



2

ETHNIC, REGIONAL, and SECTARIAN ALIGNMENTS in AFGHANISTAN

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THE PROBLEM

ANY ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN how the various peoples of Afghanistan align themselves must give close attention to what they are like in their rural settings, for, as it happens, the rural peoples—ethnically diverse and politically divided as they are—have more political influence than some observers have recognized.¹ One reputed authority of the region has said that “politics [in Afghanistan] had been confined mainly to Kabul,” confined, in fact, “mainly to the royal family, to an urban elite . . . to a very select group of people.”² Quite the contrary, the rural populations of this nation have repeatedly exerted a decisive influence on public affairs. These groups—tribal, ethnic, sectarian, and regional in their loyalties—have quarreled among themselves and with the government, particularly when administrative vigor was either too harsh or too lax, so as repeatedly to distract the government with fresh provincial brushfires. A few times—actually only rarely, but the social implications were momentous—large numbers of the provincial peoples collectively, as much by fortuitous coincidence as by coordination, have risen up against the government.³ But their importance to national affairs goes beyond their periodic squabbles and localized restiveness. They are, in fact, numerically quite preponderant. Before the current civil war, in which, as is well known, thousands have been killed and millions dislocated, the rural populations accounted for 87 percent of the nation.⁴ Of their number about a fifth were pastoral nomads and the rest were mainly sedentary agriculturalists. So by virtue of sheer numerical strength the ru-

ral peoples have exerted a powerful distinctive influence on public affairs for the nation as a whole. That influence may have been somewhat intensified by the decline of the cities in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the result of a general decline in economic and cultural interchange throughout Central Asia.⁵ The Second Anglo-Afghan War culminated the process, leaving the cities—especially Kabul, but also Qandahar and Herat—in ruins. Yaqub Khan, who succeeded Sher Ali Khan as ruler of the nation in 1879, complained that “the troops, the city [Kabul] and surrounding country have thrown off their yoke of allegiance [to the government]. The workshops and magazines are totally gutted. . . . In fact, my kingdom is ruined.”⁶ Because the peoples of the provincial areas had been spared much of this calamity, it was on them that the government, struggling to lift itself out of the ashes, had to rely for stability and strength. Eventually, of course, the government regained its footing and the national economy recovered a degree of health. But the rural populations, restive and factious as they were, continued to act as a distinctive influence on national affairs.

Thus, in order to assess how, within the context of this book, the ethnic minorities articulate with the Afghan government, we have to rephrase the question so as to place the focus on the significant units of sociopolitical action. Contrary to what might be supposed, the actual operating units of sociopolitical coalition among these populations are rarely genuinely “ethnic” in composition. The collectivities of people who act together for social or political purposes are better identifiable by some other term, such as “subtribe,” “regional group,” or “Islamic coalition.” Even if these terms lack specificity, and so must be explained as to their actual content in Afghanistan, they in any event diverge far from what is implied by the term “ethnic.” There are, to be sure, “ethnic types” in Afghanistan, in the sense of bodies of people who share common linguistic and cultural heritages and are regarded by most people as being distinctive in some sense. In fact, there are perhaps two dozen such ethnolinguistic types, depending on how one counts. But the main ones—that is, the largest and most influential ones—never act as a single social unit and are, on the contrary, riven with internal factions. Except in the cases of the smallest ethnolinguistic types, such as the Qirghiz, in which the boundaries of the type coincide with some other social unit, the real units of cooperation are normally based on other grounds of loyalty than common ethnic identity. The categories of ethnic ascription are not in fact the categories of sociopolitical action.⁷

Accordingly, this chapter will raise and attempt to answer⁸ the following set of questions:

1. What are, in fact, the characteristic units of social and cultural significance (including the units of ethnic ascription)?
2. What conditions control the alignment and composition of the viable sociopolitical units among the rural populations?
3. What impact has Afghan government policy and practice had on these populations over the years and how have they responded?

This discussion will suggest in the concluding section some of the reasons why these peoples have responded as they have to the recent Marxist and Soviet regimes.

IMPORTANT SOCIAL AND ASCRIPTIVE UNITS IN RURAL AFGHANISTAN

The main ethnolinguistic types in Afghanistan are listed in Table 2.1. Their locations are indicated on Figure 2.1. As already stated, the actual units of sociopolitical action—except in the cases of the very small ethnolinguistic types—are not coterminous with ethnolinguistic boundaries. These social units will here be called “coalitions,” but seem to be what Whiteford and Adams⁹ have called “operating units.” I describe the actual units of sociopolitical cooperation—coalitions—as three types: those that commonly exist among “tribalized” societies, those that exist among “peasantized” societies, and those that unite people from different ethnolinguistic types.

One type of coalition exists within the “tribalized” ethnolinguistic types. The term “tribalized” here suggests segmentary systems based on agnatic relationships; they are nested systems of obligation based upon degree of relationship through male ancestors. The more closely related people are, the stronger their obligations to cooperate, help, avenge, and so forth. The less closely related they are, the less their obligation. The widest lines of connection are seldom activated; some have not been active for generations. This is the system of alignments extant among the Pashtuns, Turkomans, Baluch, Qirghiz, and some others. A similar structure exists among the Nuristani peoples, except that their lineages, unlike those in the other “tribal” societies, are ranked.

TABLE 2.1

MAJOR ETHNOLINGUISTIC GROUPS in AFGHANISTAN*

Group	Language	Religion	Population Estimates†	Location
Pashtun (Afghan)	Pashtu	Sunni (a few Imami Shi'ites) Islam	6,500,000	All over; concentrated in South and Southwest
Tajik (eastern and northern)	Dari (Persian)	Sunni (Ismaili in NE) Islam	3,500,000	North, northeastern
Farsiwan†	Dari†	Imami Shi'ite Islam	600,000	Western
Hazara	Dari	Imami (a few Isma'ilis, Sunnis) Islam	1,000,000	Hazarajat, Northwest (Qala-i Nao)
Uzbek	Uzbek (Turkic)	Sunni Islam	1,000,000	North
Aimaq tribes	Dari (some Turkic words)	Sunni Islam	800,000	West Central
Brahui	Brahui (Dravidian)	Sunni Islam	200,000	Southwest
Turkoman	Turkic dialects	Sunni Islam	125,000	North, Northwest
Baluch	Baluchi	Sunni Islam	100,000	South, Southwest
Nuristani	"Katiri" languages (Indo-European)	Sunni Islam	100,000	Northeast
Pamiris	Indo-Iranian dialects	Sunni and Isma'ili Islam	"several thousand"*	Northeast
Kohistani	Dardic dialects	Sunni Islam	n.a.*	Northeast
Gujar	Indo-European dialects, Pashtu	Sunni Islam	n.a.*	Northeast
Qirghiz	Turkic	Sunni Islam	n.a.*	Northeast
Jat	Indo-European, Pashtu	Sunni Islam	"several thousand"*§	Pamir (now Turkey); gypsy-like, itinerant
"Arab"	Dari	Sunni Islam	n.a.*	North; Sayyid Arabs widely dispersed
Mongol	Dari (with some Mongol words)	Sunni Islam	"several thousand"*	West Central

*Adapted from Dupree, *Afghanistan*, pp. 58-64.

†These populations are sometimes called "Tajiks," but, being Imami Shi'ite and distinctly Mediterranean in appearance, they are clearly different from the northeastern Tajiks, who are either Sunni or Isma'ili and bear traces of Mongoloid ancestry. Dupree reports (in a personal communication) that part of the confusion results from the tendency for Farsiwans to identify themselves as "Tajik" when in other parts of the country, especially in Kabul, probably because "Tajik" is a rather generalized, nonspecific ethnic category. However, compare the somewhat different usage of Richard Tap-


per, "Ethnicity and Class: Dimensions of Intergroup Conflict in North-Central Afghanistan," in *Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan: Anthropological Approaches*, ed. M. Nazif Shahrani and Robert L. Canfield, pp. 230-46 (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, 1984).

‡Figures on total population are only estimates. They range from 15 million to 18 million.

§Shahrani now says the number is less than 1,000. They fled and are now in Turkey.

FIGURE 2.1

MAJOR ETHNOLINGUISTIC TYPES in AFGHANISTAN



From Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 58. Reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press.

The actual size of the social unit suggested by the word "tribe" varies significantly among the largest tribalized group. The Pashtuns as a whole have, as already stated, rarely acted together. They are divided into two main branches, the Durrani and Ghilzai, and the various sub-branches of these have likewise seldom united for political action. It is the subbranches of these—or some subdivision within them—that are the viable sociopolitical units entailed in the concept of tribe. Because the Pashtuns are segmentary, sometimes broken into smaller localized agnatic groups, and sometimes drawn together on a larger scale, depending on issues and circumstances, the "tribe" that is extant at a given time can be a larger or smaller unit, a higher or lower level of agnatic coalition. Circumstances in different areas can favor the persistence of larger units than in others. Kakar, for example, notes that the Durrani tribes are larger than those of the Ghilzai.¹⁰ Using the term "tribe" for what I have just called a "subbranch," he says, "the Ghilzai elders . . . exercised only limited authority over the nearest sections of their tribe. The Ghilzai tribe, as a whole, was broken up into small independent groups ['tribe' as used here]. But in a state of emergency, such as war, this was altered. Among the Sulaiman Khel [for example] *chel washtees* (fighting forces?), commanded by an able person who was given wide power . . . were organized. During the campaign each clan ['tribe'] of the Ghilzais elected leaders, presumably in the above manner."¹¹

A different type of coalition exists among "peasantized" ethnolinguistic types and includes the Tajiks, Farsiwans, Hazaras, Pamiris, and perhaps also the Uzbeks. The term "peasantized" is used here to suggest that the higher-level agnatic associations that unite the subunits of "tribes" are no longer significant; the viable units of sociopolitical affiliation are smaller. They include, as they do among tribes, patrilineal extended families, localized agnatic groups, and regional or neighborhood groupings whose members recognize affiliation through agnates.

The important sociopolitical alignment beyond the agnatic community and neighborhood are patron-client networks. These may be highly agnatic in composition, one of the agnates being the preeminent person of wealth and influence, and his close kinsmen serving as loyal colleagues and supporters. But there may be other kinds of loyal "friends" in the network as well: the patron's affines, affines of his neighbors, and the like. The strength and wealth of such a person may change or vary partly in respect to the fortunes of other prominent patrons, for there are other prominent men who

with their relatives and friends form other nuclei of social and political activity. Sometimes the prominent person becomes a malik, or *arbab*, an official government representative of some of the people in his area. Sometimes he and his friends may support another person to be the malik, often a close relative or loyal associate. Patron-client networks appear to vary greatly in size; such networks appear to be larger among the Uzbeks than the Hazaras.¹² Specific patron-client networks may also vary a great deal over time; a patron's fortunes rise and fall, depending on how he handles his affairs since social influence can very much be a matter of impression management.

The third type of coalition includes people from different ethnolinguistic types that unite under religious authorities. But they are religious authorities of a certain type. They are learned in Islam, like mullahs, but in addition they are reputed to have special access to God and His blessing. This reputation may derive, depending on the emphases of the sect, mainly from their descent from Muhammad (and his son-in-law Ali) or from one of the caliphs or another ancient person that is sacred to some Muslim groups, or it may derive from an extreme piety that has enabled them putatively to be infused with the character of God, or it may derive from their control of spiritual powers, such as the jinns. Such people are known variously as pirs or shaykhs or *ruhanis*, among the Sunnis and are the focal persons of the Sufi orders; among the Shi'ites they are the paramount Sayyids; they are called "saints" in Western literature.¹³ Believed to be *walis*, "friends" of God, their favor, because of their unusual access to the blessing of God, which brings prosperity and healing in this life and the next, is highly valued. The great "saints" are sought for advice, favor, and blessing by people from far and wide. This makes them nodes of informal "friendship" networks. Some of these "saints" would never use their social position for political, or at least materialistic, ends. But under certain circumstances some of them have induced, or allowed, their followers to act collectively on some public issue. In such a case, the saint may avoid becoming personally involved, but nevertheless assign one or several of his prominent "friends" to take the lead in the matter. When the members of a "saint's" personal network of friends act in concert to bring something about in a public arena, they may be called a "saint coalition."

There is yet a wider network than this that can become activated as a coalition. This occurs when the saints presiding over different coalitions decide for some special purpose to work together in common cause. This may be called an "Islamic coalition." Coalitions of this type have rarely arisen, and when they have, they have been

short-lived. Always, of course, they have arisen in special and extreme circumstances. But they are nonetheless potential, for it is common for Islamic authorities to maintain contacts with other authorities in their own sect. If they have been in association for a long time, their "friends" may intermarry with members of their family. This tends to integrate the "friends" more firmly into a network of associations having not only religious or sectarian loyalties but also affinal and agnatic ones. Because "saints" of different Islamic sects do not recognize each other, the outer limits of such Islamic coalitions are the sect.

Such are the units of active cooperation among the rural populations of Afghanistan. Let us now examine the conditions that affect their emergence as political units.

CONDITIONS AFFECTING the SOCIOPOLITICAL ALIGNMENTS of the RURAL POPULATIONS

As should be evident, some of the sociopolitical groupings mentioned or described above are perpetually operational; extended families are an example. Others are operational only on specific occasions for specific tasks, such as tribal movements. Some are rarely operational; they only take shape under extreme circumstances and perhaps only because of the Herculean efforts of some key individuals; Islamic coalitions are presumably of this sort.¹⁴ It should also be evident that ephemeral social units can be especially important in the relations of the rural populations to the Afghan government, for by virtue of their size they can exert a significant influence on public affairs. The next three sections seek to explain the conditions under which ephemeral coalitions take form.¹⁵ Three kinds of determinative circumstances will be described, the material conditions, the relevant cultural heritages of these peoples, and the policies and practices of the Afghan government.

Important Material Conditions

The material¹⁶ conditions to be emphasized here are associated with the geophysical conditions of this region. These significantly affect—in the sense of setting a limiting context for—the sociopolitical alignments of Afghanistan's rural populations. They are

(1) the terrain, which, because of its dramatic features, drastically affects spatial relations among these peoples; (2) the climate and ecology, which influence the production systems of these peoples; and (3) the location of the country as a whole, which establishes its geopolitical context.


Few regions of the world are topographically more various and abrupt than Afghanistan. Descending from northeast to southwest through the heart of the country, the Hindu Kush mountain range, which is the westernmost spur of the Himalayas, lifts dozens of peaks higher than any in Europe or the continental United States, the highest to above 25,000 feet. Nestled between the crests and folds of this range, sometimes bounded by abrupt cliffs, are alluvial plains of varying shapes and sizes. Because most of them are well watered by the runoff from melting snow and ice, they are suitable for settled human habitation.

Existence on these sharply bounded plains often entails a measure of isolation. Many of these plains are "islands," bounded, perhaps on several sides by forbidding cliffs and steep ascents, sometimes open to neighboring plains only along the stream banks above and below. As a result, the natural lines of contact, such as they are, between communities on these plains follow the lines of drainage (Figure 2.2). Along these lines of contact, the "islands" vary in their accessibility. Normally the higher ones are the most isolated; they are usually also, of course, smaller. But downstream they get progressively larger and, as the folds that bound them broaden and flatten, the lowest ones become easily accessible from several directions. But even many of the downstream "islands" are rather isolated because they are situated in arid places, for surrounding the Hindu Kush range from which lines of drainage flow are wide, expansive deserts.

The major highway in this region (Figure 2.3) skirts wherever possible the central mountain massif. Only at one place—at Salang, the pass above Panjsher to the south and Andarab to the north—does it approach the Hindu Kush. From this paved highway extend four paved roads that link Afghanistan to its neighboring nations, one going east to Peshawar, Pakistan; one south to Chamand, Pakistan; one west to Iran; and one (and now possibly two) north to the Soviet Union.


The great circle highway connects, of course, the population centers of the country: Kabul, Ghazni, Qandahar, Herat, Mazari-Sharif. These cities are relatively well integrated into a national system of commerce and communication. But the other populations of the country—those situated far off any roads, paved or unpaved, and

FIGURE 2.2 RIVERS and DRAINAGE in AFGHANISTAN



From Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p. 32. Reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press.

FIGURE 2.3 HIGHWAYS and ROADS in AFGHANISTAN



From Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p. x. Reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press.


those dwelling on the further "islands"—are more isolated. As a result of the terrain, most of the rural populations are relatively inaccessible and poorly integrated into the nation as a whole. Their loyalties and interests remain local (see Figure 2.4).

Climate and ecology in turn are geophysical features that directly influence rural production systems and sociopolitical alignments. Two major wind currents pass across this terrain. The monsoon winds that blow in summer from east to west are thoroughly dried by the time they arrive, having already dumped their moisture on Indochina and India. Alpine winds flowing from west to east still have enough moisture to blanket the mountains with heavy snow in winter. It is the runoff from winter snow that feeds most of the people in Afghanistan. Surface water is abundant in spring and summer, which is ideal for the irrigation grain farming practiced by most of the sedentary rural population. The variation in altitudes provides the context for the other major production system in rural Afghanistan, pastoral nomadism, by which the flocks of migratory peoples subsist on the luxuriant grasses of the highlands in summer and those of the lowland plains in winter.

As is well known, these two systems of subsistence, irrigation grain farming and nomadic pastoralism, affect the ways people cooperate and organize. Irrigation requires cooperation among the people who use the natural surface water flows. They must arrange, first, to build the canal that brings the water to their fields; then they must arrange to clean it—an important task in many parts of Afghanistan where the swift mountain runoff may fill canals with debris—and they must arrange to use the water according to some schedule. The nomadic system of the pastoralists similarly requires cooperation, especially during the migration when the pastoralists come into closest contact with the settled populations, and when there is the greatest chance of conflict over the straying flocks onto the lands of the agriculturalists.¹⁷

One other significant geophysical feature is the location of Afghanistan in respect to the resources and population centers elsewhere. This region of Central Asia, of which Afghanistan is a part, is bounded on the northeast by the Himalayas and on the northwest by the Caspian Sea and Kara Kum desert, and constitutes the historic corridor of diffusion, trade, and conquest connecting the great population centers of South Asia, China, the Middle East, and Europe. Diverse linguistic, cultural, political, and religious heritages have met and mingled here, and their impact on the sociopolitical alignments

FIGURE 2.4 The LARGER "ISLANDS" of CULTIVATION



COINCIDENT WITH AREAS OF
MAXIMUM POPULATION DENSITY

From Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p. 46. Reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press.

of the peoples living in this region will be explained in the next section.

Traditions

The word "tradition" is used intentionally here, that is, as the statements, beliefs, legends, customs, understandings, terms, and categories of experience and social relationship that are handed down from one generation to another. Tradition, used alone, can never explain a people's behavior, since behavior is always situational, contextual, circumstantial. But there are frames of meaning, biases, and entrenched understandings that people have received from their past, which are already intact when they are confronted with exigencies, and these affect how people understand their problems, how they perceive what is of immediate or of prior importance, and thus how they will be prone to act. However unpopular the notion of "tradition" as a social force may be in some circles,¹⁸ it is a necessary concept for the analysis here since it is precisely the prejudices, assumptions, established perspectives, and so forth, that these rural populations *bring to* their experience that make them distinctive; these affect how they organize their affairs and solve their problems in ways different from other peoples. This is especially necessary if we want to take note not only of how they are aligned but also of the particular moral understandings which shape their particular alignments.

This is not to say that tradition is a static, unbendable force, constraining creative thought and innovative behavior. Rather, tradition changes—is revised, lost, revived, corrupted—as people use it to interpret and respond to the problems they face.¹⁹ But if tradition is tractable, it is not infinitely plastic. It does not conform neatly to every human exigency as it appears.²⁰ It exerts a weight of its own by being, in Sahlins's words, a system "in place" at any given moment, setting the context of new and emerging problems, limiting the range of acceptable responses to them. Tradition is therefore an important determining condition of a people's existence, distinct from other determinants. In the case of the problem before us, it is, along with the material conditions already described, the second of three conditions that govern the sociopolitical alignments of Afghanistan's rural peoples. We shall explain the tradition controlling these alignments as a set of heritages and will describe each—ethnic diversity, Islam, and

xenophobia—in terms of the important antecedents that give each its distinctive influence in social affairs today.

The diverse ethnolinguistic heritage results from a busy history of invasion and immigration in the area. The Indo-Aryan peoples who in ancient times occupied the region now called Afghanistan were invaded, mostly from the north, by more kinds of people than anyone will ever count—peoples whose identities, if they are known at all, are only vaguely familiar to most of us: Scythians, Massagetae, Sakas, Dards, Huns, and Ephthalites. In the more recent past Arabs, Turks, Mongols, and Persians invaded the region. These many and diverse kinds of people passed through, hid in, or were trapped in this territory. And they left behind the melange of phenotypic features, tongues, and customs now extant in modern Afghanistan.

They bequeathed to the present at least one feature of social alignment that is shared, I believe, by all the Afghanistan peoples: the rule of patrilineal descent. They also bequeathed to the present a history of interethnic hostility. The various occupants of this territory have competed with each other for desirable goods—land, water, flocks, women, and silver—and have captured and enslaved or sold each other for too many generations for their differences to be easily forgotten. Their irritations may be said to run deep in the sense that each group “remembers”—in the form of stories, sayings, and monuments—the offenses done against them by their enemies. This is the basis of the interethnic separations that exist today. Even if the large ethnic types cannot get together, neither can any portion of them easily unite with other ethnic types who were once their enemies.

The heritage of Islam originated with Islamic invaders, mostly Arabs, who reached into the area less than a century after the death of Muhammad. By the third Islamic century (our tenth) prominent rulers were striking coins in the name of God and his Prophet.²¹ The influence of Islam, as it did almost everywhere it stayed, shaped the whole world view of the peoples of the area. Islam brought to the rulers the notion that they were answerable to God for guarding the faith. It brought an extensive and growing literature which covered many subjects, but especially it brought a system of jurisprudence, which the peoples of this region not only imbibed but also expanded and in significant ways reshaped. It brought new concepts of authority enshrined in words for new kinds of specialists—terms like *mazhab*, *faqih*, *gazi*, *mufti*, *muhtasib*, *mullah*, *mawlawi*, and *mawlana*, for

specialists in law and learning; terms like *imam* and *rowzakhan* for ritual leaders; terms like *fakir*, *shaykh*, and *sayyid* for sacred persons. How thoroughly Islamic notions have permeated Afghan society is shown by pointing out that (with the exception of the word *pir*) the most common terms of self-ascription—*watan*, "one's homeland," *qawn*, "one's clan or kinship group," *mazhab* (or *madhhab*), "one's sect group"—are Arabic words.

Islam also brought a new kind of issue over which people took up arms against each other: religious sect. This kind of antagonism—between Sunnis and Shi'ites—had already existed among Muslims before it came into this area. But here it became intensified by many political struggles that went on for generations. One of the most important took place in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, between the Safavids, who were Shi'ites, and the Turko-Mongols, who were Sunnis. Their struggles were not merely interethnic conflicts, for the Safavids, it will be remembered, had self-consciously promoted Shi'ism in order to win the support of the oppressed Shi'ite populations of Khorasan. Dogmatic differences were thus deliberately wedded to power and territorial interest. It could have no other effect than to politicize sectarian categories. The Sunni-Shi'ite opposition was further intensified during the reign of Abdur Rahman (1880-1901). Amir Abdur Rahman fought four wars to subjugate the dissenting peoples of the region that had recently been ceded to him by the British and Russians. In each war he sought the support of the religious authorities, and in each he sought to identify the opposition with heresy. In the third war, against the Hazaras, who were Shi'ites, he won the support of essentially all the Sunni authorities; the Hazaras, on their side, had gained the support of all the Shi'ite authorities, and one served as their leader. The inter-sectarian tensions of that war are well preserved in the memory of the Hazaras, who lost, and they are evident today in the discriminating practices of the Sunnis against the Hazaras.²²

Islam brought yet one more cultural feature of importance to Afghanistan life: Sufism. Indeed the peoples of Khorasan—which at one time concluded Afghanistan and a portion of Central Asia as well as eastern Iran—made some of the most significant contributions to the development of early Sufism. Some of the greatest of Sufi thinkers came from this region. Hujwiri, for example, who wrote the first great treatise on Sufism in the Persian language, was born in Ghazni, and died, after many travels throughout Khorasan, in Lahore. Moreover, many of the Sufi orders, especially in the earliest period of

Sufism, developed in this region, for example, the Naqshbandis and Chishtis.²³

Sufism introduced many notions to Islam, but one that may be mentioned here, because it has had a significant influence on Afghanistan society, is the belief in walis, "friends" (i.e., of God). Hujwiri in the eleventh century, drawing from the teaching of another Khorasani, al-Tirmidhi (whose work is lost), made the classic statement of this notion in Persian:

God has saints (*awliyaa*) whom He has specifically distinguished by His friendship (*wulaayat*) and whom He has chosen to be governors of His Kingdom and has marked out to manifest His action and has peculiarly favored with diverse kinds of miracles (*karaamat*) and has purged of natural corruption . . . so through the blessing of their advent the rain falls from heaven, and through the purity of their lives the plants spring up from the earth, and through their spiritual influence the Moslems gain victories over unbelievers. . . . They have power to loose and to bind and are the officers of the Divine Court.²⁴

Throughout Islamic history, since this belief became widely disseminated, there has been difficulty and disagreement over who might be the true walis—Hujwiri believed that some of them did not even know they were walis—but that such sacred persons exist, or may exist, is not doubted by most of the rural populations of Afghanistan. This popular belief is an important basis for the influence of the "saints."

The heritage of xenophobia took form mainly in the nineteenth century as a reaction to the persistent interventions and invasions of the region by the British, who sought a defensible northern frontier for its empire in India, and by the Russians, who were rapidly expanding into Central Asia. In a period of eighty years the Afghanistan peoples fought three wars with the British and several skirmishes with the Russians. Despite many internecine tensions among themselves, the menacing presence of the non-Muslim ("Christian") British and Russians generated a strong anti-European (and anti-Christian) xenophobia among these peoples throughout the last century. This xenophobia was defined in Islamic terms. All the conflicts with the outside powers were seen as clashes between Muslim believers and infidel outsiders. Appeals of the government for popular support made in these terms drew large numbers of warriors

from varying tribal backgrounds, and the Afghanistan peoples became known for their fanatical Muslim zeal.²⁵

The geophysical setting and the various heritages of the rural peoples of Afghanistan have been two influences affecting their sociopolitical alignments. There is yet another, namely, the impingements of the Afghan government, and it is to these and the responses to them that we turn in the following section.

Policies and Actions of the Afghan Government

✓ The government of Afghanistan took shape toward the end of the previous century under the influence of Amir Abdur Rahman of Kabul, and the institutions which he established were in some ways still in place in the 1970s. I will describe the policies and practices of the government as they existed initially, the general trends that developed afterwards, and their effects.

✓ By the turn of this century effective provincial administration had been imposed and provincial governorships were strong enough to exert a significant force upon the affairs of the rural populations. The main assignments of the governors were to keep order, collect taxes, and conscript young men for the military. The maintenance of order was a major concern because opposition to the government was common in the provinces. To the Amir this "necessitated breaking down the feudal and tribal system and substituting one grand community under one law and one rule."²⁶ This entailed strengthening his control of the provinces by means of the standing army he was forming. He made military contingents available to the provincial governors so that they could improve the government's control of recalcitrant populations and replace troublesome leaders. He also instituted policies that would strengthen government control at the expense of "the feudal and tribal system." He drew provincial and subprovincial boundaries through tribal territories so as to make different segments of a tribe answerable to different provincial governments. He enlarged his bureaucracy so that it could take over some of the functions of the local leaders, the maliks or arbabs, some of whom had been extremely powerful. Disaffected elements of a malik's following became more able to break away and arrange to have their own representatives to the government. As a result, the number of maliks increased and the sizes of their followings, and hence their influence, declined.

Besides being responsible for maintaining order, the other main tasks of the provincial governors were to collect taxes and conscript men for the army. Given extensive powers, sometimes they were abusive, demanding excessive fees and keeping large amounts for themselves. In some of the more distant provinces the governors began to collect taxes as "rent," turning their provinces into virtual fiefdoms. Dupree says "the right to collect taxes sometimes became confused . . . with bona fide ownership of land. Land was sold and resold by government officials without any regard to the traditional joint ownership of village lands by the clan or lineage."²⁷ The effect, in any case, was to disenfranchise some people, to abuse traditionally sanctioned rights to land, and to fragment the social units associated with it. The conscription of men for the army, if it abused established customs, had the effect of mixing the ethnic groups, but on different echelons, since the officers were nearly always Pashtuns. The mixing of the ethnic groups in the military sometimes worsened the interethnic tensions, especially so among the smaller and weaker ethnic groups. It did have the salutary effect, however, of broadening the outlook of the troops from the provinces and fostering a national consciousness. As will be explained below, conscription was required of only some groups, certain Pashtun groups being exempted, and thus the impact of the military experience varied considerably.

Since that time the central government has increased its direct control over provincial affairs. The number of provincial governments increased from four at the turn of the century to twenty-eight in 1970. More boundaries cut across old coalition territories, and more governors deal with smaller numbers of people, thereby leaving maliks with fewer numbers of people to represent. Moreover, the staffs of the provincial governments have increased, and they have been involved in many more activities.²⁸

Other policies and practices of the government were directed toward control of the religious authorities. The Afghan rulers had already in the nineteenth century been paying stipends to mullahs who expressed loyalty and helped encourage the warriors to fight. But under Abdur Rahman efforts were made to bring the Islamic learned establishment under more direct control. Some of the Muslim authorities to whom the people had informally turned for counsel and adjudication were given positions as judges in the provincial governments. They were required to pass government-controlled examinations in Islamic jurisprudence and their judgments were made subject to review by secular officials. *Madrasahs* (advanced schools for

Islamic learning) were established. Mosques in the major cities were built or improved and refurbished by government grants, and their mullahs supported by stipends. *Waqfs* (endowments which supported religious authorities) were taken over by the state.

Thus were the authorities of Islamic learning brought under the control of the central government. There were some Islamic authorities who were less easily controlled, however. These were the shaykhs or pirs, those who claimed to be, or were reputed to be, walis, the sacred persons through whom special grace putatively passed to the common people. Their social influence was exerted mainly through the Sufi orders that formed around them. The Sufi orders had long been troublesome to the Afghan rulers as in many other Islamic nations, and before the turn of the century they had been banned. Many pirs, like the mullahs—which most of them also claimed to be—were provided pensions. The pirs and their clients were thus brought under a degree of control. But the belief in sacred authorities who have direct and special access to God could not be outlawed, and the informal ties of dependence which the rural peoples formed with the pirs have persisted. Small groups of people under the tutelage of a Sufi authority still meet to practice the Sufi rituals of worship. Informal networks of religious affiliation have thus persisted. In fact, many of the rulers and prominent leaders of the country—and especially the women of their families—have retained informal ties with pirs.

The degree to which these informal "friendship" networks have been under the control of the government has therefore been unclear. Officially the pirs and the Sufi orders have no legitimacy and no capability of exerting any significant influence on public affairs. But unofficially they continue to be important in informal ways, and especially so to the common people, for nonpolitical reasons. These networks remain socially viable. That they could, under special conditions, become the basis of powerful political coalitions has made them potentially significant, for at the time when they have coalesced they were capable of exerting much pressure on public affairs.

Another policy of the government that significantly affected the sociopolitical alignments of the rural populations involved ethnic favorites and discrimination. The government treated the various ethnic groups differently. The Pashtun tribes were given, on the whole, favorable treatment. Some of them were absolved from conscription to the military and from taxation. Some were paid stipends. Some of the nomadic Pashtuns were awarded special grazing rights in the

Hindu Kush. These privileges were given as rewards for loyalty and assistance to the government in its military campaigns.

Troublesome populations, on the other hand, received no such favors. The Hazaras, who rebelled and fought an extended war against the Afghan government, were stripped of their control over the Hindu Kush pastures and the pastures were given to the Pashtun pastoralists. This had a devastating impact on the Hazara's society and economy. These pastures had been held in common by the various regional Hazara groups and so had provided important bases for large "tribal" affiliations to be maintained. With the loss of their summer pastures the units of practical Hazara affiliation declined. Also, Hazara leaders were killed or deported, and their lands were confiscated. These activities of the Afghan government, carried on as a deliberate policy, sometimes exacerbated by other outrages effected by the Pashtun pastoralists, emasculated the Hazaras. Today they are peasants owning relatively small tracts of land and, as of the 1970s, gradually declining economically. Large numbers were migrating seasonally to find work and many were permanently situated in the cities seeking to survive as day laborers.

The Nuristanis fared better. After they were subjugated and forcibly converted to Islam, and some of their young men were carried off to be servants of elite Kabul families, they were left relatively alone. That they had become Sunnis when they converted to Islam may also have contributed to their being treated better than the Hazaras, who were Shi'ites. The inaccessibility of Nuristan and the personal ties with their young men in the capital—some of whom eventually advanced to prominent positions in the military—combined to give the Nuristanis a comparatively comfortable relationship with the central government.

Other rural populations for a long time remained relatively unaffected by the Afghan government. These were the groups situated in more inaccessible regions of the country, groups like the Baluch, Qirghiz, and Mountain Tajiks. Having been relatively unaffected by government controls, they tended to retain wide segmentary and kinship-based social units.

This differential treatment of the ethnic types in the country of course created wide differences in their political and economic fortunes. As a whole, the Pashtuns have prospered and the Nuristanis have done well. On the other hand, the Hazaras lost ground, becoming Afghanistan's underprivileged ethnic minority.²⁹

But at the same time, as the government has become stronger

and more effective, it has tended toward impartiality. The favored status of the Pashtuns has been eroding for some time. The government has trod ever deeper into local Pashtun affairs, just as it has into those of other groups. As everywhere, the government has built roads and set up telephone lines in rural Pashtun territory. As everywhere also, it has brought in more officials to inquire into local Pashtun affairs. Moreover, the government's dependence upon the Pashtun tribes' support declined as it acquired more advanced weapons for its military. The purchase in 1955 of heavy arms from the Soviet Union enabled the government to possess, for the first time, more firepower than all the Pashtun tribes combined. In another realm, the development of a national educational system further eroded the Pashtun advantage, for eventually the government began allowing bright non-Pashtun students to study at advanced levels, and eventually to study abroad. As a result, Uzbeks and Tajiks as well as Pashtuns have reached responsible positions in the Afghanistan bureaucracy.

The development of an infrastructure by the government to protect and facilitate these policies had a major impact on the rural populations by affecting economic opportunities and patronage links. As already mentioned, existing roads were improved, especially those connecting the provincial seats with Kabul, thereby opening the way for a better transport and trade system. A few entrepreneurs organized and promoted industries—cotton and karakul, for example—which eventually flourished and of course increased the number and value of products sold for cash. The marketing of goods within the country—not to mention to the outside—has radically expanded.

These developments have fostered a kind of class differentiation among the rural populations. Agriculturalists who were favorably located on or near a main road have begun to raise crops that bring a high cash value in the cities. Some of the more well-to-do families have ventured into trucking and transshipping. Seasonal labor in the cities has been more feasible for the poor. On the whole, the rural families that have by such means been able to tie into the cash economy have done well. Those that have not done so have tended to decline.³⁰ Of course, with the growth of the importance of cash, there have also been more opportunities for cultural brokering. Because the services provided by the government have for the common people been difficult to obtain without the recommendations of

well-placed "friends," the broadening of government influence that accompanied the development of the national infrastructure fostered the importance of well-placed patrons.

As the Afghanistan government became more powerful and efficient the range of feasible responses by the rural populations became narrower. There was less local autonomy, less room for the formation of coalitions, less room for leaders to maneuver. The obvious response of the rural populations to the pressures of the Afghan government, then, has had mainly to be compliant. But some of the peoples have complied as little as possible, in fact, avoided compliance, in three ways that may be mentioned: by smuggling, by other forms of evasion including bribery, and by rebellion.

What is now called smuggling was normal among the Pashtun nomads of eastern Afghanistan for many generations. As the nomads migrated between lowland pastures in India and Pakistan and the highland pastures in central Afghanistan, they carried besides their personal effects, some goods for trade or barter. They have long bought and sold and bartered and traded with the settled populations of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. The animal products of the highlands—wool, ghee, *qurut* (dried yogurt)—were exchanged in the lowlands for the products of the subcontinents—tea, cloth, and other manufactured goods. When national governments began carving up the landscape, the British, with reluctant acquiescence from the Afghan rulers, drew a national boundary between the usual summer and winter territories of the Pashtun nomads. Initially, the boundary made no difference, as neither the British nor Afghans had the wherewithal to enforce it. But shipping of goods across this boundary has continued, even though both governments are now trying to control it, basically because the region in Pakistan across the border is still essentially under tribal control. Members of the tribes in Afghanistan have kinsmen in the urban centers of both countries who can help them market their goods, and they have relatives and allies on the other side of the border who can help them continue to avoid the officials.

As the government has felt it necessary to intrude more directly into local affairs, the local populations, unable to resist by force, frequently resist by evasion. They underreport their livestock holdings, underreport the size and productivity of their land, and until fairly recently fail in many instances to report the births of sons so as to avoid sending them to the army. Moreover, they prefer to

settle their disputes without involving the government. There are in many communities strong pressures to withhold information on sensitive matters from outsiders, but especially government officials.

Another way the local populations try to control government intrusion into their affairs is by bribing the officials. A subject of great sensitivity among Afghan officials, bribery is openly and at length talked about among the rural peoples. Two conditions seem to foster the payment of bribes. One is the desire, sometimes the demand, of the officials for them. Most officials are underpaid, and, in fact, it has been said that the government assumes that local officials will receive some supplementary income. I found no evidence, however, that the higher-paid officials such as governors and judges accepted bribes. But some of the lower-echelon officials, clerks, *alaqadars* (subdistrict administrators), and hakims sometimes accepted bribes. Even so, many of them claimed that they did not want the bribes, but were being forced to accept them by the insistence of the people. This is the second condition that fosters the payment of bribes, for the rural peoples often doubt that their case will get adequate attention, or their claims receive a fair hearing, unless some sort of special gratuity is given. Even though they resent the necessity, as they see it, of paying a bribe, once they are obliged to deal with the government they want to pay it in order to make the most of the situation.

The bribery system has helped the local maliks to prosper. As the bribe is paid through them, and the client who pays the money has no direct access to the officials except through him, the malik is able to keep a portion of the amount paid; in fact, it is normally understood that he will keep some of it. It was often said of the "good" maliks that they do not take much of the money paid to the government—that is, as taxes or bribes.

The payment of bribes is therefore both a way of relating to the government and a way of evading it. Because the price of bribes is so great, people make every effort to avoid letting the government know about a case. It was better, many people in Bamyan told me, to resolve a case internally. Once it becomes "official" it becomes far more costly—even though in principle such government services are supposed to be free. Anyway, they say, no matter how much one pays, one cannot be sure of not being outbid by one's opponent. Such is their sense of alienation from the government.

Rebellion has been, of course, a rare response to the influence of the government. But in fact a number of rebellions have been

reported. Most of them have been brief and abortive, but, as is well known, not all of them.

The typical units of rebellion have of course been the rather large coalitions—smaller groupings easily recognize the impossibility of success. The type of coalition that is most often mentioned in the historical literature is the “tribe.” That term, as already explained, says little about how large the coalition may be. Another kind of rebellious group sometimes discussed is the “bandit” group. Bandits seem to arise among less tribalized peoples, such as Tajiks and Hazaras. Still another kind of rebel coalition is the saint coalition or Islamic coalition. This sort of coalition is almost never mentioned in the literature. But that such groupings have formed is frequently suggested by the fact that they are led by religious authorities, almost always referred to as “mullahs” in the literature. The key instigators in the successful rebellion against Amanullah in 1929—in which several tribes and several ethnic types were involved—were the Mujadidi brothers and a prominent “mullah” from Panjsher, all of whom appear to have been regarded as “saints” by the rural populations.³¹

CONCLUSION

The viable units of sociopolitical activity among the rural populations of Afghanistan have not, on the whole, been ethnolinguistic types. Rather, they have been other kinds of sociopolitical units. Those have taken form in respect to three types of influences, the geophysical conditions of the region, the historic traditions of obligations and understanding existing among these populations, and the impingements of government. Despite the government's impingements, however, some of the rural populations do find ways to evade or resist the government.

There is no need to elaborate further. But it may be useful to make, in conclusion, an analytical point: In identifying the structures that were “in place” among the rural populations of Afghanistan in the late 1970s—when the rural populations so generally and vigorously rose up against the “reforms” of the Marxist government—it is wise to consider not only the sociopolitical structures that were viable and active and thus “visible” at that time, but also those that were implicit in the biases and orientations of these people, the structures

that were "potential" in Afghanistan rural society. Perhaps one failing of Soviet strategists, when they decided to invade Afghanistan, was the failure, as had earlier rulers, to consider the scope and strength of the implicit and potential coalitions of the rural populations. We social scientists who sympathize with the resistance activities of the Afghans may congratulate ourselves for having kept the importance of these coalitions from any Soviets whom might have consulted our work.

NOTES

1. One's obligations seem to grow in respect to one's knowledge. I have received a number of grants and fellowships that have in one way or other enhanced this research: from the Social Science Research Council, the University of Michigan Center for Middle Eastern and North African Studies, the National Endowment for the Humanities, Washington University, and the School of American Research. Gratitude is expressed to all these organizations. In the preparation of this chapter I have benefited from the comments of Jon Anderson on another paper on a similar topic. I also am grateful to A'i Banuazizi, Lois Beck, Louis Dupree, and Nazif Shahrani for comments on the chapter. Also, as there have been delays in publication, much has changed in Afghanistan and the article should be read as a statement of the situation in *circa* 1980. Some recent works on the topic are: M. Nazif Shahrani and Robert L. Canfield (editors), *Revolution and Rebellions in Afghanistan: Anthropological Perspectives* (1984, Berkeley: Institute of International Studies); Robert L. Canfield "Islamic Sources of the Resistance," *Orbis* 29 (1985), pp. 57-71; the proceedings of the Conference on "Le Fait Ethnique en Iran et en Afghanistan" at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique edited by Jean-Pierre Digard (in press); and above all the writings of Olivier Roy, most important of which is his *L'Afghanistan: Islam et Modernité Politique* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1985).

2. Jim Paul, "The *Khalq* Failed to Comprehend the Contradictions of the Rural Sector: Interview with Feroz Ahmed." *Middle East Research and Information Project* (hereafter MERIP) *Reports* (No. 89), 10:6 (July-August 1980), pp. 13, 14.

3. Mountstuart Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and Its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary and India, Comprising a View of the Afghaun Nation and a History of the Dooraunee Monarchy*, 3rd ed. (1815; London: Richard Bentley, 1839) vol. 1, p. 281; Leon B. Poullada, *Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan 1919-1929: King Amanullah's Failure to Modernize a Tribal Society* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973); Rhea Talley Stewart, *Fire in Afghanistan: Faith, Hope and the British Empire*, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1973).

4. See *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 26 (11 January 1980), pp. 30031-32. See also the final reports, based upon an incomplete census project in the 1970s, of the Afghan Demographic Studies Program in the Ministry of Planning.

5. Vartan Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, 1919-1929: King Amanullah's Failure to Modernize a Tribal Society* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 69-73.

6. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 126.

7. For fuller arguments on ethnic processes see Frederik Barth, ed., *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969); and Abner Cohen, *Custom and Politics in Urban Africa: A Study of Hausa Migrants in Yoruba Towns* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969).

8. This analysis must be regarded as preliminary, approximate, and suggestive. Almost anything that might be said about Afghanistan is probably in some sense wrong, as this region contains one of the most disparate populations of the world. My best field experience has been with Hazaras, although I have had some contact with Pashtun nomads, and extensive contact with urban, middleclass Afghans. All the statements concerning matters beyond this range of knowledge should be considered schematic and suggestive.

The best published attempt to survey the structure of rural Afghanistan as a whole is Dupree's *Afghanistan* with which this analysis differs somewhat at a few points. See Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973). To augment the schematic analysis in this chapter see also the publications cited in Dupree, *Afghanistan*, and in M. Jamil Hanifi, *Bibliography of Afghanistan* (New Haven, Conn.: Human Relations Area Files, 1982). Because Kakar's 1979 study is a social history of the reign of Amir Abdur Rahman, it tends to be ignored as an ethnographic source. It is, in my opinion, a rich store of ethnographic information. See Hasan Kawun Kakar, *Government and Society in Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979).

9. Scott Whiteford and Richard N. Adams. "Migration, Ethnicity and Adaptation: Bolivian Migrant Workers in Northwest Argentina," in Brian M. Du Toit and Helen I. Safa, eds., *Migration and Urbanization: Models and Adaptive Strategies* (The Hague: Mouton, 1975). See also Richard N. Adams, *Crucifixion by Power* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970).

10. Hasan Kakar, *Afghanistan: A Study in Internal Political Development, 1880-1896* (Lahore: Educational Press, 1971), p. 132.

11. *Ibid.*

12. Cf. G. Whitney Azoy, *Buz Kashi: Game and Power in Afghanistan* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982); and Robert Leroy Canfield, *Faction and Conversion in a Plural Society: Religious Alignments in the Hindu Kush*, Anthropological Papers No. 50 (Ann Arbor: Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, 1973). Professor M. Nazif Shahrani noted in a personal communication that Azoy's description of patron-client networks in northern Afghanistan is less typical of the Uzbeks than the Pashtuns.

13. The Mujadidi and Gailani families mentioned by Naby in this volume are prominent leaders in the Sufi orders, the Mujadidi's in the Naqshbandiyya order, the Gailanis in the Qadiriyya order. The great saints of the Shi'ites are Sayyids. Even though the Shi'ites have no formal Sufi orders, they have imbibed many of the same concepts of sainthood as the Sunni Sufis, but associated with concepts of the Islam and by derivation with the Imam's representatives; these are normally the Sayyids, sacred descent from Ali (and the Prophet) being especially venerated among Shi'ites.

(See Roy, *L'Afghanistan*.) There is a vast literature on the subject. See, for example, Fazlur Rahman, *Islam*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), pp. 174 ff.

14. Robert L. Canfield, "Islamic Coalitions in Bamyan: A Problem in Translating Afghan Political Culture," in *Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan: Anthropological Perspectives*, ed. M. Nazif Shahrani and Robert L. Canfield (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, 1984), pp. 211-29.

15. Underlying this presentation is the notion that societies may take different "structural poses" depending on different conditions. (See Fred Gearing, "The Structural Poses of 18th Century Cherokee Villages," *American Anthropologist*, 60 [1958], pp. 1148-57.) Our discussion includes both ecological and sociopolitical matters as impingements or controlling conditions that affect their "poses," but it also includes something that Gearing took for granted, the traditions or heritages that affect the way the impinging influences are perceived and defined.

16. I assume "material conditions" to include (1) those that are "natural," that is, that are inherent in or closely allied to the geophysical features of the region; and (2) those that are technological. Technology, some would argue, for example, Sahlins, is actually part of the cultural tradition, which I discuss in the section on tradition. See Marshall Sahlins, *Culture and Practical Reason* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976). But the technology to which I refer has a closer link to the land and the requirements of human subsistence than the types of traditional culture I describe. It is necessary to deal with the aspects of human culture that are closely allied to biological needs and the material resources for satisfying them, and it is necessary to deal with the aspects of human culture that express and serve the moral and spiritual need of humans to be placed in fields of significance. Kroeber's distinction between material culture and moral culture, and Redfield's between technology and world view, continue to be necessary and utile. See Alfred L. Kroeber, *Anthropology* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1948); and Robert Redfield, *The Primitive World and Its Transformations* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1953).

17. Frederik Barth, "Nomadism in the Mountain and Plateau Areas of Southwest Asia," *Problems of the Arid Zone* (Paris: UNESCO, 1960), pp. 341-55.

18. See Marvin Harris, *Cultural Materialism* (New York: Random House, 1980); and Eric A. Ross, ed., *Beyond the Myths of Culture: Essays in Cultural Materialism* (New York: Academic Press, 1980).

19. See Emile Durkheim, *The Evolution of Educational Thought*, trans. Peter Collins (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977).

20. See Sahlins, *Culture and Practical Reason*; and Edward Shils, *Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).

21. See Jere L. Bachrach, "Andarab and the Banijurids," *Afghanistan Journal*, 3:4 (1976), pp. 147-50.

22. Dupree has an interesting discussion of the discriminatory pressure placed on the Qizilbash, who were Shi'ite. See Louis Dupree, "Further Notes on Taqiyya: Afghanistan," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 99:4 (1979), pp. 68-82; see also Louis Dupree, *Saint Cults in Afghanistan*, American University Field Staff Reports, South Asia Series, vol. 20, no. 1 (1976).

23. See Marshall G. S. Hodgeson, *Venture of Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), vol. 2.

24. Ali B. Uthman Hujwiri, *The Kafsh al-Mahjub: The Oldest Persian Treatise on Sufism*, trans. R. A. Nicholson (London: Luzac, 1910 [c. 1050]), pp. 212-14.
25. Arnold Fletcher, *Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1965).
26. Quoted in Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p. 419.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 420.
28. Robert L. Canfield, *Hazara Integration into the Afghan Nation: Some Changing Relations Between Hazaras and Afghan Officials*, Occasional Paper No. 3 (New York: Afghanistan Council of the Asia Society, 1971).
29. Klaus Ferdinand, "Preliminary Notes on Hazara Culture," *Historiskfilosofiske Meddelelser Udgivet af Det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab*, Bind 37, nr. 5. (Copenhagen: Ejnar Munksgaard, 1959); Klaus Ferdinand, "Nomadic Expansion and Commerce in Central Afghanistan: A Sketch of Some Modern Trends," *Folk* 4 (1962), pp. 123-59; Canfield, *Hazara Integration into the Afghan Nation*; Robert L. Canfield, "Suffering as a Religious Imperative in Afghanistan," in Thomas R. Williams, ed., *Psychological Anthropology* (The Hague: Mouton, 1976), pp. 465-86.
30. Canfield, "Suffering." Thomas J. Barfield, *The Central Asian Arabs of Afghanistan: Pastoral Nomadism in Transition* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), provides an excellent example of the impact of the sudden availability of cash markets on pastoralists in Qataghan.
31. See Stewart, *Fire in Afghanistan*; and Poullada, *Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan* and Canfield, "Islamic Coalitions in Baurian."