was imposed or accepted everywhere in Africa, despite the absence of "nations" corresponding to the boundaries of the states so imposed. Young points to three general consequences for "cultural self-definitions" of the various policies pursued by the European imperial states. One was the tendency, so characteristic of the modern state, to count and classify the peoples within its boundaries, fitting them into "discrete, bounded groups" where before, as Southall has noted, there were often only "interlocking, overlapping, multiple identities." The state authorities and Christian missionaries also sometimes created entirely new categories, some of which ultimately took hold in the form of new identities, others of which did not. The European colonial state also tended to make differentiations among various categories of people, favoring some groups and ignoring others.

In the postcolonial era, the new elites who led the nationalist movements and took control of their states after independence sought to create nations to conform to the boundaries of the new states, adopting the slogan of "national integration." That slogan, however, flew in the face of the existing cultural diversities and the classifications and differentiations added to them by the colonial powers, who often also attempted to manipulate ethnic differences in their struggles against the nationalist forces. Consequently, after independence, ethnic movements, parties, and leaders arose to take advantage of the greatly increased opportunities made available by the expansion of state activities that increased "the stakes of cultural competition." Yet, Young notes that the threats to the nation-state form have been less widespread than might have been expected and that it remains the virtually universal form throughout

Africa.

Young's paper supports three themes noted in the introductory chapter. First, it supports the idea that it is often a mistake to think of cultural categories in multiethnic societies as "givens." Second, his analysis indicates clearly the differentiating role of the modern state. Third, his analysis also clearly indicates the change in the nature of ethnic relations that occurs when the state's activities increase. In the early stages of colonial rule, the main issues are local control and the search by the authorities for favored collaborators. In the later stages and in the post-independence period, issues of differential access by ethnic groups to new economic opportunities made available by an expanding state become increasingly prominent.