

Ethnofederalism and the Ethnogeopolitics of Afghan State

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The state structuration in Afghanistan began with the ethnopolitical portioning of the state. This had intrinsic limitation as the common Afghan would only see state coming through particularistic arrangements conveyed through traditional authority. The secular institutions such as bureaucracy, law and civil society had disadvantage in this setup. The provincial governance showed better resilience to such ethnopolitical structure and at the same time National legislature too strived for more powers that could lend credence to secular institutions in Afghanistan. The role of democracy in promotion of such cause was only partially successful as the majoritarian power often slipped into the dominance of Pashtun warlords that carried a sense of distrust due to the superimposition of Taliban identity in their geocultural realms. Therefore, it depended a lot on leaders to make a careful choice between limited democracy and limited ethnocracy. The minority in Afghanistan took up the cause of secular institutions as they were the larger guarantee of their inclusion in power sharing. But the majoritarian leadership has often bargained outside the institutional framework that can be seen as consociational arrangement effectively weakening the secular institutionalization. This paper looks into the power sharing arrangement between Pashtun and non-Pashtun groups within the fiduciary limits of ethnofederalism and ethnogeopolitics that have shaped the evolution of Afghan state post 9/11.

Introduction

The Bonn agreement has proved to be a reckoning case of mutant ethnic conflict that simply refused to subside given the internal-external connection of groups; the sources of power resided outside the state territory. The law remained in the hands of warlords who were connected to their kinsmen beyond state territory often stressing the borders that has prevented the Afghan state from having peaceful coexistence with neighbors. This tricky situation had much contribution from the Cold War geopolitics, which created microstructures of contested spaces along margins of tribal and kinship groups. The role of technology in making these rivalries count in the stratagem of great powers paved way for the threatening scenario where even the smallest and remotest act of an individual would construe the perception of threat. And, therefore, the war which started as the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) finally narrowed down to signature pointing and personality strikes even after a decade.¹

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¹ C C Fair, K Kaltenthaler and W J Miller (2014), "Pakistani Opposition to American Drone Strikes", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 129, No. 1, pp. 1-33.

This has had much to do with the role of leadership who are the mobilizer of threat. The important variable that got into play with signature strikes were the sections of tribal groups represented by personality and their following. The extended kinship network and loyalty have been the foremost qualification to be a successful warlord apart from small arms and drugs. These drone strikes have particularly riled the Pashtun tribal communities in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which generated myriad reactions such as one leading to incendiary green on blue attacks.

The present paper looks into structuration of Afghan state since the advent of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) under United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) aegis and myriad forms of ethnomethodological approaches adopted by international agencies during the course to trim down its ethnic baggage. However, the very idea of *qawm* simply refuses to debilitate the tribal polity and the new arrangement of power sharing has tried to resurrect the consociational form of institution building, but geopolitics of the land simply keeps the aspirations of state stability lower than expected. It has historically been the habit of the Afghans to look beyond their territory but the real deficit of statehood is marked by virulent tribal autonomies that are vulnerable to persistent influence from the neighbors. The most important qualifier at this stage is that not all ethnoscares feel the same vis-à-vis drone warfare. It is the Pashtun lands, which is spread across the Durand line that has the maximum bitterness against the drones. The sufferings have further aggravated the sense of marginalization among the Pashtuns and they find it more difficult to reconcile with the state that condescends the drone strike. The question arises that through the Bonn agreement international actors tried for maximum inclusion of ethnic groups to build the Afghan state, then why Taliban-led Pashtuns could not see themselves coming to the party. Their antagonisms are based on challenges to the constitutional framework, but their methodology is quite paradoxical. They oppose the present constitution from the perspective of Islam as non-compromising spirit of the state, but their share in power looks for the dominance over Pashtuns, to which most of the Taliban leadership belongs. The coercive power of Taliban essentially emanates from their majoritarian status.² This also refers to the peculiar setup of Pashtuns. Taliban sees constitution as not only obtrusive to their ethnic but also their tribal framework. The *khel* and clan system is almost complete reference to political authority commanded by elders. The presence of overarching tier of state that can constrict their bargaining power vis-à-vis other ethnic groups is seen as a threat. There is also an important aspect of body politic, i.e., the role and social space for woman. The women are considered as focus of family honor and their equivalence to land and material asset brings in confrontation with the state. The Pashtuns do not see the secular state as a substitute to their tribal authority to whom they could delegate the legal framework guaranteeing the security of their women folk, land

² S G Jones and A Munoz (2010), *Afghanistan's Local War: Building Local Defense Forces*, p. 15, National Defense Research Institute, Rand Corporation, Pennsylvania.

and material asset. A larger part of insecurity comes from ethnic segmentation of society. The Taliban reference largely points to urban centers, but the countryside already had those restrictions imposed by village menfolk.³ The third vital element of Pashtun underpinnings to Taliban movement has been the narco-finance of their resistance against the state as the personalities and their kinship structure form the core of influence over members. The drug trade generating huge sums of money is used by Taliban (tribal) leaders in order to maintain their status and their capabilities that justify their prime position. The narco-finance often has come as a handy gain for the warlords who share power within government and influence the state machinery to facilitate these alter-statist goals. Taliban exploit the ethnic divide over political economy of drug-money. Therefore, Taliban also sees itself in confrontation with the Afghan state over this very crucial issue.⁴

Ethnicity and Democracy

It is pertinent to engage in theoretical debate that can explain the difficulties in accommodation of ethnic groups within governance under emergent Afghan state. The idea of power sharing renders a different picture of state if power remains an indivisible good beyond group level. The rights and freedoms of individual do not reflect the power arrangement which are more than often realized in group. The right to admission certainly refers to an individual's admissibility, but it does not question the systemic disposition towards the norm of selective admission. Thus, the generalization of norms of admission affects more than a single individual and therefore they cannot be treated on individual basis. The generic nature of individual rights affect a large number which are marginalized in power arrangement. The idea of liberal democracy has been affine to the individual's free space. But the quest for these freedoms imbibes into growth of institutions where either a balance of power among groups is reached, or in an absence of this, it gives way to institutionalized rivalry.⁵ The important quest lies in locating freedoms between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* (i.e., community and society). The former has more particularistic understanding given the fact that rights and status within the group are inherited and their givenness contributes to the formation of cultural identities through symbolic valuation of individuals and their reference group. The *Gesellschaft* (society) has more organizational interface, where public life resides. The institutional apparatus of power does not separate the two and the community at times governs the societal forms such as the state and its government. The extraneous factors such as international conventions tend to limit such influence often viewed as curtailing the

³ N Nojumi, D Mazurana and E Stites (2009), *After the Taliban: Life and Security in Rural Afghanistan*, p. 37, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Ltd., Plymouth.

⁴ A H Amin, D J Osinski and P A DeGeorges (2010), *The Development of Taliban Factions in Afghanistan and Pakistan: A Geographical Account*, p. 61, The Edwin Mellen Press, Lampeter.

⁵ S A Derso (2012), *Taking Ethno-Cultural Diversity Seriously in Constitutional Design*, pp. 6-10, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden.

communalization of state. This curtailing influence can come from myriad external sources, such as global finance, regional organizations, great power intervention etc. However, the groups within society again try to scale up to the newly acquired state parameters and often it leads to a scenario where power and corruption play cog and wheel relation for those groups who are at the center. The law and its ability to stem the disfavor from institutional practices becomes sole recourse for the marginalized groups. The role of democracy is pivotal in raising such legislative framework and failure to do so keeps bringing such endeavors with each hustings. The democracy is a majoritarian framework by its very essence and has the ability to corner multiculturalism or minority rights. It is then up to the law and legislative bodies to get things back to a sustainable balance. But this has been the ideal not the norm and the focus has been on structural attributes within democratic framework that can be molded for the allocation of political space to smaller and marginalized groups. The idea of spatial devolution of power has been one of the most favored ideas to placate the marginalized groups (minorities) that can be geographically determined and the very hierarchical nature of the state allows the allocation of power at sub-national tier. Federalism has been defining identity of multicultural democracy that allows smaller substate units to enjoy power and constitute freedoms to smaller groups. The idea has been pitted against the Smith's notion of dominant ethnics and its role in formation of nation-state. Smith believes capitalism has pivotal role in the core-periphery organization of the structure of national territory. The capitals are centers of finance, military power and technology, whereas the peripheries are no more than repository of mass population ideal for cheap labor. The spatial classes contribute to the resistance against the core, which is mobilized by the peripheral elites. These elites of periphery are pre-existent in traditional structures of society that survive even under the capitalist system with many social roles and statuses preserved due to community interests.⁶ Anything short of self-determination within the federal structure can acquire a particularistic form coined by Andrew Lijphart as consociationalism. This involves a mutual agreement of the elite to collectively share power through collegium with segmentary structures of power.⁷ This can very well point to the notion of confederacy that makes federal units highly independent. The ability to mobilize masses on the basis of cultural, social and emotional soft points creates the fertile soil for nationalism. The need for having a nation for collective that can preserve from the unevenness of capitalist development has been ubiquitous in the post-colonial African and Asian communities. And, the right to self-determination has been seen as natural right for the communities who find political course as the sole choice for economic goals.

The course of nationalism in Europe has shown myriad trends ranging from universal secularization to de-territorialization of minorities. These have created a

⁶ A D Smith (2003), *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism*, p. 50, Taylor & Francis, London.

⁷ L A Jinadu (1985), "The Consociational Federalism, State, and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria", *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 71-100.

repressed accommodation of minorities and a passive resistance to the nation-state. The problem with self-determination or political divorce is the borders and territories. The redrawing of borders and each ethnic group aiming at having its national territory would simply mean an unmanageable relation between groups and nations.⁸ The redrawing of borders has its parallel in reterritorialization of power in a federal system. The sub-national units also in one sense imply drawing borders within borders under a common institutional framework. This means a self-rule along shared-rule, but does this sharing go down to the smallest unit identified or remain a majoritarian domain at the second-tier, is a question of practice under federalism. The tier at which indivisibility is defined also defines the homogeneity of territory and the viability of borders. The very idea of borders is the property not only defining the group identified, but also inviting the contest to reorder the territory. The hierarchical arrangement of power in state does not imply groups do not contest the hierarchy and more often the situation emerges where the majority group takes an ally with minimal tradeoff with power sharing group and creates an oligarchic setup where rest of the diversity is devoid of any consociational participation. The instruments of ethnic dominance may vary from constitutional engineering to military deployment.

Another quest is the shifting of emphasis from one identifier to another. The state might deploy language, religion, cultural symbols to make borders blurred and induce malleability into sharp edges of ethnic conflict.⁹ The consociational democracy does not look into any such malleable forms, but deals with innovations in structure that can integrate the differentiated power sharing by groups in question. The two arrangements are dear to consociationists: (1) the sharing of power in executive and legislature by territorially segmented units; and (2) the functioning democracy.¹⁰ These are important when even there are no formal federal units such as in Afghanistan, but there are well-marked ethnic boundaries that create a domain wherein several sub-national units reside. There is also the important element of minority veto that qualifies consociation. This remains a vital signature to making or breaking of consensus. The dominant group might be constrained in its maximizing influence in the wake of such veto. There are usually near majoritarian cases of governance, where the executive might be overpowering in order to bypass the constraints. There is also a case where majoritarianism remains under check due to absence of a single party that is driven by majoritarian interest. In fact, Afghanistan's constitutional engineering has specifically weakened the growth of any single majority party that can deal with the rising expectations of one large group, especially, the Pashtuns.

⁸ Y T Fessha (2010), *Ethnic Diversity and Federalism: Constitution Making in South Africa and Ethiopia*, p. 13, Ashgate, Surrey.

⁹ Y Ghai (2000), *Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-Ethnic States*, CUP, Cambridge.

¹⁰ A Lijphart (1985), "Non-Majoritarian Democracy: A Comparison of Federal and Consociational Theories", *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 3-15.

Afghanistan's case represents more of a compound majority that often shuffles between hard and soft territoriality given the fact Pashtuns have opted for various territorial and a-territorial allies at different point of time. The compound majority is different from simple majority in a sense that consociational element imbibes the spirit of process representing typical socialization of federal structure. The dichotomy of structure and process represent the essential crossover of federal and consociational state.¹¹

Evolution of the Afghan State

The state of Afghanistan post-Bonn has been a discrete exercise in deference to 1964 constitution that paved way for a constitutional monarchy with significant devolution of powers to the legislature. The question of devolution of power has been a tricky one in the Afghan case as the informal structures too play a significant role in this regard. The role of Loya Jirga has been quite important as a grand decision-making body that can even abrogate the legislative actions. The legitimacy came from the confederate (consociational) structures of ethnic groups that are represented by their traditional leadership. Here, it is important to underscore the two terms, the confederate and the consociational, which essentially represent the sharing of sovereignty in formal and informal domains. The two eventually converge into leadership or the elites that actually indulge in power sharing process and also carry the influence of their tribe or *qawm* into formal institutions of legislature. The typical situation in the past arose from the point of view of religion. The religious authorities have not been prescribing territorial segregation in Afghanistan except for one case of the Hazaras, who belong to the Shia sect of Islam and are largely located on Andarab plateau. The consociational element resides in Afghanistan as the communities have intermarried on margins, shared common locality (*manteqa*) and often have bilingualism.¹² The tribes have traditional understanding of various power contests pertaining to territory, material possession and women. The conflict resolution institutions of *shura* and *jirga* have been converging for intra- and inter-ethnic disputes, viz., the important dispute arising over trespassing and grazing rights often bringing nomads and sedentary population into conflict. The women constitute an important part of blood money that is exchanged as compensation to the aggrieved party. The difficulty in fixing the nomadic groups into provinces creates a situation where the settled ethnic groups might favor federal structure of state, but the nomads might find it obstructive to their transhumance rights and trans-territorial freedoms.¹³ The duality of power systems were apparent as the state was led by monarchy till 1973 and thereafter the revolutionary elite kept rotating power

¹¹ D J Elazar (1985), "Federalism and Consociational Regimes", *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 17-34.

¹² T Barfield (2010), *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*, p. 16, Princeton University Press, Oxford.

¹³ A Rosman and P G Rubel (1976), "Nomad-Sedentary Interethnic Relations in Iran and Afghanistan", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 545-570.

amongst themselves till 1992. The state largely remained a rentier state as it hardly produced adequate revenue receipts and depended heavily on the external aid. This perpetual dependence allowed wide latitude for great powers that intervened on the pretext of aid and assistance. The ethnicization of the state was preeminent as the monarchy largely raised governance structure on kith and kin loyalties, and even after 1973 the tribal loyalty systems were strong basis for recruiting army and bureaucracy.¹⁴ The collapse of Najibullah government in 1992 and the anarchy in its aftermath characterized much of the development that was seen inimical to civilized world. The metaphor 'constitutional monstrosity' was used for the 1992 government formed after the Peshawar Accord that was signed between mujahideens, the Wattan Party and the former Najib loyalists. The ethnicization of conflict effectively tore into the majoritarian statehood. The role of Tajik and Uzbek militias significantly altered the balance in and around Kabul where largely Pashtun population lived. The idea of dominant ethnic community leading the state could no longer be considered a norm.¹⁵ Hekmatyar, a Kharoti Pashtun, found himself at odds in the power sharing arrangement and therefore sought cross-border help from Pakistani military establishment for tilting the power game in his favor. The presence of large number of Pashtuns in Pakistan gave a degree of legitimacy for its concern towards the happenings in Afghanistan, but further ethnicization of groups only made matter worse in days to come, when Taliban emerged as a distinct Pashtun force counterpoised to the Tajik and other minority dominated Northern alliance during the late 1990s. The Taliban adhered to distinct religious identity in order to escape the ethnic polarization of Pashtuns versus non-Pashtuns. The ethnic polarization prevented any possibility of forming a national state. It only meant a coercive state dominated by the majority, here, the Pashtuns. This scenario alerted the northern and western neighbors, namely, Iran and the Central Asian Republics of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, who found the ethnic repression of Tajiks and Uzbeks as cascading into creating instability within their own society. The failure of state to create an integration policy even under the banner of Islam spelled troubles for Taliban. The post-Soviet Afghanistan had this divisive polity only to be qualified as the failed state. The post-Najib state in Afghanistan failed to create a framework for social and economic regulation and the welfare opportunities that would have built trust among ethnic groups; something that has been typical of a failed state.¹⁶

The idea of dominant ethnic was both internally and externally challenged in Afghanistan. The minorities resisted the Pashtun dominance within Afghanistan given the past historic experiences dating from the times of Amri Abdur Rahman Khan. This Amir reterritorialized northern Afghanistan by resettling the Gilzai Pashtuns, who

¹⁴ B R Rubin (1992), "Political Elites in Afghanistan: Rentier State Building, Rentier State Wrecking", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 77-99.

¹⁵ S M Tarzi (1993), "Afghanistan in 1992: A Hobbesian State of Nature", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 165-174.

¹⁶ N M Shahrani (2002), "War, Factionalism and the State in Afghanistan", *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 104, No. 3, pp. 715-722.

were uprooted from southern Afghanistan. The Hazara lands were reallocated to the Kuchi Pashtuns in central highlands. These memories of bitterness remained at large while the new political formations were considered. This further went into formation of alliances during the advent of Taliban. Taliban were particularly anti-Shia in their ideological Islam and the 1998 massacre at Mazar-i-Sharif reminded of medieval world brutalities. The war crimes were purely ethnic in nature in Mazar as the Hazaras civilians were searched from door-to-door and ethnic genocide made the city smelling foul for days. There was nothing Islamic in the killing of the old and the children and raping of women by Taliban troops.¹⁷ This fairly indicated the role of Pakistan in aggravating the conflict between the groups and it invited action from other Afghan neighbors, particularly from Iran. Iran being a Shia country took strong exception to the atrocities against Afghan minorities. And, soon an alliance came into picture with Iran, Russia and India supporting the minorities from the northern side. Thus, the ethnic conflict almost created polarization of nations around Afghanistan. The US still harbored the faith in Taliban that was expected to dump al-Qaeda and stick to its initial mandate. This did not happen until the 9/11 tragedy, which took toll of the pride of superpower, who had declared the victory in favor of individual liberty, freedom, democracy and market forces. The new threat on these very coveted values became conspicuous by the choice of target, the twin towers. The idea to restore those values hard won in the aftermath of victory over Cold War brought NATO and the US to focus on Taliban-led Afghanistan.

The rebuilding of Afghanistan state this time was a novel experiment as the state had to conform to not only domestic constituency but also an external one, and neutrality was a ruled-out option. The earliest signs of resistance to Pashtun dominance during Soviet occupation was visible in the form of *Shura-i-Ahl-i-Jihadi Islami*, an organization of Hazara, Tajik and Uzbek warlords formed in 1985, who espoused the twin objective of removing Soviet occupation and the Pashtun hegemony together.¹⁸ Hekmatyar and Taliban only made the situation further polarized between Pashtuns and the non-Pashtuns. The social breakup had its visible footprint in the backdrop of Bonn talks that aimed at bringing various ethnic groups into some power-sharing arrangement, at the same time the state needed to be identified with the universal (Western) values so that there is trust and secure relation that could prevent future uncertainty. Afghans had no experience of secular institutions under monarchy and the successive regimes did not strive to build one causing the spiral of mistrust between these polarized groups. The polarization went into feeding the state formation of Afghanistan and the Bonn Agreement looked to mitigate this situation. One of the covenants had been to chaff the good from the bad. Karzai and many of his associates joined the NATO allies in order to seek

¹⁷ A Rashid (2001), *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, pp. 72-74, Yale University Press.

¹⁸ H Emadi (2010), *Dynamics of Political Development in Afghanistan: The British, Russian and American Invasions*, p. 168, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

legitimacy from the Pashtuns who formed the largest group. But the good and the bad deal allowed Pakistan to chip in with its own set of interests that kept Pashtuns away from a possible amicable solution. Bonn Agreement at the outset was forged under the US-led NATO hegemony. All the arrangements were to be supervised by the ISAF forces and the administration was to facilitate their strategic goals until Taliban was decimated. Karzai represented the political face of the administration creating acceptability among majority. He even went to Kandahar in the aftermath of signing the agreement in order to wean away support of Pashtuns from Taliban. The executive or the bureaucracy was largely governed by Northern alliance partners. Thus, a consociational arrangement of power sharing emerged from the foundations of Bonn Agreement. This was unique in the history of Afghanistan as hitherto the kinship loyalty used to be the basis of recruiting the bureaucracy by the Pashtun monarchs. The 2014 Presidential elections, third in succession, were hailed as a unique exercise in the light of post-Karzai political environment. There was no predated choice of leadership by international actors, nor there any resistance to play up the sentiments of the masses. The contest, however, was arranged on the lines of personalities of Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah. They not only represented the quest for majoritarian rules versus larger coalition of minorities. But in the end the Uzbek warlord General Dostum was bargained into power sharing arrangement that finally tilted the score in favor of President Ghani, who represented a large group of Ghilzai Pashtuns and had the favor of the US as part of geopolitical interest. The majority interest as portrayed by President Ghani has cross-border linkages in Pakistan as well; not only his Ahmedzai tribe is located east of Durand line, but also the geopolitical formation patronized by Pakistan's army and the ISI has been that of Pashtun-Uzbek alliance that could cover minimax arrangement of power sharing. The other ethnic groups have largely relied on opportunities and their differences in order to strike a bargain. The political structure of Afghanistan under this model is very little inclined towards any federal setup, but has strong consociational element in terms of power sharing to the extent that Parliament has often found it difficult to pursue and protect the interest of the marginalized groups. It is in history that neighbors intervened on behalf of those disadvantaged that the state was forced to concede a few demands.

Conclusion

The question of state and its choice of political setup no longer remains a domestic affair if it has social groups that engage into neighborhood. This has precisely been the case for most of the post-colonial South Asia. The borders remain in contest due to the potential vulnerability conveyed by the peripheral groups. These groups not only represent spatial attribute but are also systemic attribute given the fact they might not assimilate with governance. It remains a potent source of migration from one state to another for such groups and where border, one such as Durand Line, remains highly porous, that can effectively increase the bargaining power of the

Pashtuns who consider themselves marginalized in the current setup. Their role in intelligence gathering and sharing with the state has significant impact on interstate relations. These groups demand share in power for better access to economic resources and also the strategic autonomies of their border lives, which make their communities as mobile territories. The unique situation in Afghanistan has been that Pashtuns represent both a maximal and minimalist case for statehood. They represent the earlier case of Pashtun nationalism that led to Pashtunistan movement. But Pashtun nationalism only represents a partial nationhood for an Afghan state. They are concentrated in large parts of southern Afghanistan, but historically the Durrani preferred the coalition of a few Pashtuns along with non-Pashtuns. The Ghilzais remained largely outside the ambit of power. The present-day Afghanistan has no such historic disposition and the Ghilzais, though occupying the Durand Line, are equally good in seeking their share of power through the help of their extended communities in Pakistan. This has impact on sub-national structuring of power. The unique method to handle such influence was devised in the form of Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV). The essence of this mechanism in democratic elections is that a single majoritarian group cannot capture power and the proportional share of smaller groups does get representation. The ethnic scenario of Afghanistan begets its rationale right; however, those political groups that are pluralist in nature—and there is already collective formation under single organization—simply fail to assert their power position that is much needed to formulate a state that can inherit the balance of ethnic groups within the balance of political formations. The consociational behavior, which tends to reside in political parties, has been denied an opportunity and the state is forced to seek a consociational structure through SNTV that has restricted the growth of nationalist perception in Afghanistan. The federal structure is no longer a need if state powers are in disposition of ethnic segments. Thus, effective unity is maintained by making groups identify their ethnopolitical stakes in governance. This presumes that ethnic groups would cooperate on the issues of national interest as they are putatively seen as a collective sum of their individual group interests, a situation of apportioning of international aid by northern regions that bargained collectively as compared to the southern regions that were more infested with insurgency. Afghanistan can be seen as a case where the consociational approach is pitted against the federal approach and this may be defined as limiting approach to nation building that might harden the identity of ethnoscares that can reflect upon its neighbors adversely. ▣

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