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Ethnic cores and dominant ethnies

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References

In the burgeoning literature of the 1950s and 1960s on 'ethnicity', as it came to be called, one bedrock assumption was almost universally endorsed. Ethnicity adhered to numerical and sociological cultural minorities, never to numerical and sociological majorities in a given state. National states, it was conceded, were rarely monoethnic. The great majority consisted of a nation and one or more ethnic minorities. On the one hand, there was the historic 'nation', the most populous, the wealthiest and the politically dominant of the cultural groups in the state, even if it was not indigenous. On the other hand, there were the minority populations, immigrants of a different culture, if not religion, each of them less populous, poorer and without power, acculturating to the national Way of Life and in the throes of assimilation. These were 'the ethnics', in contrast to the 'nation', into which they were to be incorporated and integrated, if not melted down.

This was, broadly speaking, the image of the 'national state' held by American sociologists at the time, and it was clearly drawn from the peculiar experience of immigrant societies, notably the United States. We see it even in more sensitive treatments like those of Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan. How far the image conformed to the reality is another matter; and in particular, I leave aside the rather different issues raised by the history and status of the Blacks in the United States, defined in terms of 'race', from which sociologists and politicians alike wished to differentiate other non-Black minorities, partly through the use of the term 'ethnicity'. Here I want to show how this specifically American image and usage of the term 'ethnicity' have distorted our overall understanding of the dynamics of ethnicity and nationhood, and how historians and social scientists have tried to produce a more valid and useful framework for the analysis of the interrelations of ethnicity and nationhood, as well as for our understanding of the origins and development of nations.[1]

A critique of 'minority ethnicity'

We might start with the term itself. Although as a noun the term 'ethnicity', signifying, like social class, either a sub-field of the study of stratification, or a type of status group, or both, seems to have originated after the Second World War, its roots in an adjectival concept referring to the origins and culture of a group are far older. They reach back to

the first Greek usage, in Homer. Here, *ethnos* refers to a band or host or tribe—be it of friends or fighting men or a swarm of bees, or of named groups like *ethnos Lukiōn, ethnos Achaiōn*. In Pindar we read of the *ethnos* of men or women, in Herodotus of the *to Medikon ethnos,* and in Plato of the *ethnos* of heralds.[2]

What these usages appear to have in common is that the groups in question possess certain common cultural, and in some cases physical, attributes. The named groups also appear to have some territorial referent. Herodotus seems to have thought that the cognate concept of *genos* referred to a smaller kinship group, a sub-division of *ethnos,* but he sometimes uses *gens* interchangeably with *ethnos,* much as the Romans tended to use *genos* to refer to larger civilised peoples, other than themselves, the *populus Romanus*. For the Romans, the concept of *natio,* on the other hand, was reserved for distant, usually barbaric tribes, and only in the Middle Ages did it begin to acquire its modern usage, alongside the old Roman usage of *gens*. However, no such consistency informed the ancient Greek usage in respect of *ethnos*. Though, like the apparent Jewish opposition between the *'am Israel* and the *goyim,* the Greeks clearly distinguished *Ellenes* from *barbaroi,* their use of the term *ethnos* covered all 'peoples' who possessed common cultural traits.[3]

These ancient usages, untidy as they may appear, were nevertheless highly influential for the ways in which later epochs sought to describe relations between cultural and territorial groups. Thus, in the New Testament and Church Fathers, the *goyim,* or Gentiles, rendered by *ta ethnē* (which in turn were translated into the *nationes* of the Vulgate), referred to all peoples apart from the Jews and Christians. This suggests a considerable overlap, if not identity, between *ethnos* and *natio,* in contrast to the opposition between ethnic groups and nations, and ethnicity and nationhood, in modern Western, and specifically American, usage. Of course, terms frequently change their meaning. But here we have two diametrically opposed traditions, in one of which the terms 'ethnic' and 'national', and ethnic group and nation, overlap or are even synonyms, while in the other, they are radically different and opposed concepts.[4]

The argument from etymology brings us immediately to that from history. Here I think it useful to contrast two kinds of historical development, the one endogenous, the other exogenous, the one based on long resident communities, the other on recently arrived populations, the one claiming to be indigenous and autochthonous, the other immigrant and pioneering. I refer, of course, to the Middle Eastern and European societies, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, to the immigrant societies of North America, Australia and Argentina.

In the first of these, we are confronted by an evolution of long resident ethnic groups or, in the French term, *ethnies* in the formation of nations over *la longue durée*. The concept of *ethnie* refers to a named human popula-. tion with a myth of common origins and ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more elements of common culture, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites. This slow development from *ethnie* to nation was often accompanied by the use of force on the part of the centralising state of a dominant *ethnie* who constituted the state's core against adjacent *ethnies* and its conquest of their territories, as occurred in England, France, Spain, Sweden and Russia. Throughout this long-drawn-out process, the leading personnel of the state were largely drawn from the members of its core *ethnie,* and, equally important, its social, religious, military and political institutions, as well as its customs and codes, were those of the

dominant *ethnie's* elites. To this, largely European, evolution I shall shortly return, for it has been pivotal to the formation of nations and national states.[5]

In the second kind of trajectory, one or more *ethnies* pioneered the development of a new territory and attracted immigrants from many other *ethnies,* who formed the nation through voluntary submission to common myths, symbols, norms and codes and with differing degrees of social mobility and intermarriage. Of course, we should be careful not to exaggerate the historical differences between the two models of nation-formation. Even in immigrant societies, there was a pioneering or leading *ethnie,* which soon assumed a position of dominance in the nineteenth-century state. But, apart from the much shorter time-span involved, there was no forcible incorporation of long resident *ethnies,* except for the indigenous peoples; while, on the other hand, there was a clear desire for integration into the state by successive waves of immigrants. As a result, it was much easier to oppose the concept of the territorial nation or national state to the ethnic groups formed by incoming migrants eager for rapid integration into the host culture.[6]

Here, the argument from history finds its complement in that from sociology. There is an important difference between *ethnies* whose attachments to particular territories, for example Euzkadi or Slovenia, appear to be 'immemorial, their origins being lost in a haze of legends, and the fairly recent and relatively well documented arrival of immigrant groups who have no particular attachments to this or that territory within the large host state and no wish to politicise their cultures and historical mythologies in opposition to the national state into which they seek rather to be integrated.

It is little wonder if, in the latter case, quite different terms are used to denote the immigrant communities, the ethnic groups, from the total community of the host state, or nation. The relations between ethnic groups and the nation differ greatly from those obtaining between a peripheral *ethnie* and the state in long-resident national states. In immigrant societies, the governing impulse, with a few exceptions among indigenous and Black peoples, has been to integrate, if not assimilate; and this has been more or less acceptable, the return to a 'symbolic ethnicity' notwithstanding. Whereas, in long-resident societies, no such mutual understanding has prevailed in the case of resident or 'homeland' *ethnies*. Even in the French case, where the republic has sought to homogenise its citizens, there has been considerable resistance by the resident *ethnies*— Bretons, Corsicans, Alsatians and the like. This has demonstrated the historic dominance of the French *ethnie* within the French national state, something that its members have taken for granted in equating France and the French national state with the French *ethnie*. And, from the standpoint of the Scots and Welsh, not to mention the Irish, the same might be said of the English, for whom Britain and Britishness was simply an extension of their own identity.[7]

Ethnic cores and nation-formation

Despite these historical and sociological contrasts, the consequences of these two trajectories for the creation of nations and for their internal relations may not, after all, be that different.

Let me start with nation-creation. It has often been argued that in Europe the state, together with nationalism, forged nations, not the other way round. This is, in general, the

thesis of political modernists like John Breuilly, Charles Tilly, Michael Mann and Anthony Giddens. It is also, quite explicitly, the message of Eric Hobsbawm, and more subtly that of Ernest Gellner. In all their theories and approaches, the modern, centralised, professional state plays the central role in the drama of nation-creation. If, for Gellner, the state mediates modernisation, for the other theorists it provides the impetus and engine for modernisation and nation-creation, a process that becomes increasingly an intended outcome of mass mobilisation by elites.[8]

But this was clearly an over-simplification. For one thing, it overlooked the fact that the strong Western states, which provided the buttress and proof of the 'theory', were themselves founded on a degree of ethnic and cultural homogeneity at the centre during the period of their foundation and initial development. It was this relative ethnic homogeneity of the core that enabled the state to expand without internal ethnic fissure, such as we have witnessed in Sub-Saharan Africa. Religion provided a second unifying factor. We do not have to embrace Hastings' view that nations are a Christian product and phenomenon to see how a widely accepted biblical and providentialist reading of the role of dynastic kingdoms helped to buttress these Western medieval Christian states. The drive for religious, and cultural, homogenisation by absolutist states was predicated on a long history of divine chosenness of the ethnic core. Third, the growth of shared historical memories and an 'ethno-history' among the elites of dominant ethnic cores has helped to underpin and legitimise the dynastic state and its wars. It has also provided a repertoire of ethnic myths and symbols of heroes and saints, exploits, battles and sacrifices, on which later generations of the dominant *ethnie* have been able to draw when they and their state have been under threat.[9]

While many factors encouraged, and impeded, the growth of strong states, the combination of ethnic bonds, biblical religion and shared ethno-history, which so often produced a sense of ethnic election and mission, constituted a powerful support, indeed a necessary condition, for the states that would later help to forge nations. In other words, viewed diachronically, the state could be seen to play a mediating role between an initial ethnic core which it helped to consolidate and the subsequent formation of nations. For this reason, in some cases, France and England among them, it is no easy matter to discern the shift from ethnic core to nation. What is clear is that the strong aristocratic state built upon this ethnic core began to expand both through conquest of outlying areas and through *bureaucratic incorporation* of the middle (and much later the lower) classes of the state's population, imposing the language, culture and religion of the dominant *ethnie,* and drawing a large part of its administrative personnel from that same core *ethnie*. Such a complex process, involving the state, ethnic core, aristocracy and religion, represented the first, and perhaps the most influential, of the trajectories of nation-formation, and at its centre we can discern the pivotal role of an ethnic core.[10]

It might be thought that the second major trajectory of nation-formation, that of *vernacular mobilisation,* denoted not just a different, but a diametrically opposed, role for *ethnies,* one that is perhaps more akin to that of ethnic minorities in immigrant societies like the United States. After all, their sociological point of departure is quite different. Unlike the 'lateral', aristocratic *ethnies* whose members built up the strong states of western and northern Europe, much of eastern and south-east Europe, as well as parts of Asia, consisted of 'vertical' or demotic *ethnies,* which were generally smaller, more compact and more exclusive than their lateral counterparts. Some, it is true, like

Bohemia, Bulgaria and Serbia, could point to a history of medieval statehood, or, like the Greeks, to a special role in a wider Orthodox empire. But most of them were subject *ethnies* of far-flung empires, often submerged and with only shadowily documented histories. In these cases, it was an enlightened intelligentsia which, touched by Romanticism and attracted to an historicist nationalism, sought to return to an ethnic past, and recover it for themselves and their 'people', along with a vernacular culture and language. But, as a consequence of their mobilising endeavours, a remarkable transformation occurred. Like the ugly duckling that became a swan, several of these neglected erstwhile minorities, once roused and politicised, became dominant *ethnies* in the new national states that were created by the Great Powers—in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania and Georgia. The point, of course, is that in Europe, and in parts of Asia, these long-resident 'peripheral' *ethnies,* on becoming masters in their own houses, transmuted into dominant *ethnies* in national states, or indeed into dominant nations—with or without small ethnic minorities and peripheral *ethnies* within their borders. So that, though their starting-point and trajectories were quite different, these demotic *ethnies* arrived at much the same *dominant-ethnie* national end-point as their Western European 'lateral' counterparts.[11]

Other kinds of polity later followed the Western bureaucratic route, often quite deliberately. In later Tsarist Russia and Meiji Japan, for example, the dominance of the ethnic core was clearly displayed in an admittedly multicultural setting, and in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries policies of cultural homogenisation were increasingly enforced. The Young Turks, too, attempted a Turkification of the Ottoman empire, in line with an integral nationalism, with disastrous results, preparing a way for what would amount to a secession of the Turkish core from the Ottoman empire.[12]

This tendency for nation-formation to be closely bound up with the position and transformation of the role of the dominant *ethnie* might lead us to think that all nations are founded on strong core *ethnies* and their symbolisms and mythologies. That constitutes the strong claim of 'ethno-symbolism'; and one can certainly think of many cases that demonstrate such an intimate connection. I do not think the evidence allows us to go that far. On the one hand, there are cases like the Slovak where ethnicity was too weak, ethno-history too shadowy and ethnic symbolism too undifferentiated (from that of the Czechs and others) to allow us to posit any progression from *ethnie* to nation; the ethnic elements appear to have been forged in the crucible of the nation-creation process itself. On the other hand, there are cases like Eritrea, where a prior association and unity of the designated population were based on a history of political ties through, in this case, periods of Italian and then British colonisation—ties strong enough to differentiate the Eritrean populations from those of neighbouring Ethiopia. But it remains to be seen how far such state-based 'nations' will survive and flourish, in any more than a juridical sense.

As a result, we can only advance a weaker claim: to build, create or forge nations, it greatly helps the creators to be able to point to and make use of a relevant prior core *ethnie,* or at least strong ethnic networks; and that not to be able to do so greatly hinders the tasks and processes of nation-formation. The point at issue here is the well-known problem of popular 'resonance'. To mobilise people to make the necessary sacrifices for the nation-to-be, one needs ethnic ties—shared memories and common myths, symbols and codes, as well as some widely held values and traditions—which can underpin the new national 'construct' and show the members of the core *ethnie* that they are one

historical people of common devotion, and preferably that they are ancestrally related, however fictively. And, even then, in highly polyethnic states, the chances of forging successfully integrated nations may be slender.[13]

Dominant *ethnies* versus peripheral *ethnies*

Let me turn to the politics of dominant *ethnie* nations, and more particularly in Africa and Asia. Here, these difficulties of resonance and mobilisation are all too apparent. Policies similar to those employed by Meiji Japan and Tsarist Russia have been attempted in some post-colonial states, for example in Burma, Kemalist Turkey, Zaire and, in respect of Africanisation, in Uganda and perhaps now in Zimbabwe. But, in these cases, the project of national unity around the culture of a core *ethnie* has met with only limited success. Instead, we find an uneasy, even conflictual, relationship between ethnic cores and peripheral *ethnies,* as in states like Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, sometimes leading to open ethnic wars, as in Burma, Sudan and Zaire. Here, the dynamics of nation-formation have foundered on the inability of core *ethnies* to forge sufficiently strong states which can accommodate peripheral *ethnies.* To this, we must add the novel impact of nationalist ideology. The epoch of Western nation-formation predated the emergence of nationalism, and hence the ideological blueprints which it subsequently afforded to *ethnies* that were dissatisfied with their lot. In today's world, the lure of potential nationhood has meant that, in addition to their economic and political weakness, post-colonial states based upon a core *ethnie* are faced with threats of secession, at least as a bargaining counter in the struggle for political offices and the redistribution of scarce resources. In consequence, core *ethnies* are often locked in a struggle to establish their dominance, in some cases by force, further weakening their chances of creating unified national states, let alone nations.[14]

   A similar, if somewhat more muted and peaceable, tension can be found in the national states of Western Europe and Canada. Ethnicity, which for many had seemed to be obsolete in the aftermath of the War and its geno-cides, suddenly re-emerged as a political force in the 1960s and 1970s—to be followed by a second wave of more strident ethnic revival in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union after 1989. Suddenly, long established nations found that they were viewed from the periphery of 'their' states as dominant *ethnies,* and that the larger identity, which they had assumed to be merely an extension of their own national identity, was no longer an exclusive property, if indeed it ever had been. Thus, the English, so long accustomed to think of the British nation and British identity as an historic extension of their own national identity, found themselves swiftly disabused by Scots and Welsh of such proprietary notions; and much the same occurred in France, when Bretons and Alsatians, Provencals and Corsicans attacked the centralist Jacobin ideal of a unitary France dominated by Paris and the historic north-central French *ethnie.* Even in more federal states like Belgium and Spain, the old dominance of historically hegemonic *ethnies* was challenged by autonomist movements of peripheral but long resident or 'homeland' *ethnies,* sometimes violently. And, further east, in the former Yugoslavia, the project of Greater Serbia culminated in a series of horrifying wars and carnage, as Tito's federal state swiftly unravelled under the pressures of ethnic nationalism.[15]

One consequence of these movements has been to underline the mixed nature of conceptions of the Western nation and national identity. Nonimmigrant Western states have increasingly thought of themselves and their nation as territorially based and civic in orientation, their nationalism firmly entrenched in a liberal conception of individual rights. But the 'ethnic revival' of the 1970s (if that is the right term) revealed the ethnic underpinnings of even the most liberal and civic states, if not in the eyes of the members of their dominant *ethnie,* then in those of its peripheral ethnic communities. The sense of alienation and exclusion felt by many members of peripheral *ethnies,* of a combination of bureaucratic interference and sociai and economic neglect, highlighted the ethnic divisions within the national state and the often unconscious bias on the part of central government towards the needs and interests of members of the dominant *ethnie,* who in virtue of their great numerical majority or political hegemony, or both, appeared to receive a disproportionately high share of jobs and resources. And, given the vital role of perception and sentiment in the sense and understanding of ethnicity, that appearance of bias and sense of alienation has defined the ethnic nature of Western states as much as, if not more than, any overt discrimination by the elites of the dominant *ethnie* against peripheral *ethnies*.[16]

A second consequence of the ethnic revivals in the West and the East has been to reinforce the ideological commitment to civic, and even multicultural, conceptions of national identity, at least on the part of elites. Given the desire of the majority of the members of peripheral *ethnies* to oppose the historic bias towards the dominant *ethnie,* but not to secede from the state in which they had been incorporated, state elites who are largely recruited from the dominant *ethnie* have found it politic, if not necessary, to accentuate the equality of all the members of the polyethnic state and even to recognise the separate rights and cultures of peripheral *ethnies*. This occurred most dramatically in France, where during the 1960s the western half of France, including Brittany, had been designated as 'parkland' by the Debré government, but which was subsequently accorded a more equal share of industrial development. Of course, this change in policy was hastened by the influx of immigrants of radically different culture from that of the majorities of most Western states, placing multiculturalism within an overall civic national identity on the agenda. But, once again, this has only served to highlight the ethnic nature of Western European national states, and the perceived ethnic basis of their national identities.[17]

Dominant ethnicity: erosion or revival?

How useful in today's world are concepts like 'ethnic core' and 'dominant ethnicity'? Has globalisation altered, once and for all, the nature of national states, as it has diluted their power and efficacy? In a post-modern epoch of mass migration and cultural assimilation, can ethnicity, dominant or otherwise, play any but the most folkloric role?

This is a huge subject, and only a few comments can be made here. Much of the discussion is centred on the West, meaning North America and West/Central Europe, which is then generalised globally. But even the most cursory global survey suggests that ethnicity and especially dominant *ethnies* remain a powerful force in most states outside the West. One might just as well posit the contrary claim: the conflict between dominant

and peripheral *ethnies* is not only becoming fiercer and more entrenched, it is actually part and parcel of the cultural and political pluralism of the world order, as it has evolved since Westphalia and the French and American revolutions. Where states remain largely sovereign, at least in matters of society and culture, and where their scope and penetration are much greater than before, the likelihood of conflict between the ethnic powerholders at the centre and the parties of marginalised *ethnies* in the periphery is that much greater—and endemic. The ways in which colonial territorial lines were drawn, and the advantages accruing under colonialism to some *ethnies,* who tended to be the most central and hegemonic, if not the most populous ethnic groups, were reinforced by the norms of the inter-state order and the increasing power of the modern, centralised state, which controlled the sources of patronage and became a prize of bitter rivalry. The result of such high stakes has been the intensification of conflicts between dominant *ethnies* and peripheral ethnic minorities, on the one hand; and, on the other hand, a range of measures and attempted solutions for conflict management, including arbitration, minority rights, consocia-tion, autonomy and even federalism.[18]

A second point concerns immigration, especially in the Western context. While there has been a continual ebb and flow of migrants throughout recorded history, the scale and cultural mixing of current migration flows are probably unprecedented. So at the very moment when some European states have shown themselves willing to surrender some of their sovereign powers and functions to a supranational authority, particularly in the economic sphere, there is a determined contrary trend to a stronger delineation of controls by these same national states over immigration and related areas, to avoid labour conflicts and cultural backlashes. Similarly, at the societal level, while we are witnessing an undoubted fraying and erosion of widely held traditions of national identity on the part of members of the dominant *ethnies,* we are also periodically reminded of the limits to such erosion, not only by violent displays of xenophobic resentment, but also by often passionate discussion and de fence of a national identity based on the symbols, memories, values and myths of the dominant *ethnie*.

Much the same can be said about the cultural effects of a third factor, globalisation. The voluminous literature on this vast topic seems, on this point, to be at best inconclusive, insofar as, on the one hand, it documents the loss by the national state of many of its major economic functions and some of its political controls, while, on the other, it highlights the resilience of local ties and the revitalisation of ethnic bonds, aided by the uses of intermediate technology and urban and media networks. But this applies equally to dominant *ethnies,* insofar as through their control of major economic, media and political networks, they are able to increase their resources and power, and determine the agenda for regional and minority *ethnies*. Far from over-riding and dissolving ethnic differences, the evidence suggests that globalising trends, including mass migration, sharpen cleavages and inequalities, particularly where class and ethnicity are superimposed, and where nationalism is invoked as the ground and goal of revived ethnic aspirations.[19]

Undoubtedly the traditional sense of national identity is under siege today. So rapid has been the pace of cultural change since the War, that the foreignness of the past extends to the remoteness of the conceptions of national identity held by our grandparents, and even our parents. But there is really nothing new in this. There have always been rival ideologies of national identity and a succession of competing traditions

of the sources and myths of the 'authentic' nation. This is a far cry from the claim that globalisation necessarily erodes all sense of national identity. If the idea of a monolithic national identity is a fiction, generated perhaps by a severe crisis of national existence such as the War, so is that of a general withering away of nations and national identities. What is perhaps new, at least for some Western states, is the degree and range of cultural recombinations to which a sense of national identity is now subject. This requires on the part of members of the dominant *ethnie* a much more radical rethinking of what they have taken for granted in respect of their national identity. In other words, from being implicit and tacit, the multiculturalism which is so much an expression of the diversity of ethno-cultural and religious groups within the contemporary national state has now been made explicit, and has become a matter of overt policy.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we should perhaps remind ourselves of the elusive yet durable nature of ethnic ties across the centuries. While particular ethnic categories, associations and communities have emerged, flourished and declined, with only a few surviving in some form the many vicissitudes of social, economic and political change, ethnicity and ethnic ties as such have been a recurrent feature of human history since records commenced in the third millennium BC. These ties take many forms. For the most part, they are fluid and mutable, embodied in oral cultures and 'tribal' networks. Often, they become visible simply as cultural and linguistic categories, noted by travellers and ethnographers, but without much in the way of shared memories or myths of common ancestry or solidarity. At other times, they coalesce into definite networks of association and symbolism; and in some of these cases, they become well-documented named communities with a distinctive culture and network of institutions.[20]

   With the introduction of powerful state structures, first under agrarian empires and then in modern states, ethnicity became institutionalised, and even frozen into an 'ethnic mosaic'. That is to say, some ethnic communities found stable niches in the economic and political structures of empires, like the *millets* of the Ottoman empire, which helped, at least partially, to congeal them by assigning them a specific function in society. In the modern period, centralised, bureaucratic states, along with nationalist ideologies, tend to reinforce the role of ethnicity. But they also transform it. While they undermine the status of some *ethnies* and augment that of others, their overall thrust is to politicise ethnicity and create an interplay between dominant and peripheral *ethnies* competing for resources through the institutions of powerful, centralising states. Despite the present trend in some areas to greater unions of states, the cultural and political pluralism that underpins the inter-state order remains intact; and as long as it does so, the tensions between dominant *ethnies* and peripheral ones will continue, and will find expression in the ideals of the self-determination of peoples which nationalism has unleashed.

Notes

1 See Glazer and Moynihan (1964), Introduction; and Glazer and Moynihan (1975),
      Introduction. For the debate about the post-war resurgence of white ethnic minorities, see

Greeley (1974); and for the issue of 'symbolic ethnicity' among third generation immigrants to the United States in the 1970s, see Gans (1979).

2 For these usages, see Liddell and Scott (1869), under *ethnos,* citing *inter alia* Homer: *The Iliad* 13, 354 and Plato: *The Republic* 290C.

3 Liddell and Scott (1869), under *ethnos,* citing Herodotus' *The Histories* I, 101, 125; and Lewis and Short ([1879] 1955), under *natio*. See also Geary (2002), Chapter 2, who argues that ancient historians after Herodotus failed to observe his methodology and value neutrality, and chose to objectify and rank ethnic groups outside the Roman *populus,* rather than capture the fluidity of ethnic experience.

4 For changes in the concept of *natio,* see Hertz (1944) and Zernatto (1944); also Greenfeld (1992), Introduction. Christian usages sharpened the contrast between *'am Israel* and *goy* (a term also used sometimes of Israel) in the Hebrew Bible.

5 For the concept of *ethnie,* see A.D.Smith (1986), Chapter 2. See also the comprehensive analysis in Horowitz (1985), Chapter 2. For this process of 'bureaucratic incorporation', notably in the West, see A.D.Smith (1989).

6 On such an immigrant 'plural' route, see A.D.Smith (1995), Chapter 4. For an illuminating recent analysis of national formation and ethnic reformation in the case of the United States, which emphasises the colonists' cultural homogeneity, see Kaufmann (2002).

7 For homeland communities, see Walker Connor (1994); and *idem* (1986), The impact of homelands upon diasporas', in Sheffer (1986). On the French case, see Suzanne Berger (1977), 'Bretons and Jacobins: reflections on French regional ethnicity', in Esman (1977), and Brubaker (1992), especially Chapter 7. On British and English nationalism, see Colley (1992) and Clark (2000).

8 See Tilly (1975), Introduction; Gellner (1983); Giddens (1985); Hobsbawm (1990); Breuilly (1993); and Mann (1995). For a critique of such 'modernist' approaches, see A.D.Smith (1998).

9 See Hastings (1997, 1999). On ethnic underpinnings of modern nations, see Hutchinson (2000). On war and ethnicity, see A.D.Smith (1981b).

10 On these different kinds of *ethnie,* and the routes of nation-formation, see A.D. Smith (1986: Chapter 4; 1989). For a processual analysis of nation-formation, see Uzelac (2002).

11 Eastern European nation-formation is discussed in Sugar and Lederer (1969), and Sugar (1980). For the route of vernacular mobilisation, see A.D.Smith (1989).

12 On Tsarist Russia and its minorities, see Kappeler (2001). On ideas of Japanese ethnic homogeneity in the Meiji and later periods, see Oguma (2002). For the Young Turk ideology, see Berkes (1964) Chapters 11–14 and Poulton (1997) Chapter 3.

13 For ideas of ancestral relatedness, see Connor (1994), especially Chapter 8. For the importance of myths, symbols and codes, see Armstrong (1982), and for a brief outline of an 'ethno-symbolic' approach, see A.D.Smith (1999), Introduction.

14 This process has been fully analysed by Horowitz (1985); see also the essays in Brass (1985).

15 There is a large literature on Western 'autonomist' movements; see especially Esman (1977), A.D.Smith (1981a), and Orridge (1982). For the Yugoslav debacle, see Ramet (1996).

16 The academic version of the grievances of peripheral *ethnies,* the 'internal colonialism' model of Hechter and others, derived via the *dependistas* from the case of Black exclusion in the United States, is presented in the essays in Stone (1979).

17 On centralism and ethnicity in France, see Coulon (1978) and Brubaker (1992). For 'civic' nationalism, see especially Breton (1988) and Miller (1995); for a critique, see Yack (1999).

18 On these conflicts, see Horowitz (1985). For the range of attempted solutions, see McGarry and O'Leary (1993).

19 On this literature, see M.Guibernau: 'Globalisation and the nation-state', in Guibernau and Hutchinson (2001). See also the essays in Featherstone (1990), and A.D.Smith (1995), Chapter 1.

20 On both the polyethnicity of empires rooted in labour needs, and the failed nationalist attempt to homogenise populations, see McNeill (1986).

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